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(Abstract) 
THE EXPLORER, THE UNITED STATES GOVER.~!IENT 
AND THE APPROACHES TO SANTA FE: A STUDY OF AMERICAN 
POLICY RELATIVE TO THE SPANISH SOUTID'lEST, 1800 - 1819 
Lee Francis Brown Loyola University, Chicago 
Historical literature on the Spanish Southwest has 
made much of the lure which this vast region has held for 
Americans. It has been a lure of trade, of wealth, of ad-
venture and of expansion. Few single places in the South-
west could rival the particular attraction of Santa Fe, 
variously referred to as the "gate way" to the rich mines of 
Mexico, and as a "port of call" on the western edge of the 
Great Plains. To some historians the objective of trade 
with Santa Fe can explain in large measure the whole Mani-
fest Destiny movement. The fact that seventeenth and 
eighteenth century geographic concepts placed this village 
close to the Mississippi and Missouri River systems height-
ened American interest as well as Spanish fear of approaching 
foreigners. 
The importance of the approaches to Santa Fe for in-
dividual Americans in the early nineteenth century cannot be 
' denied and· should not be neglected. When one examines the in-
terests of the United States Government, however, it becomes 
I 
quite obvious that the statesmen of this nation were not as 
Vitally interested in bringing the Santa Fe region into the 
fold of the American system. In fact, official America, at 
times, discouraged and forbade its citizens to move toward 
the Rocky Mountains. Such a fact becomes all the more inter-
esting when one notes that Thomas Jefferson, is considered 
this nation's first "expansionist" President. 
Jefferson has been regarded often by historians as 
western-minded; the evaluation has merit. His moves towards 
securing the Mississippi Valley and the Territory of Orleans 
following the Purchase attest to his western-mindedness. For 
regions much farther west, however, Jefferson seemed less vi-
tally concerned to encourage American expansion or settlement. 
His reasoning is examined in this study. He spoke with de-
termination when addressing the Spanish about America's right 
to land as far west as the Rio Grande, but a closer examina-
tion of his actions would reveal a Chief Executive perhaps 
more a clever diplomat playing at brinkmanship rather than an 
active expansionist. James Madison was even less vitally in-
terested in the approaches to Santa Fe. Therefore, an at-
tempt is made to show that the active and positive expansion-
ist programs of the United States Government, beginning with 
the military expeditions of 1819, were not a part of the pol-
icy or plans of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. 
Another aspect of American interest in the Southwest 
which bears heavily on this study is an evaluation of the 
cartographic development and the role it played in determining 
outstanding issues. Accordingly the purpose of this study is 
two-fold: to examine the policy of the U.S. Government rela-
tive to the Spanish Southwest during the period 1800-1819 and 
to evaluate the extent to which cartography shaped America's 
interest and attitudes towards this region. 
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PREFACE 
The purpose of this study is twofold: to examine the 
policy of the United States Government relative to the Spanish 
Southwest during the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison, and to evaluate the extent to which cartography 
shaped America's interest and attitudes towards this region. 
The specific area of the Spanish Southwest which is of vital 
concern to this study is the Lower Rocky Mountain region, or 
what may best be termed, the ap9roaches to Santa Fe. American 
interest in other areas of the Southwest such as California 
and the Texas-Louisiana border area was motivated by a different 
set of forces and is only of secondary concern here. 
Historical literature on the Spanish Southwest has made 
much of the lure which this vast region has held for Americans. 
It has been a lure of trade, of wealth, of adventure and of 
expansion. Few single places in the Southwest could rival the 
attraction of Santa Fe. ,This small village, variously referred 
to as the "gateway" to the rich mines of Mexico, and as a "port 
of call" on the western edge of the Great Plains, has been the 
destination of many an American trader and trapper. To some 
iii 
historians the objective of trade with Santa Fe can explain 
in large measure the whole Manifest Destiny movement. 
iv 
The frontier town of Santa Fe, located well to the north 
and west of the more settled areas of New Spain, was also highly 
valued by the Spanish. They considered it necessary to pro-
tect their silver mining areas of northern Mexico from foreign 
encroachment. The fact that seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
tury geographic concepts placed this village close to the 
Mississippi and Missouri river systems heightened Spanish 
alertness to anyone approaching Santa Fe. American and Spaniard 
alike obtained his concepts of the approaches to Santa Fe largely 
from the same cartographic sources, sources steeped in geogra-
phic myth and legend. As the nineteenth century dawned states-
men of the United States and Spain were basing their claims and 
making policy supported by maps generously filled with errors. 
The cartographer etched-in details for the Southwest that often 
bore little resemblance to what actually existed. 
The importance of the approaches to Santa Fe for indivi-
dual Americans in the early nineteenth century cannot be denied, 
and should not be neglected. The picture seems quite different, 
however, when one examines the interest of official America --
the United States Government. The Executive leadership of this 
country in the hands of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison did 
not evidence an interest or a desire to bring the Santa Fe 
region into the fold of the American system equal to that of 
individual traders, trappers and adventurers. 
v 
Of the two Presidents examined in this study, Jefferson 
has been regarded by historians as the more western-minded, 
a man of expansion. The evaluation has merit. His desire to 
coordinate scientific and geographical knowledge for use in 
planning domestic and diplomatic programs has been the subject 
of considerable research. His moves towards securing the 
Mississippi Valley and the Territory of Orleans following the 
Purchase attest to his western-mindedness. For regions much 
farther west, however, Jefferson seemed less vitally concerned 
to encourage American settlement. His reasons are examined in 
. this study. James Madison was even less vitally interested in 
the approaches to Santa Fe. An attempt will be made to show 
that the active and positive expansionist programs of the 
United States Government, beginning with the military expeditions 
of 1819, were not a part of the policy or plans of Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison. 
Very special thanks are due Dr. Robert w. McCluggage 
who suggested the research into the subject of this study. His 
interest in the topic, his patience and expert guidance, have 
been invaluable. A special note of gratitude must be given to 
the late Dr. Joseph w. Schmitz, S.M., without whose 
vi 
encouragement and faith in the writer this dissertation would 
never have become a reality. 
' 
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CHAPTER I 
THE SPANISH SOUTHWEST BEFORE 1800 
Although organized and directed activity by the United 
States Government in the Southwest began with the advent of the 
nineteenth century, that vast region had drawn the attention 
and interests of individual Americans for many years. This 
was only a natural continuation of the western interests ex-
emplified by the English settlers from the early Colonial days 
to the War of Independence. If one accepts the premise that 
·exploration in colonial times was an integral part of Indian 
trade, the whole westward advance of the English as well as the 
French during their periods of colonization orr-the North Ameri-
can continent can be readily understood. 1 Even if the commer-
cial or economic thesis is denied as a sole motive for explo-
ration; if it is placed alongside other motives such as imperial 
rivalry, scientific advancement, or simple adventure, a study 
' 
1 Abraham P. Nasatir (ed.), Before Lewis and Clark: 
Documents Illustrating the History of the Missouri, 1785-1804 
(2 vols.; St. Louis: St. Louis Historical Documents Foundation, 
1952), I, vii. 
1 
2 
of the Southwest clearly indicates that all three major powers 
--France, England and America--cast longing eyes towards what 
Spain claimed as her own, west of the Mississippi River. 
The story of Spain's conquest, exploration and settle-
ment of the Southwest (the northern provinces of ~~e Viceroyalty 
of New Spain) has been told numerous times. The names of 
Coronado, Onate, Kine, Garces, and Escalante alone reflect 
many chapters of Borderland history familiar to students of the 
Southwest. While the accounts of the numerous colonization 
efforts by Spain in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries are not pertinent here, it is important to consider 
briefly that period of Spanish occupation when foreign intruders 
first began to appear at the gates of Santa Fe, capital of the 
northern province of New Spain. Not only was Santa Fe the 
provincial capital, it was the key frontier outpost from which 
Spanish military and commerical expeditions set forth to protect 
and expand the rights of His Catholic Majesty in the Southwest. 
Situated near the valley of the Upper Rio Grande, Santa 
Fe had come along an arduous road since its beginnings in the 
' first decade of the seventeenth century. 2 In 1680 the famous 
2Hiram Martin Chittenden, The American Fur Trade of the 
Far West (2 vols.; New York: The Press of the Pioneers, Inc., 
1935), II, 484. France v. Scholes, "The Supply Service of the 
3 
Pueblo Revolt had forced the Spaniards to abandon the settle-
ment and retreat to El Paso. Reoccupation took place by way 
of a military invasion in the 1690's, and from that time on 
the Spaniards preserved a durable, though at times, precarious 
control. The annals of New Mexican history are resplendent with 
accounts of daring individuals of the cross and of the sword 
• 
who extended the control of Spain over vast western territory. 
Likewise these men added to the world's knowledge of the land, 
knowledge which Spain fought to keep within the confines of 
her own court, but which eventually helped traders and explorers 
of non-Spanish origin as well. 
Somewhere to the east of the Spanish settlements in New 
Mexico were the French. Just where Spanish control ended and 
the French flag could be securely planted remained vague for 
several centuries. Spain and France were not explicit as to 
the boundaries separating their respective domains, and this 
situation caused innumerable difficulties, not only for the 
two respective powers, but the Americans as well at a later 
' New Mexico.Missions in the Seventeenth Century," New Mexico 
Historical Review, V (January, 1930), 93. A full study of the 
founding and colonization of New Mexico can be found in Charles 
W. Hackett (ed.), Historical Documents Relating to New Mexico, 
Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1775. Collected by 
F. A. and Fanny R. Bandelier (3 vols.; Washington: Carnegie 
Institution, 1937). 
EARLY FRENCH AND SPANISH EXPLORATION IN THE SOUTHWEST 4 
Source: Hawgood, John A. America's Western Frontiers. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967, pp. 19, 31. 
--
5 
date. From the latter part of the seventeenth century until 
1762, the area generally referred to as the Mississippi Valley 
was under French control. During that period the French, be 
they voyageur, trader or explorer, had penetrated most of the 
country watered by the Mississippi and Missouri rivers. This 
had been done much to the chagrin of the Spanish. Frenchmen 
had set foot on most of the territory between the Mississippi 
and the vague border separating French Louisiana from the 
3 Provincias Internas. 
As early as 1703 some French traders, advancing south 
and west from their bases in Illinois, entered the present 
state of Oklahoma on a general line towards New Mexico. Other 
Frenchmen were approaching the same area from the Lower 
Louisiana settlements by way of the Red and Arkansas rivers. 
All of these traders and trappers, however, found their going 
difficult due to the presence of certain hostile Indian tribes. 
The Apaches along the Red River, and the Comanches along the 
Arkansas and Platte rivers posed formidable obstacles. The 
Spanish took advantage of any and all animosities between the 
' 
3Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark ••• , I, 55, 12. 
When discussing the western boundary of the Louisiana Purchase 
and the negotiations relative to the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819, 
it will be seen that Spain and France, not being explicit, as 
to the boundary separating their respective domains, caused 
unending trouble for American statesmen. 
6 
red man and the foreigners: any tribe which would help prevent 
the advancement of the intruder could be assured of gifts and 
supplies from the Spaniards. 4 Such a procedure did not always 
prove successful. 
In spite of the efforts to keep New Mexico and the 
surrounding territory the exclusive domain of the King of Spain, 
in the year 1739 a party of Frenchmen led by the Mallet broth-
ers reached Santa Fe. Pierre and Paul Mallet, with a party of 
eight or nine, arrived in the New Mexican capital on July 22, 
1739. They succeeded in getting through the Comanche barrier, 
remained for about nine months and then returned. 5 These sons 
of France brought back to the Illinois region news that the 
Spaniards in Santa Fe would welcome commerce. 6 It is inter-
esting to note that regardless of what the official policy of 
the Spanish Crown was relative to trade in the colonies, non-
Spanish traders who reached Santa Fe did not always find 
4 Alfred B. Thomas, "Spanish Expeditions Into Colorado," 
The Colorado Magazine, No. 7, I, (November, 1924), 202. Alfred 
B. Thomas, "Spanish Exploration of Oklahoma," Chronicles of 
Oklahoma, VI, (June, 192~), 188-213. 
5Thomas, "Spanish Expeditions Into Colorado," p. 202. 
Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark ••• , p. 28. 
7 
themselves unwelcome. The strict regulations concerning the 
entry of goods into New Spain set down by the Casa de 
Contratacion was doubtless a major factor here. Goods were 
scarce on the frontier, and when brought in through legal 
channels prices were exorbitant. It is little wonder that the 
inhabitants of Santa Fe welcomed contraband trade. 
Thus in spite of the distances which separated the 
Spanish northern frontier from French Louisiana, and the 
dangers involved, French traders were very much attracted to-
ward contraband trade with New Mexico, as well as along the 
Louisiana-Texas border. The extensive French activity within 
the latter region is an episode in American history well 
7 investigated by others. It is believed that other Frenchmen 
found their way into the New Mexico region also, but the evi-
dence is scarce. Certainly the founding of St. Louis brought 
to the Mississippi Valley numbers of men longing to penetrate 
the Spanish Borderlands. The Mallet expedition had proved the 
Missouri-Platte-Arkansas route a more easily traveled highway 
than the Red River approach, where the Spanish with their 
' 
Indian allies were more successful in blocking the path of 
7 The many works of Herbert E. Bolton and Issac J. 
Cox are of great benefit in relation to this subject. 
8 intruders. 
In view of the fact that throughout this study much 
will be made of the role geographical information played in 
8 
the formulation of American policy relative to the Southwest, 
it should be emphasized that charts and maps from French 
sources were most important. Since the French did, in fact, 
explore much of the land also claimed by Spain, and French 
cartographers were rather prolific in recording the infer-
rnation furnished by their fellow countrymen, a brief survey 
of French cartography in the Southwest is in order. Actually, 
French cartographers were at work using information acquired 
from other explorers long before the French were active in 
the Mississippi Valley and the Southwest. 
The list of French cartographers is long, but one of 
the first whose work played a key role in mapping the South-
west was the celebrated Jean Baptiste Louis Franquelin. Of 
his several maps, the one published in 1688 is of prime 
importance. Franquelin indicated a river of great extent 
corning in from the west above the mouth of the Ohio, after 
' 
8 Issac J. Cox, "Opening of the Santa Fe Trail," 
Missouri Historical Review, XXV (1931), 30. Nasatir, Before 
Lewis and Clark. • • , I, 27-28. 
pt 
--
] "9 flowing through the "land of Les Panimaha [Pawnees • 
river is named "La Grande Riviere des Missourites, ou 
The 
. 'tt' ,,10 Emissouri is. In actual fact the river so named is the 
Platte. It seems that the Franquelin map with this major 
9 
geographical error, although it remained in manuscript form, 
became known to numerous map makers in subsequent years; his 
representation of the Missouri Valley held sway with cartog-
raphers for a long period. 
The outstanding work in the field of cartography for 
the eighteenth century was by the French and has been extolled 
by Carl I. Wheat in his monumental study Mapping the Trans-
mississippi West. He considers the efforts of the Frenchman 
Guillaume Delisle as "towering landmarks along the path of 
11 Western cartographic development." Considering that the 
seventeenth century was relatively barren of cartographic 
progress with respect to the Southwest, his maps became even 
more important. The general map maker of the day simply 
9
carl I. Wheat, The Spanish Entrada to the Louisiana 
Purchase, Vol. I of Mapping the Transmississippi West (5 vols.; 
San Francisco: The Institute of Historical Cartography, 1957-
1963), 51. 
lOibid. 
11 b'd L.!_., p. 59. 
10 
exercised his imagination, and his "lack of knowledge, if 
fairly reflected, would have left such vast blank areas on 
. . . " th ld h b f l' . t 12 maps ey wou ave een o 1ttle use or 1nteres . 
On the Delisle map of 1701, the Missouri River is 
indicated in a form relative to its importance. Farther to 
the west, just north and east of the province o.f New Mexico 
there is written, "par icy [sic] Commerce avec !es Espagnols;" 
this gives the impr~ssion that French traders and trappers had 
at this very early date, penetrated the Spanish preserve. 13 
Delisle's most celebrated map, and the one which was copied 
and reprinted throughout the century, was his Carte de la 
Louisiane et du Mississippi, published in 1718. On this map 
the Rio Grande is indicated as rising far in the north, just 
south of what Delisle labels the Missouri River. Legends 
give evidence that the Spanish had been fording the river 
to trade with the Indians, possibly for "yellow iron 11 • 14 
Since it is clear the Spaniards were fording the Platte and 
not the Missouri a repetition of Franquelin's idea of the 
Missouri-Platte basin is evident. 
' 
12
rbid. I pp. 34-35. 
13
rbid., p. 56. 
14 b'd !_2;_., pp. 66-67. 
F 
--
11 
A good summary, both descriptive and informative, of 
Louisiana as well as the lands farther west, is the Histoire 
de la Louisiane by Le Page du Pratz published in Paris in 
1758. These small volumes contain a map which is rather 
accurate for lower Louisiana, but as the cartographer traced 
his designs farther west, his accuracy declined. 15 The 
Missouri River is drawn in a fashion giving the appearance 
that its headwaters were near the sources of the Rio Grande. 
Taking such indications as being accurate, it is little wonder 
that French traders, as well as their Spanish, English and 
American counterparts, saw in the Missouri-Platte system a 
direct highway connecting Illinois with New Mexico. Reference 
to a modern and accurate map of the region in question would 
lead one to suspect that the South Platte was the stream which 
probably "became" the Missouri for these early French cartog-
raphers. An accurate delineation of the South Platte, like 
that of the Red River of Texas, would have to wait until the 
nineteenth century. 
With the end of the French and Indian War the Spanish 
' borderlands.were suddenly thrust eastward to the Mississippi. 
lS d . . d 1 L . . ( 1 Le Page u Pratz, H1sto1re e a ou1s1ane 3 vo s.; 
Paris: 1758). Newberry Library in Chicago has a copy of this 
work in their rare book collection. See also Nasatir, Before 
Lewis and Clark ••• , I, 56. 
p 
II. SECTION OF DELISLE MAP OF 1718 
Source: Paullin, Charles O., and Wright, John K. Atlas of 
the Historical Geoqraphy of the United States. Washington: 
Carnegie Institutions and American Geographical Society of New 
York, 1932, Plate 24. 
12 
p 
13 
In order to keep Louisiana out of British hands, France, in 
a treaty previous to and separate from the Treaty of Paris 
of 1763, ceded Louisiana to Spain. In that treaty the granting 
words are: 
His Most Christian Majesty cedes in entire 
possession, purely and simply, without ex-
ception, to his Catholic Majesty and his 
successors in perpetuity, all the country 
known under the name of Louisiana, as well 
as New Orleans and the island in which that 
place stands.16 
The French threat to Santa Fe thus came to an end, 
although rumors of French traders among the Indians continued 
to filter into Santa Fe. The main attention of the officials 
in Spanish Louisiana was now focused on the upper reaches of 
the Mississippi and Missouri rivers where the British were 
becoming more of a threat. Encroachment from Canada into 
Spanish Illinois and Louisiana was not a new problem for 
Spain, but the latter part of the eighteenth century saw re-
newed activity on the part of the British to spread their 
economic interest, operating from such towns along the 
17 Mississippi as Natchez. Although the British did give the 
' 
16s' h . . d 1nger Hermann, T e Lou1s1ana Purchase an Our 
Title West of the Rocky Mountains, with a Review of Annexation 
by the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1898) I P• 17. 
17Noel M. Loomis and Abraham P. Nasatir, Pedro Vial 
and The Roads to Santa Fe (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
p 
--
14 
Spanish just cause for alarm and did encroach upon the latter's 
domain, and though it was believed they might one day seek out 
Santa Fe as "compensation of their southern colonies, if they 
escaped from them," the threat of the British did not im-
mediately concern the Lower Rocky Mountain region. 18 
The transfer of Louisiana to Spain necessitated some 
hard thinking about the future administration of New Spain, 
especially the frontier region. Political organization in 
northern New Spain during the eighteenth century was closely 
linked to frontier defense, military organization, and boundary 
expansion. Indians had been taking advantage of the feeble 
presidia! garrisons which could strike no effective retal-
iatory blows. To the Indian problems came added threats of 
encroachment upon Spanish territory, as indicated above, by 
European rivals such as England and France. The humiliating 
defeat which Spain suffered at the hands of the English in 
the Seven Years' War prompted the energetic Charles III 
(1759-1788) to take a closer look to the unsettled conditions 
in his northern borderlands and embark upon a program of re-
' organizing and strengthening this region. 
Press, 1967), p. 93. A. P. Nasatir has written numerous articles 
on the Anglo-Spanish frontier in addition to his lengthy intro-
duction to the collection of documents in his Before Lewis and 
Clark • 
18Loomis, Pedro Vial ••• , p. 98. 
p 
-
15 
The last detailed report of the defense system on the 
frontier had been made around 1730, and since that time no 
comprehensive inspection had been ordered by the government. 
The result was an expected decrease in efficiency. Accordingly, 
· · 1765, the king commissioned the Marques de Rubi "to report 
. in 
on the status of each presidia, its location, condition of its 
garrison, ••• and to make suitable recommendations. 1119 The 
Marques de Rubi arrived in Mexico in early 1766 and immediately 
set out to complete his review of Spanish frontier defense 
from Texas to California. The report of Rubi was to have far-
reaching consequences for the future development of the northern 
frontier. He was highly critical of existing conditions, 
singling out presidia! commanders and accusing them of contri-
buting largely to the poor conditions. He found the presidios 
to be haphazardly scattered across the frontier with no thought 
to a co-ordinated defense program, and among his recommendatios 
was a proposal to reduce the northern outposts to fifteen along 
a line drawn from the coast of the Gulf of California to the 
mouth of the Guadalupe River in Texas, following the thirtieth 
parallel. ' Santa Fe was thus being left well outside the defense 
cordon as such; Rubi felt the cost of including the town would 
19 Marc Simmons, Spanish Government in New Mexico 
(Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1968), p. 4. 
p 
-
16 
h 'b' . 20 be pro i itive. He obviously could not leave the town with 
no protection so the presidia at Santa Fe was to remain, but 
more than ever it would be a lone bastion far to the north 
of other points of military strength. 
It had been indicated that Spanish officials on the 
frontier were continually trying to secure the area against 
hostile Indians. Pacification of the Indian was a major 
objective, and the governors in the remote town of Santa Fe 
did not have an easy time of it. It seems that they seldom 
had enough soldiers at their command. Help from Chihuahua 
ft 1 . . d h t . . 21 was o en s ow in coming, an t e erritory was immense. 
While the Marques de Rubi was inspecting the military 
organization of the frontier provinces, Charles III dispatched 
a Visitador General to New Spain with authority to make major 
reforms in administrative and financial affairs. Jose de 
Galvez, the man appointed by the king, came to New Spain and 
by 1776 major political changes had been implemented. The 
entire northern frontier of New Spain was reorganized into 
the Provincias Internas. Long recognizing that Mexfco City 
' 
20 
. d . 1 64 . s . h Loomis, Pero Via .•• , p. • Simmons, panis 
Government in New Mexico, pp. 4-8. A more detailed discussion 
on this point can be found in Alfred B. Thomas, Teodoro de 
Croix (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941). 
21 . d . 16 Loomis, Pero Vial ••• , p. • 
p 
.. 
17 
could not properly handle the problems of areas so remote, 
and due to the multitude of duties and responsibilities of 
the viceroy, sweeping reforms were initiated. New Mexico was 
included in the western section of the Provincias Internas. 
There was to be a governor in Santa Fe, but he was now directly 
under the authority of the Comrnandante-General located in 
'h h 22 Chi ua ua. 
It has been pointed out by one historian of the West 
that most American explorers of the nineteenth century had 
to rediscover the Southwest, as the details of Spanish explo-
23 
ration had been all but forgotten. As indicated earlier, 
one of the reasons for this was the policy of the Spanish 
government to keep all geographical knowledge of its 
territories from the public eye. Since the early American 
explorers did use maps and charts based in large measure on 
what cartographers could ultimately extract from Spanish 
sources as well as from French cartographers, a brief survey 
22Philip Coolidge Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands: 
The Adams-Qnis Treaty o~ 1819 (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1939), pp. 30, 43-44. For a more developed study 
of the work of Jose de Galvez see Herbert I. Priestly, Jose de 
Galvez (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1916) 
23w·11· l . d E . h l. iam H. Goetzmann, Exp oration an mpire: Te 
Explorer and the Scientist in the Winning of the American West 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 39 • 
p 
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of Spanish exploration and mapping of the Provincias Internas 
th . 1 f th . . d 2 4 before .e arriva o e Americans would be in or er. 
Only a few of the many Spanish expeditions which set 
out from Santa Fe are pertinent to future American interest 
and advancement. Foremost among these efforts was the famous 
Dominguez-Escalante expedition of 1776. For a number of years 
previous to this date New Mexican traders had traveled from 
Santa Fe into present day Colorado and Oklahoma as well as 
into the Southern Rockies. Subsequent Spanish traders deepened 
the trail, not only to the north and east, but also the north-
west. As tales of profit and adventure found their way to the 
adobe capital more traders set out. The particulars of most 
of these treks are unknown. The Spanish government had 
definite restrictions on trade, and most of the individual 
trappers found it better to speak little of their work when 
the ears of officials might be too keen. Most often details 
25 
as to their respective areas of operation remained a secret. 
24 h . h' . k 1 d 't d b Carl I. w eat in is maJor wor a rea y ci e a ove 
has an extensive section,on early Spanish maps and cartog-
raphers. 
25Joseph J. Hill, "Spanish and Mexican Exploration 
and Trade Northwest from New Mexico Into the Great Basin, 1765-
1853," Utah Historical Quarterly, III, No. 1 (January, 1930), 4. 
Herbert E. Bolton, "Pageant in the Wilderness: The Story of 
The Escalante Expedition to the Interior Basin, 1776." Utah 
Historical Quarterly, XVIII (1950), 6-7. David J. Weber, 
"Spanish Fur Trade from New Mexico, 1540-1821," The Americas, 
XXIV (1967), 126-27. 
p 
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At any rate by 1776, most of the region east of the Colorado 
River and as far north as the Gunnison was well known to 
Spaniards trading out of New Mexico. Several reasons can 
be cited for continued Spanish interest in this region. 
continued reports of Frenchmen in the Pawnee country (present 
day Kansas and Nebraska) , and rumored mines gave a certain 
impetus to trader and government official alike. Foremost 
among the reasons for Spanish forays, however, was the 
26 
continued Indian menace. 
The road westward to the Pacific was blocked by 
Indian resistance, namely the Hopi and Apaches. Because of 
the advance of the Russians down the California coast, the 
Spanish had colonized Alta California. This had largely 
been done by a water approach around the peninsula of Baja 
California. Officials felt, however, that an overland route 
should and must be found, hence the organization of an 
expedition under the leadership of two Franciscan Friars--
Francisco Athanasio Dominguez and Silvestro Velez de 
27 Escalante. The aim of the expedition was two fold: to 
' 
open communication between Santa Fe and Monterrey, California 
26 Thomas, "Spanish Expeditions into Colorado," p. 289. 
27 Bolton, "Pageant in the Wilderness," p. 1 • 
p 
b 
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by way of the land of the Yutes; and, as far as the two 
Franciscans were concerned, to find an overland route to the 
missions of California. The expedition was sponsored by the 
Governor of New Mexico and was under the military command of 
28 Don Bernardo Mier y Pacheco. 
The route of the expedition took the party into 
territory which had apparently never before been explored by 
white men -- deep into the Rockies to the White and Green 
rivers and into the Great Basin. It has been called "the 
most fantastic exploring venture of all those the Spanish 
conducted in the Southwest." 29 
It was the presence of Mier y Pacheco, a retired 
captain and resident of Santa Fe, that makes the expedition 
pertinent to this study. Experienced at mapping other 
portions of the frontier of northern Mexico, the Spanish 
gentleman charted the entire region traversed by the Escalante 
party. It was the first attempt by any European to map the 
28Ibid., p. 9. ~erbert s. Auerbach, "Father 
Escalante's Route," Utah Historical Quarterly, IX (1941), 73. 
Hill, "Spanish and Mexican Exploration ••• ,"pp. 7-13. 
29 Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire . . . ' p. 69. 
p 
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d Ri. B . 30 colora o ver asin. Unlike other early cartographers he 
did not have the work of others to guide him; his map was 
based solely upon notes and observations made by him on the 
journey. A quadrant was used for determining latitude, but 
it seems that westerly and easterly positions were calculated 
by distances traveled and compass observations. 31 Carl I. 
Wheat believes that Mier y Pacheco scored many "firsts" on 
his great map, especially in his charting of the rivers and 
mountains near the Great B~sin •32 William Goetzmann refers 
30
aolton, "Pageant in the Wilderness ••• ," p. 12. 
Mier y Pacheco arrived in America in 1743, and went to El 
Riso as a soldier; he took part in campaigns against the 
Apaches. In 1745 he went east from El Paso with Captain 
Ruben de Solf s to map the banks of the Rio Grande and Conchas 
rivers. The young soldier arrived in Santa Fe' in 1754, where 
he served as alcalde and captain of the frontiers of Galisteo 
and Pecos. He subsequently made campaigns against the Co-
manches on the eastern border of New Mexico and mapped the 
regions covered in his forays. A map which Mier y Pacheco 
drew in 1760 was sent to the king, who turned it over to 
the engineer accompanying the Marques de Rubf to America in 
1766. 
31J. Cecil Alter, "Father Escalante's Map," Utah 
Historical Quarterly, IX (1941), 64-67. 
32Wheat, The Spadish Entrada ••• , I, 115-16. No 
map drawn prior to Escalante's tour de force offered even a 
fraction of the broad and remarkably accurate coverage the 
Mier y Pachecho map did. The river on which Mier placed the 
words "puede ser el Misuri" is in reality the south fork of 
the Platte, but this notation does indicate that the Spaniards 
had some idea that the Missouri rose from what he termed the 
spine or backbone of North America, not far n'' ,. th of the 
Arkansas River • 
, 
.... 
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to the map as a "rather fanciful version of the country •• 
1133 Nevertheless this map became the basis of all maps of 
the New Mexican region for many years including the more 
famous map by Alexander von Humboldt which appeared in 1811. 
Authorities seem to feel that von Humboldt must have had 
access to the Mier map even though it remained unpublished for 
34 
over a century. Pike's map of 1810 and William Clark's 
maps of 1810-1814 also give evidence that the Spaniards con-
cepts had not been forgotten. Specific references to cartog-
raphic errors and geographic misconceptions will be indicated 
as they become relevant. It would be of interest to note here, 
however, that no mention is made in the Escalante journal, nor 
is there any indication on the accompanying map of English, 
French, or American settlements. No trappers, traders or 
explorers of these nations were apparently roaming that part 
of the Spanish Southwest. As observant as the members of the 
expedition were in relation to other matters, the absence of 
such references leads one to conclude that non-Spanish 
intruders were not yet active northwest of Santa Fe as they 
' 
33 Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire • . . , p. 69. 
34Wheat, The Spanish Entrada ••• , p. 96. The use of 
Mier's material by Alexander von Humboldt left a stamp on the 
representation of the West that was not erased until the time 
of Fremont • 
were to the east of that Spanish outpost. 
commanches on the warpath caused another expedition 
to be sent north in 1779. The Governor of New Mexico, Juan 
Bautista de Anza, led the party. While attempting to quell 
the Indian disturbance he recorded some items which throw 
more light on geographical information for the period. 35 
concerning the Rio Grande he noted, 
This river, as is known, empties into the 
North Sea [Gulf of Mexico] and the Bay of 
Espiritu Santo. It has its source fifteen 
leagues in the Sierra de la Grulla .•.. 
The Yuta nation accompanying me, who re-
side at the same source •.• tell me it 
proceeds from the interior of a great 
swamp, which is formed ••• by the con-
stant melting of the snow on some mountain 
peaks that are very near it.36 
His small but important map also indicated the head-
waters of the Canadian and Arkansas rivers under different 
names. Although Anza cannot be credited with the birth of 
the idea, the concept of a central height of land and a 
"great central reservoir of snows and fountains" began early 
23 
35Thomas, "Spanish Expeditions Into Colorado," p. 300. 
Hill, "Spanish and Mexican Exploration ••• ," pp. 14-15. 
Anza led a military force north into the San Luis Valley and 
east over the mountains. The purpose was to punish some 
Commanches who, under their leader, Cuerno Verde (Greenhorn), 
had been murdering Spanish settlers. 
36Ibid.,p. 14. 
b 
37 
and remained in vogue well into the nineteenth century. 
Even when cartography became more perfected, old myths 
continued to hold their own. This situation was aptly 
described by one writer when he asked, "Why is it that the 
mind of man is so constituted that when alternatives are 
24 
presented he will almost always choose the one that is most 
incorrect? 1138 
Thus far emphasis has been placed on Spanish activity 
radiating from Santa Fe to points largely within the western 
Provincias Internas. Such activity was natural since all 
official trade and communication with that frontier capital 
had been carried on from Mexico City through Chihuahua, 
headquarters of the Commandante-General. In other words Santa 
Fe's only official connection with the outside world was along 
what might be termed the Chihuahua Trai1. 39 
37Wheat, The Spanish Entrada ••• , I, 12, 117-119. 
This map now in the Archives of the Indies is a small manu-
script. It delineates the upper Rio Grande Valley to a point 
near 40° north latitude, and east of the mountains bordering 
the valley appears the R. de Mora and the Nacim.to del Rio Roxo 
-- actually the headwaters of the Canadian. The Arkansas and 
Huerfano rivers are also indicated. 
38 Henry R. Wagner, The Cartography of the Northwest 
Coast of America to the Year 1800 (2 vols.; Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1937), I. 75. 
39 . . . Loomis, Pedro Vi.al • • • , p. xvi. 
b 
The situation was abruptly changed in the 1790's 
when one Pedro Vial opened new roads from Santa Fe eastward 
to San Antonio, Natchitoches and St. Louis. The third road 
he opened in the years 1792 and 1793 was to St. Louis, and 
it became the important connection with Santa Fe from the 
Mississippi-Missouri region. It could well be called the 
precursor of the later famous Santa Fe Trai1. 40 It was the 
speed with which Vial made his third trip that made the 
Spanish officials realize Santa Fe was not as far from the 
restless Americans as they would prefer. 
The Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Louisiana, Zenon 
Trudeau, informed the Baron de Carondelet, Governor and 
Intendent of Louisiana, that Vial was certain the journey 
between St. Louis and Santa Fe could be made in twenty-five 
25 
days. It was only delay by hostile Kansas Indians that made 
41 his initial trip somewhat longer. Three years later 
401bid., xv-xvi. Pedro Vial, or Pierre Vial, was a 
native of Lyons, in the southeast part of central France. 
Although it is not too clear it seems that he was on the 
Missouri River before the Revolutionary War. He appears 
actively on the scene in '1786 as an explorer who was directed 
to open a trail from San Antonio to Santa Fe. For about 
twenty years Vial traveled around Santa Fe, San Antonio, 
Natchitoches and St. Louis, quite a feat considering the hostile 
territory he crossed and recrossed. 
41
zenon Trudeau to Baron de Carondelet, St. Louis, 
October 7, 1792, Louis Houck (ed.), The Spanish Regime in 
Missouri (2 vols.; Chicago: R. R. Donnelley and Sons company, 
26 
correspondence between the same two Spanish officials in-
dicated that Vial (according to his own statement) made the 
trip from the New Mexican capital to the Panis towns on the 
Kansas River in eight days. Trudeau further stated that 
traders from St. Louis had made the journey to those same 
42 
villages in about ten days. Bernard de Voto in his work 
The Course of Empire is most skeptical of such statistics. 
Noting that Vial could not have made his journey from Santa 
Fe to St. Louis in less than fifty days, he attributes to 
this man a large responsibility of offering further evidence 
to the Spanish that Santa Fe was most vulnerable to foreign 
. . 43 intrusions. 
1909), I, 351, Loomis, Pedro Vial .•• , p. 90. Zenon 
Trudeau was born in New Orleans in 1748. He was well educated 
and became a lieutenant colonel in the Louisiana Regiment. 
He was appointed lieutenant-governor of the Upper Louisiana 
in 1792, serving until 1799, when he was succeeded by Carlos 
du Hault de Lassus. Ibid., p. 68. The Baron de Carondelet 
was born in 1748 in Flanders and was a colonel in the Spanish 
army and governor of San Salvador when he was appointed to 
succeed Estevan Miro as governor and intendent of the provinces 
of Louisiana and West Florida in 1791. 
42 Trudeau to Car~ndelet, St. Louis, July 4, 1795, 
printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark ••• , I, 329-30. 
43 ( Bernard Devoto, The Course of Empire Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), pp. 360-61. As late as 
1847 the best recorded time from Santa Fe to Independence, Mo. 
(250 miles west of St. Louis) was twenty-five days. This was 
by forced riding, which Vial would have had neither reason nor 
b 
27 
Vial drew two maps of his wanderings that are not only 
documents of interest for the information they contain, but 
also for the fact that they stayed hidden from cartographers 
for so long. His first map dated October 18, 1787, purports 
to show the Mississippi watershed and a portion of the Rio 
Grande with the intervening territory. Of especial interest 
was his charting of the Red River. His calculations are 
fairly accurate for the region in which this river has its 
44 
source. In view of the fact that explorers and cartog-
raphers, European as well as America, confused the sources 
of the Red River with those of the Canadian for the next 
sixty years, it would be interesting to speculate what effect 
accurate information of this area would have had on future 
Spanish-American rivalry. Somewhat of a mystery surrounds 
the 1787 map as to how Vial could have traced the Upper 
Missouri River as he did, indicating the great bend at the 
Mandan villages. How could this unlettered Frenchman at 
equipment and preparation to do. Two months from Independence 
to Santa Fe was good traveling time for a wagon train after 
the trail was well established and all the watering places 
known. Three men on horseback would normally take more time, 
not less. 
44 Wheat, The Spanish Entrada ••. , I, 125-126. 
b 
45 Santa Fe have known of the Mandans? 
It has been noted that pacification of the Indian 
tribes was a major (some say the major) concern of Spanish 
officials in the Western provinces. In the Provincias 
28 
Internas the Spanish Government still largely used the mission 
system plus military expeditions to handle the problem. In 
Louisiana, however, the Spaniards had adopted the French 
policy of sending traders among the various tribes keeping 
the natives friendly through trade and gifts. Although the 
Louisiana story as such does not concern the subject under 
study, mention must be made of the Missouri Company. This 
company and the many men connected with its various enter-
prizes continued to operate when the United States purchased 
the Louisiana Territory in 1803. St. Louis, the headquarters 
for the company under the Spanish, was also the major entrep~t 
for the Americans. Because of its position relative to trade 
and defense St. Louis gained for itself a monopoly of all 
important activity between the Mississippi-Missouri basin and 
the Rocky Mountains. Hiram Chittenden states, "it is doubtful 
' if history ·affords the example of another city which has been 
45 Ibid., pp. 127-128. It was not until 1854 that the 
Red River's course was charted in detail, even though it was 
known after Major Long's exi;edition in 1820 that the Red and 
Canadian were different streams. 
29 
the exclusive mart for so vast an extent of country •• ,,46 
The Missouri Company was a response to British 
competition on the Upper Missouri as well as a defense against 
further Anglo encroachment. Even before official sanction 
was received the merchants of St. Louis led by one Jacques 
clamorgan, organized the Compagnie de Commerce pour la 
oecouverte des Nations du haut de Missouri, May 12, 1794. 47 
The merchants later obtained the right to exclusive trade 
for ten years with the nations on the Missouri River living 
above the Poncas, who were located along the present day 
Nebraska-South Dakota border. Of those men who originally 
took part in the Company's activities, the names of Clamorgan, 
Charles Sanguinet, Laurent Durocher and Regis Loisel seem most 
prominent, and continued to be so when the Americans acquired 
the Louisiana Territory and began to look in earnest towards 
the Pacific. 
The driving force of the Company in its early years 
was Jacques Clamorgan. His personal motives are not always 
clear, though it is certain the chance to get rich helped 
' 
46 h · h . d I 99 C ittenden, Te American Fur Tra e ••• , , • 
47 H. T. Beauregard (trans.), "Journal of Jean Baptiste 
Trudeau Among the Arikara Indians in 1795," Missouri Historical 
Society Collections, IV (1912), 9. 
30 
drive him on. Regardless, he did have the confidence of 
Governor Carondelet, and managed to combine commercial and 
political activities for the betterment of the Spanish Empire. 
In addition to opening trade with the Indians and ousting the 
British from Spanish territory, the Company was to attempt to 
discover a route to the Pacific, joining the Missouri with 
d l 'f . 48 Mexico an Ca 1 ornia. It will be remembered that a common 
belief of the day was that the Missouri River had its source 
a little to the north of the source of the Rio Grande. Such 
an effort as planned by Clamorgan would only help to defend 
"rich" Santa Fe from British and American intruders. 
In the 1790's the Company sent out three important 
expeditions, the first being under the leadership of an 
h 1 t . 49 ex-sc oo master Jean Bap iste Truteau. This expedition 
48A. P. Nasatir, "Jacques Clamorgan: Colonial Pro-
moter of the Northern Border of New Spain," New Mexico 
Historical Review, XVII (April, 1942), 106-07. Of his early 
life little is known; he emerges into history as a merchant 
in the West Indies. As early as 1780 he became associated 
with Thompson and Company of Kingston, Jamaica, probably in 
the slave trade between that island and New Orleans. He was 
back in Spanish Louisiana by 1783, and in the latter part of 
that year, or very early' in 1784, he ascended to Upper 
Louisiana. Clamorgan himself tells us in 1793 that he had 
been a resident of Illinois for more than ten years. Nasa-
tir, Before Lewis and Clark •.. , I, 83. Annie Heloise Abel 
(ed.), Tabeau's Narrative of Loisel's Expedition to the Upper 
Missouri, translated from the French by Rose Abel Wright 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939), p. 19. 
49 Ibid., p. 9. Beauregard, "Journal of Jean Baptiste 
31 
set out for the Mandan villages high on the Missouri River 
at the "great bend" located today in the state of North 
Dakota. Truteau was given ample authority for the regulation 
of trade, and was instructed to obtain information concerning 
the distance to the Rocky Mountains "which were located to the 
f h f h . . ,,50 West o t e Source o t e Missouri. Another order, which 
was curiously struck out by Carondelet, instructed Truteau 
to determine the distance from the Mandan villages to the 
Spanish settlements of New Mexico. 51 In actuality Truteau did 
not ascend the Missouri much above the Arikara villages 
located to the south of the Mandans, but he did manage to 
secure a great deal of valuable geographical information. He 
seems to have learned that the Comanches roamed the banks of 
52 the Platte River and south toward the Arkansas. 
Trudeau ••• ," Truteau was born at Montreal, December 11, 1748. 
From the profession he afterwards adopted, it is to be inferred 
that he received more schooling than was usual in those days. 
He came to St, Louis in 1774, and was the first school master 
of the village. He did not find teaching a lucrative business, 
and when his needs began to be exigent, he replenished his 
finances by a trading trip to the Indians. The spelling of 
the name varies between "Trudeau" and "Truteau." The latter 
spelling is used in this text. 
' 50 . . Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark ••• , I, 87. 
51Ibid. 
52
rbid., p. 91. Beauregard, "Journal of Jean Baptiste 
Trudeau. • • • , " pp. 32-33. 
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The second expedition of the Missouri Company in 
1795, early got into trouble with the Ponca Indians. 53 Later 
in the same year, not being able to find a native Spaniard 
capable for the job, a Scotsman turned Spanish citizen led 
an expedition up the Missouri. James Mackay, accompanied by 
thirty-three men, set out from St. Louis in August. The object 
of the expedition was to "open commerce with those distant and 
unknown Nations in the upper parts of the Missouri and to 
discover all the unknown parts of his Catholic Majesty's 
Dominions • • 54 • as far as the Pacific Ocean." Mackay himself 
was unable to complete ti1e journey, but he sent his assistant, 
John Evans, overland to the Mandans. Mackay's instructions 
to Evans were more imaginative than those of previous Spanish 
explorers and were the prototype for the instructions Thomas 
Jefferson later issued to Lewis and Clark. On January 28, 
1796, Mackay issued his lengthy instructions to Evans. The 
latter was to cross the continent in order to discover a 
passage from the source of the Missouri to the Pacific Ocean. 
He was to keep a daily journal making notations on latitude_ 
' and longitude. Furthermore he was to "take care to mark down 
53Loomis, Pedro Vial 
• • • I p. 107. 
54 
· f L ' d Cl k I 97 Nasatir~ Be ore ewis an ar ••. , , • 
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[his] route and distance each day. 1155 
Claiming all the land he traversed for King Charles 
III of Spain, Evans set out but got no farther than the 
Mandan villages. Mackay did keep a journal and submitted it 
to authorities in Louisiana. This journal was later sent to 
the mother country, and in light of what has been mentioned 
relative to geographical concepts and American interest in 
the Southwest, it would be advantageous to quote from the 
letter accompanying the journal. 
The relation of Mackay confirms the previ-
ous information of the introduction of the 
English from Canada into the domains of the 
King, both among the Mandan tribe who are 
located on the south shore of the Missouri 
River ••• and on the Chato River [South 
Platte] which flows into New Mexico, to the 
point where they have erected a blockhouse, 
in order to assure their clandestine trade 
with our Indian tribes, and perhaps even, 
with the natives of Santa Fe. The letter 
written to me by the Commandant of the Post 
of Natchitoches, ..• agrees with the re-
lation of Mackay. In respect to the fact 
that, notwithstanding that the said letter 
attributes to the Americans the construc-
tion of the blockhouse above mentioned, it 
is a fact that the latter have not allowed 
themselves to be seen as yet on the Missouri 
and its neighborhood.56 
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY. 
55A. p. Nasatir I "John Evans I Explorer and Surveyor," 
Missouri Historical Review, XXV (1931), 228-29. 
56
aaron de Carondelet to Prince of Peace, June 3, 1796, 
. Printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark •.• , I, 354-55 • 
.......____ 
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The Spanish from New Mexico had explored northwest 
and northeast from Santa Fe, and had coursed the Missouri 
from St. Louis at least as far as the Mandans, but by the 
end of the eighteenth century most of Louisiana north of the 
Red River was still a vast unknown and uncharted haunt for 
Indians and buffaloes. The few clusters of settlements, such 
as St. Louis, and Natchez, clung to the banks of the 
Mississippi. Except for an occasional river settlement, the 
character of Upper Louisiana to the Rocky Mountains had 
changed little since the first French and Spanish explorers 
prodded their ways during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. 57 New forces, however, were brewing. Americans 
along the eastern banks of the Mississippi were anxiously 
looking toward the West. Some were not just looking, but 
were already penetrating the Spanish Borderlands. 
By the close of the War for Independence Americans 
had become firmly established on the east side of the 
Mississippi River. What had been a possible threat to Spain 
before now became more of a reality. The eight years of the 
' war had given fresh impulse to the expansive tendencies of 
57 . h . . . . t' Arthur Preston Whitaker, T e Mississippi Ques ion, 
1795-1803: A Study in Trade, Politics, and Diplomacv 
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1962), p. 36. 
b 
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the Anglo-Americans. One need only to look at the events 
of the Confederation and Early National periods for conclusive 
evidence of a definite westward movement. All the events 
surrounding the negotiation of the Jay and Pinckney treaties 
in the 1790's, especially the latter treaty, are indicative 
of the expansive nature of the young Republic. The intrigues 
involving Citizen Ge~t and George Rogers Clark, as well as 
the machinations of James Wilkinson, which will be investi-
gated later, clearly indicate that the frontiersman was (at 
least to some extent) turning a deaf ear to the advice of 
America's first Chief Executive. In his Farewell Address 
George Washington, after discussing the events of the pre-
ceding years relative to the so-called Mississippi Question, 
expressed the hope that the frontiersman would in the future 
be deaf "to those advisers, if such there are, who would sever 
them from their brethern and connect them with aliens. 1158 
It has been said that the economic system and social 
ideals that carried the English colonists from the Atlantic 
coast across the mountains into the Mississippi Valley emerged 
' 
58 . · 1 . f h James D. Richardson, A Comoi ation o t e 
and Papers of the Presidents (10 vols.; Washington: 
of National Literature, 1897-1907), I, 217. 
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with undiminished vigor from the Revolution. 59 The treaty 
which brought the war to a close was silent on factors vital 
to the two powers now facing each other. Most historians, 
however, see American advancement and Spanish retreat as 
inevitable, a mere process of destiny, no matter what treaties 
would have been signed or arrangements made. Some Spaniards 
were also fatalistic about their nation's future in America. 
Manuel de Godoy, the Prince of Peace, is reported to have 
said in relation to Louisiana, "no es posible poner puertas 
al campo." (You can't lock up an open field). 60 Whether 
one accepts the fatalistic concept or not, there is little 
doubt that Spain had just cause to look with great alarm at 
her advancing neighbor. 
The statement that the Mississippi had now become 
the "frontier between the conservative and bigoted of mon-
archies, and the youngest of republics, 1161 is perhaps an 
historical view too prejudiced to be valid. It is indicative, 
however, of the mind-set of many Americans during the period 
' 59Arthur Preston Whitaker, The Spanish-American 
Frontier: 1783-1795 (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1927)' p. 4. 
60
whitaker, The Mississippi Question • • • I p. 35. 
61
chittenden, The American Fur Trade . . . , I, 80. 
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under discussion. Traders, trappers, explorers and many 
.American government officials seldom held Spain in high 
regard. 
Within the last decade of the eighteenth century a 
little known official American attempt to learn what lay 
beyond the river took place. The effort was secret and did 
not succeed, but it did result in two manuscript maps which 
were to prove useful at a later date. In December 1789, 
Secretary of War Henry Knox wrote to General Josiah Harmar at 
Fort Washington, a post recently constructed at the mouth of 
the Little Miami River, instructing him to 
Devise some practicable plan for ex-
ploring the branch of the Mississippi 
called the Messouri [sic] , up to its 
source and all its southern branches, 
and tracing particularly the distance 
between the said branches and any of 
the navigable streams that run into the 
Great North River which empties itself 
into the gulf [sic] of Mexico.62 
Before this letter could reach its destination the 
Secretary dispatched another indicating that the party 
' 
62
colton Storm, "Lieutenant Armstrong's Expedition to 
the Missouri River, 1790," Mid-America: An Historical 
Quarterly, XXV (N.s. Vol. XIV), (1943), 180. This seems to 
be the only study of the Armstrong expedition. 
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selected for this assignment should "be habited like indians 
in all respects, and on no pretence whatever, discover any 
connection with the troops ,.63 General Harmar subse-
quently ordered Lieutenant John Armstrong to undertake the 
journey. Doubt as to the practicality or advisability of 
such a venture was present from the outset. Armstrong was 
carefully instructed to get the approval of Arthur St. Clair, 
Governor of the Northwest Territory, before proceeding upon 
his mission. General Harmar thought the proposal too 
64 
"adventurous." 
In yet another letter to the Secretary of War, Harmar 
expressed fear it was a "very difficult dangerous under-
taking. 1165 Cognizant of the caution felt by his commander, 
Armstrong left the Rapids of the Ohio on February 27, 1790, to 
undertake his assignment. Governor St. Clair, faced with 
serious Indian problems, could be expected to be equally 
cautious about such an enterprise as was General Harmar. On 
63 Ibid., p. 181., 
64 Harmar to Armstrong, Ft. Washington, February 20, 
1790, ibid. 
65 Harmar to Secretary of War Knox, Ft. Washington, 
February 20, 1790, ibid., p. 182. 
May 1, 1790, St. Clair wrote to Secretary Knox, 
It is, sir, I believe at present, al-
together impracticable. It is a point 
on which some people are feeling alive 
all over, and all their jealousy awake. 
Indians to be confided in, there are none: 
and if there were, those who would be most 
proper, and others, are now at war; ••• 66 
A similar note to General Harmar was penned the following 
67 day. 
In light of President Jefferson's moves at a later 
date, and in view of the character of the Lewis and Clark 
expedition, it would be of interest to quote from a portion 
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of Lieutenant Armstrong's official Report dated June 2, 1790. 
Having communicated to the Governor of 
the Western Territory the business on 
which I was detached after exercising 
his mind on the occasion he observed it 
was not only a difficult task, but one 
that in his opinion could be executed 
in the character of a trader onlv [ital-
ics mine] and even in that there is dif-
ficulty, as there are by Government 
[Spanish] fixed Posts for Traders to as-
semble at and a certain quaintity [sic] 
of goods permited to go to each Post. 
The Spanish co~endent [sic] knows the 
66
st. Clair to Secretary of War Knox, May 1, 1790, 
~-, p. 184. 
675 t. Clair to General Harmar, May 2, 1790, ibid. 
quaintity [sic] of Firs [sic] that coun-
try produces yearly, and the quaintity 
of Goods necessary for the Natives -- • 
I have no doubt but in a Tour of eight-
teen months or two years the necessary 
information might be obtained, ••• 68 
Lt. Armstrong returned to the Ohio country from St. 
Louis. In that city he had traced a pencil sketch of the 
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western half of a 1750 map of French origin. On this map the 
.Missouri River is shown coming down from the northwest passing 
the Panis villages which were actually to the west of the 
Missouri along the Kansas River. The Rio Grande is curiously 
extended, rising near the Padouca villages of the Upper 
Missouri. Carl Wheat feels that Armstrong's tracing was 
"undoubtedly the first map including any part of the Trans-
mississippi West secured on-the-spot (so to speak) by an 
. 69 
official of the United States." 
Apparently the Armstrong expedition was the only 
official attempt made by the United States Government before 
the opening of the nineteenth century to see what lay beyond 
the Mississippi River. Individual Americans, however, were 
' 
68 Armstrong's Report, Ft. Washington, June 2, 1790, 
~-·pp. 184-85. 
69 Wheat, The Spanish Entrada ••. , I, 150. 
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far from inactive in their desire to learn more about the 
roads West, be they to the Pacific or Mexico. Motives varied 
and much of the lure of the West was tied up with events 
surrounding the whole Mississippi Question. 
International tensions in the 1790's threatened to 
embroil the United States in war, and our first Secretary of 
state, Thomas Jefferson, had the difficult task of steering a 
safe course for the new Republic. As Dumas Malone points 
out, "no one was more convinced than he that his country 
required peace and time to grow in. He had no thought of 
letting it be hitched to the war chariot of any other nation. 1170 
With respect to the Spanish, however, Jefferson, at times, gave 
the appearance of moving contrary to his peaceful intentions. 
It is during this period of controversy over American rights 
to the Mississippi that Jefferson displayed an attitude toward 
Spain that was typical of his dealings with that country 
throughout his public career. Moving cautiously and weighing 
every word when dealing with the French or English he was 
seldom hesitant to sound bellicose when addressing the Spanish. 
' 
70
oumas Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, 
Vol. III of Jefferson and His Time (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1962), p. 63. 
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It seems clear Jefferson always considered Spain a waning 
power that could be challenged with little danger, pro-
vided she was not allied with one of the major powers of 
Europe. More will be made of this idea later. For the 
moment the year 1793 affords an excellent opportunity to view 
Jefferson's moves in relation to Spain, and to obtain an early 
glimpse of his interest in exploring the land west of the 
Mississippi River, an interest which became more intense 
as the years progressed. 
Thomas Jefferson as a member of the American Philo-
sophical Society of Philadelphia, like his fellow members, 
was deeply interested in the Western wilderness. Acting in the 
capacity of a member of the organization (not as Secretary of 
State) he helped organize an expedition to explore Louisiana 
in April, 1793. 71 The expedition was to be under the direction 
of the French scientist (botanist) Andre Michaux, who had been 
in America some nine years and had already made scientific 
journeys from Florida to Canada. 72 Unfortunately for the 
' 71 . 
Devoto, The Course of Empire, p. 344. 
72
rbid., p. 345. A talented botanist, Michaux had 
been a resident of the United States for nine years and of 
South Carolina for seven. He had made wilderness journeys 
in the Blue Ridge and Great Smoky Mountains and the Florida 
swamps. In 1792, entering another wilderness, he had followed 
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scientific and geographical advantages this expedition may have 
given the world, the proposed journey became involved with the 
web of espionage being spun by that impetuous Frenchman, 
Edmond Genet, and the whole project was aborted. 
When Gen~t reached Philadelphia and found a fellow 
countryman who, in the confidence of high American officials, 
was about to enter the region where plans were already well 
underway to "liberate" the Spanish possessions west of the 
Mississippi, he could not let such a golden opportunity be lost. 
By the latter part of June Michaux had been selected by Getiet 
to be a French agent in the West. 73 On July 12, 1793, Genet 
wrote to his American partner George Rogers Clark 
It is time that the citizens of Louisiana, 
the descendants of France, enjoy the 
blessings of liberty, ••• It is 
to you General that this honorable 
mission is confided, you will cover 
yourself with glory and will merit 
the thanks of the great number of 
people you will have delivered from 
his botanical specialties through northeastern Canada to the 
vicinity of Hudson Bay. , Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal of 
Liberty, p. 104. He was a French botanist who had been sent 
to America by the royal government years earlier (1785) on 
an exploring expedition with a view to the introduction into 
France of American trees, shrubs and plants. 
73 Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, p. 104. 
Tyranny •••. Citizen Michaux will 
be commissioned as agent for the 
French Republic for the administra-
tive part of this affair. He is a 
prudent man, reliable, active, intel-
ligent and a friend of Liberty and 
Equality.74 
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Meanwhile Gen~t tried to persuade Jefferson to appoint 
Michaux as a consul in Kentucky, but to no avail. The most 
he could obtain from the Secretary of State was a letter of 
introduction for Michaux to Governor Issac Shelby of Kentucky. 
Jefferson further warned Genet that enticing officers and 
soldiers from Kentucky to war on Spain was actually putting 
a rope around their necks, for they would certainly be hung if 
they commenced hostilities against any nation with which we 
75 
were at peace. Such warnings did little to deter the 
Frenchman. 
Michaux set out for the West on July 15, 1793; he 
eventually reached Kaskaskia but got no farther. The details 
74Gen~t to Clark, Philadelphia, July 12, 1793, 
"Correspondence of Clark and Genet," American Historical 
Association, Annual Repdrt, 1896 (Washington, 1898), I, 986. 
These documents are selections from the Draper Collection in 
the possession of the Wisconsin State Historical Society. 
75 b'd 984 Ii.,p .. Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal 
of Liberty-:-P:- 105. 
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" of the whole Genet-Clark effort do not concern this study, 
but the original instructions to Michaux, when his journey 
had the character of a scientific endeavor, are of importance. 
According to Jefferson's instructions Michaux was to 
find the shortest and most convenient 
route of communication between the United 
States and the Pacific Ocean, within the 
temperate latitudes •.•• The Missouri, 
so far as it extends, presents itself un-
der circumstances of unquestioned prefer-
ence. It has, therefore, been declared as 
a fundamental object of the subscription 
(not to be dispensed with) that this river 
shall be considered and explored as a part 
of the communication sought for.76 
When Michaux reached the Missouri he was to "pursue such of 
the largest [tributaries] as shall lead by the shortest way 
and the lowest latitudes to the Pacific ocean. 1177 Success of 
course depended upon the reaction of the Spanish. 
In analyzing these instructions Bernard DeVoto notes 
that in the thinking of Jefferson as well as his fellow 
scientists, two problems remain that are unchanged since the 
discovery of the Missouri. 
' 
76Paul Leicester Ford (ed.), The Writings of Thomas 
Jefferson (10 vols.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1897-
1899), VII, 208-12. 
77 Ibid. 
The possibility that the height of land 
may be wide or may consist of difficult 
mountain ranges is not imagined, and the 
Atlantic and Pacific watersheds are 
assumed actually to interlock.78 
Thus we have Jefferson, a full decade before the 
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purchase of Louisiana desiring to learn about territory which 
lay well within the domain of Spain. The nineteenth century 
arrived, however, with no real American penetration or 
encroachment (depending on one's viewpoint) into the Spanish 
Southwest. No doubt individual American trappers and traders 
had already penetrated the vast territory of the Spanish 
Borderlands, just as their French counterparts had done at an 
earlier date. They did not represent "official" America, 
however, and historical evidence of their deeds remains scarce. 
As the year 1800 approached two "empires" faced each 
other across the Mississippi: one determined to prevent en-
croachment upon its domain, the other looking with longing eyes 
toward the Pacific. Spain had the very difficult task of 
defending such a long frontier -- perhaps an impossible task. 
Spanish ministers sensed the danger of the situation and tried 
to shape their policy accordingly. They turned deaf ears to 
78 DeVoto, The Course of Empire, p. 348. 
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French assurances that the "bucolic Americans would never be 
dangerous neighbors. 1179 If the idea that His Catholic Hajesty 
considered Louisiana as a barrier to his more precious 
possessions of New Spain is accepted, it would seem that 
Spain's immediate concern for the former territory rather than 
New Mexico was well founded. Constant warnings were coming 
from all sources. For example, the Bishop of Louisiana 
reported in 1799 that emigration from the western part of 
America was bringing a "mob of adventurers • . • who know not 
1 . . 80 God or re igion. " He further reported that these "adven-
turers" had spread throughout the territory and into Texas. 
"They are furnishing their hunters and Indians with arms; they 
hold conversations ••• in accord with their restless and 
ambitious character, • saying [to their listeners] , 'You 
eil [sic] go to Mexico•. 1181 It has already been noted that 
Baron Carondelet, Governor of Louisiana, warned his home 
79 h' k . h . . 9 W ita er, Spanis -American Frontier ••. , p •• 
80 , . . 1 s Jose Antonio C~ballero to Antonio Corue , an 
Lorenzo, November 13, 1799, printed in James Alexander 
Robertson (ed.), Louisiana Under the Rule of Spain, France, 
and the United States, 1785-1807 (2 vols.; Cleveland: The 
Arthur H. Clark Company, 1911), I, 355. 
81Ibid. 
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government of the danger of the approaching Americans. He 
feared the intruders would not stop at the Mississippi or 
Missouri. 
On the other hand, if the Spanish had such a fantastic 
fear of military action against Santa Fe as most historians 
indicate, their lack of immediate plans to defend that region 
seems questionable. True there was a cordon of military posts 
from Texas to Alta California, but it will be recalled that 
Santa Fe remained outside this line of defense. Perhaps the 
Spanish figured they could halt any American advance before 
it reached the Lower Rocky Mountains. When one considers the 
size of the military contingents the Spanish maintained, and 
the fact that foreign traders had slipped into the environs 
of Santa Fe for years, such a hope seems ill founded. 
Foreign economic infiltration would no doubt have been 
impossible to shut out completely. Efforts to eliminate illicit 
trade obviously had not succeeded. Spain had to act. The 
Americans were at the gate to the "open field." To many the 
whole West was fair game. Fur bearing animals were waiting 
' to be trapped; vast herds of wild horses were there to be 
tamed -- and horses were negotiable. And, of course, Santa 
Fe was rising in the distance. The major question is: did 
Santa Fe and the Lower Rocky Mountain region have the lure 
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for the United States Government as it did for individual 
adventurous trader and trapper? Were the riches which Santa 
Fe supposedly guarded the primary objective of all Americans 
who went West and South? In 1800 the people of the United 
states elected to the office of President the man Bernard 
h 11 d "f" t l" · · 1182 oeVoto as ca e our irs geopo 1t1c1an. To many 
historians the election of Thomas Jefferson ushered in the 
period of imperial rivalry between Spain and the United States 
for the Southwest. 
' 
82 DeVoto, The Course of Empire, p. 411. 
CHAPTER II 
LOUISIANA: AMERICA EXPLORES ITS PURCHASE 
Whereas by the article of the third of 
the treaty concluded at St. Ildefonso the 
9th Vendemiaire, an 9 (October 1, 1800) 
between the First Consul of the French 
Republic and His Catholic Majesty, it 
was agreed as follows: His Catholic 
Majesty promises and engages on his part, 
to cede to the French Republic, ••• 
the colony or province of Louisiana, with 
the same extent that it now has in the hands 
of Spain, and that it had when France pos-
sessed it, and such as it should be after 
the treaties subsequently entered into 
between Spain and other States. And, where-
as, in pursuance of the treaty, and partic-
ularly the third article, the French 
Republic has an incontestable title to the 
domain •••• The First Consul of the French 
Republic desiring to give to the United States 
a strong proof of his friendship, doth here-
by cede to the United States, in the name 
of the French Republic, forever and in 
full sovereignty, the said territory, •• 
• 1 
The above passage is from the treaty which signifi-
' cantly altered the course of American history. It was a 
1
charles w. Eliot (ed.), American Historical Docu-
ments, 1000-1904 (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1910), p. 268. 
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treaty which had particular importance for the course of 
westward expansion. The Louisiana Purchase, considered by 
many to be the crowning achievement of the Jeffersonian 
administration, was accomplished within a few years after 
our third President assumed office. An event of such magni-
tude did not come about overnight, however, and the back-
ground to this acquisition is detailed and comf>lex. As 
several historians have so aptly pointed out, the Louisiana 
Purchase was the result of an attempt to settle America's 
domestic tensions as well as finding solutions to vexing 
2 foreign problems. 
When Thomas.Jefferson began his term as President in 
March, 1801, any thoughts he might have had relative to the 
vast Louisiana territory would have been considered in light 
of that territory being under the flag of Spain. France had 
ceded Louisiana to Spain in 1762. Jefferson considered Spain 
a weak power and had no cause for immediate alarm. Unknown 
2Martin Borden, Parties and Politics In the Early 
·Republic (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967), pp. 
67-74. Marshall Smelsen, The Democratic Republic 1801-1815 
(New York: ·Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968), pp. 83-103. A 
full account of the Louisiana Purchase may be found in E. 
Wilson Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy, 1759-1804 (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1934). An excellent account of 
the effect of the Louisiana Purchase on the western problem 
Of the United States can be found in Whitaker, The Mississippi 
Question • • •• 
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' to him at the moment, however, was the fact that on October 
1, 1800, under pressure from Napoleon, the Spanish monarch 
had retroceded the Louisiana territory to France by the treaty 
of San Ildefonso. French possession of Louisiana made the 
entire situation more pressing for America. The united States 
had agreements with Spain concerning the use of the Missis-
sippi River and the right of deposit at New Orleans since 1795. 
How were these agreements to be affected by the transfer to 
France? Spain was obviously less than a potent force on our 
western border. France would be quite a different story. No 
one more than the President knew what the change of sever-
eignty meant to the United States. Reliable but unofficial 
news of the transfer began to reach Washington, D.C. in May, 
1801. 
Considering the strategic location of New Orleans and 
the tense European situation Jefferson could only wish that 
Spain would hold on until the United States was in a better 
position to bargain for Louisiana or possibly take over. 
Retrocession to France altered the situation substantially. 
The presenc~ of French t~oops at New Orleans foretold trouble. 
Jefferson expressed his reaction quite vividly in the often 
quoted passage from his letter to James Monroe following the 
latter's appointment as plenipotentiary to France, --
L 
If we cannot by a purchase of the country 
insure to ourselves a course of perpetual 
peace and friendship with all nations, then 
as war cannot be distant, it behooves us 
immediately to be preparing for that course, 
without, however hastening it, and may be 
necessary (on your failure on the continent) 
to cross the channel.3 
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An alliance with England was certainly not Jefferson's fondest 
desire, but pragmatic decisions were sometimes necessary, and 
he was not reluctant to make them. Then in October, 1802, the 
Spanish officials at New Orleans forced the President's hand 
by suspending the privilege of deposit. As Bernard Devoto has 
so tersely remarked, Jefferson would not "become the prisoner 
4 
of events. " He acted. 
As to the details surrounding the Purchase, more will 
be said later. It is of more immediate concern to examine the 
extent of knowledge and general concepts respecting Louisiana 
at the time Jefferson took over the reins of government and 
3 Jefferson to Monroe, January 13, 1803, Ford, The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, IX, 419. This is only one such 
statement which shows Jefferson's realist or pragmatic approach 
to diplomacy. One may'also cite the often quoted statement 
of Jefferson to Robert Livingston in April, 1802: "The day 
that France takes possession of N. Orleans ••• we must marry 
ourselves to the British fleet and nation." See Ford, VIII, 
145. 
4 Devoto, The Course of Empire ••• , p. 393. 
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was faced with the problems mentioned above. These ideas had 
a direct bearing on the Purchase negotiations as well as sub-
sequent government policy and plans relative to the more 
western reaches of the newly-acquired territory. As indicated 
earlier, Jefferson had been interested in the Transmississippi 
region for quite some time, and had gathered to his library 
all the books, maps, charts and miscellaneous information he 
could acquire. While in Europe he had purchased everything 
he could lay his hands on concerning America. By his own 
admission he had "a pretty full collection of English, French 
and Spanish authors on the subject of Louisiana." 5 Neverthe-
less, factual knowledge of what lay beyond the Mandan villages 
on the Upper Missouri, the true location of the headwaters of 
that river, the Platte, Arkansas and Red rivers, or the tribes 
and actual number of Indians roaming the Plains, were facts 
still largely hidden from the minds of official America. 
Information forthcoming from the Michaux and Armstrong 
efforts added little to what was already "known" about the 
Southwest. The journals and sketches of Evans and Mackay 
' 
would be furnished to Lewis and Clark at a later date, but 
5Jefferson to William Dunbar, March 13, 1804, H. A. 
Washington (ed.) , The Writings of Thomas Jefferson ( 9 vols.; 
Washington: Taylor and Maury, 1854), IV, 540. 
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even these bits of information were vague when one looked 
westward past the waters of the lower Missouri. It was still 
generally believed that the Missouri took its rise in the 
"Stony Mountains" from which location it would be relatively 
easy to descent to New Mexico. The Missouri thus constituted 
a highway between St. Louis and Santa Fe. 6 Such a concept 
struck fear in the minds of the Spanish to the same extent it 
must have kindled hope in the minds of American traders, 
trappers and fortune-seekers. Therefore, when Thomas Jeffer-
son began contemplating the Lewis and Clark expedition the 
whole Southwest remained much of a terra incognita, although 
it had witnessed "almost unbelievable feats of discovery by 
small parties of clanking Spanish knights and zealous hard-
bitten missionaries, 117 not to mention traders and trappers, 
for over three centuries. In a real sense William Goetzmann 
is correct when he speaks of Anglo-American exploration in the 
Southwest as a "Rediscovery. 118 
Whether or not the determination to send an exploring 
party overland to the Columbia was fully matured in 
' 
6 See Chapter I. 
7Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire ••• , p. 37. 
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Jefferson's mind when he entered the office of President is 
a question subject to some historical debate; the fact does 
remain that his message to Congress asking for funds for 
such an expedition was presented less than a week after the 
letter he penned to Monroe cited above. It was in July, 1802, 
that Jefferson asked Meriwether Lewis, his private secretary, 
to lead the expedition, and on January 18, 1803, he secretly 
asked Congress for an appropriation of $2,500 to further the 
cultural and scientific knowledge of the Missouri. 9 
Meanwhile Jefferson sounded out the Spanish on their 
possible reaction to such a venture. Jefferson knew, as did 
the Spaniards, that American territory stopped at the Missis-
sippi. Spanish reaction to the proposed expedition can be 
seen in a letter from Carlos Martinez de Yrujo, the Spanish 
Minister to the United States, to his superior in Madrid, Don 
Pedro Cevallos, dated December 2, 1802, 
The President asked me the other day in a 
frank and confident tone, if our Court would 
take it badly, that the Congress decree the 
formation of a group of travelers, who would 
' 
9
confidential Message on Expedition to the Pacific, 
January 18, 1803, Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, VIII, 
192-201. 
form a small caravan and go and 
explore the course of the Missouri 
River in which they would nominally 
have the objective of investigating 
everything which might contribute 
to the progress of commerce; but 
that in reality it would have no other 
view than the advancement of the geog-
raphy. He said they would give it the 
denomination of mercantile, inasmuch 
as only in this way would the Congress 
have the power of voting the necessary 
funds; it not being possible to appro-
priate funds for a society, or a 
purely literary expedition, . • • 
I replied • • • that I persuaded my-
self that an expedition of this nature 
could not fail to give umbrage to our 
Government. [Italics mine]lO 
Jefferson explained to the Spanish envoy that he 
could not understand the concern of His Catholic Majesty's 
Government that any such expedition could pose a danger to 
the interests of Spain since the object would be an exam-
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ination of territory found between 40° and 60° north latitude 
to ascertain a continuous communication to the Pacific. To 
this Yrujo, exhibiting geographic knowledge beyond his actual 
ability to know at that moment, remarked that the question of 
a continuous communication was a point already determined by 
' 
fruitless attempts made with this objective by the Jesuits 
lO . 1 h' mb 2 1802 YrUJO to Ceval os, Was ington, Dece er , , 
printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 712. 
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in Northern California, "as by surveys later made by the 
11 
captains cook, Maurelle, Martinez, Vancouver and Cuadra." 
All their examinations proved there "does not exist this 
passage of the Northwest. 1112 
An interesting characterization of Jefferson is made 
by Yrujo. This Spanish diplomat, who was apparently on inti-
mate terms with the President and helped stock Jefferson's 
wine cellar with fine wines and champagne, officially found 
him to be "very speculative and a lover of glory. 1113 Yrujo 
noted Jefferson might attempt to perpetuate 
the frame of his administration not only 
by the measure of frugality and economy 
which characteriz.e him, but also by dis-
covering or attempting at least to dis-
cover the way by which Americans may some 
day extend their population and their 
influence up to the coasts of the South 
Sea.14 
11Ibid. 
12Ibid. 
' 13 . Yrujo to Jefferson, February 9, 1801, March 18, 1801, 
November 20, 1802, December 30, 1802, Jefferson Papers MSS, 
Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Mo. 
14Yrujo to Cevallos, Washington, December 2, 1802, 
printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 737-40. 
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Hoping against hope Yrujo expressed doubt that the 
15 
congress would approve the President's request. Congress 
did approve the expedition, and by June, 1803, Meriwether 
Lewis had his official instructions. Meanwhile, the diplo-
matic scene had changed greatly with the purchase of 
Louisiana; Jefferson would now have more reason than ever to 
pursue his desire to explore what lay beyond the Mississippi 
River. The details leading up to the Purchase and Napoleon's 
true reasons for selling Louisiana have been discussed in 
numerous works on the subject and are not of prime concern 
here. In light of the Spanish fear of American advancement 
into the Southwest and the actual American desire to explore 
the region, the immediate reaction of Spain to the purchase 
and subsequent American activity do need examination. 
Slowness of communication played a key factor relevant 
to Spanish reaction concerning the Louisiana question. News 
of the retrocession to France had hardly reached Spanish 
authorities on this side of the Atlantic when the sale of 
that land to the United States also became known to them. A 
' 
15Yrujo to Cevallos, January 31, 1803, printed in 
Donald Jackson (ed.), Letters of the Lewis and Clark Expedition 
With Related Documents, 1783-1854 (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 14-15. 
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fear had now become a reality. For the United States the 
early months of 1803 proved to be tense. Spanish garrisons 
still occupied New Orleans, and the "right of deposit" 
question was as yet unsettled. In fact, President Jefferson 
had initiated measures to alert American troops along the 
Mississippi in the event relations with Spain worsened. 16 Even 
a cursory examination of the documents would clearly indicate 
that Spain did not take the sale of Louisiana to America 
lightly. Whether her reluctance to accept a fait accompli 
was a move to "save face," delay the inevitable, or truly pre-
vent the transaction is now a matter of academic debate. To 
those officials involved at the time, however, the probability 
of trouble seemed quite real. Secretary of State James 
Madison was polite but firm in his correspondence with Spanish 
officials. Charles Pinckney, our Minister at Madrid, was 
likewise directed to present our response to that nation's 
protestations in a most straightforward manner. Pinckney was 
to indicate the "absolute determination of the United States 
to maintain their right, with the propriety of avoiding 
' 
16 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, March 7, 1803, 
National Archives, Records of the Office of the Secretary of 
War, Record Group 107, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War 
Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889 (Microcopy 6), Roll.l. 
Future references will be cited as WD. Letters Sent-Military 
Affairs. 
L 
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'f' d d ' ' ' n 17 T f th undigni ie menace an unnecessary irritation. o ur er 
emphasize the position of the United States, Madison proposed 
to question -- What is it that Spain dreads? 
She dreads, it is presumed, the growing 
power of this country, and the direction 
of it against her possessions within its 
reach. Can she annihilate this power? 
No. Can she sensibly retard its growth? 
No. Does not common prudence, then, advise 
her to conciliate, by every proof of friend-
ship and confidence, the good will of a 
nation whose power is formidable to her; 
instead of yielding to the impulses of 
jealousy, and adopting obnoxious precau-
tions which can have no other effect than 
to bring on, prematurely, the whole 
weight of the calamity which she fears? 
Reflections such as these may, perhaps, 
enter with some advantage into your 
17 d' . k 12 180 Maison to C. Pinc ney, October , 3, u.s., 
Congress, American State Papers: Documents Legislative and 
Executive of the Congress of the United States (38 vols., 
Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832-1861), Foreign Relations, 
II, 571. The correspondence between the Spanish Minister in 
Washington and James Madison was quite heavy and heated during 
the latter part of 1803. The perfidy of Napoleon and the 
illegality of the sale of Louisiana to America were points 
continually stressed. It is interesting to note that while 
Yrujo was protesting loudly to Madison about the injustice 
that had been dealt to Sijain, he was assuring Cevallos in 
Madrid that he really didn't consider the alienation of 
Louisiana as too much of a loss to Spain. The colony had 
cost heavily and produced little. See especially Yrujo to 
Cevallos, August 3, 1803, Robertson, Louisiana Under Spain, 
France, and the U.S., II, 69-77. The correspondence between 
our Secretary of State and Yrujo may be found in the 
Arnerican State Papers: Foreign Relations. 
communication with the Spanish Govern-
ment; ••• you will make that use of 
them.18 
It is interesting to note that while Madison was 
extolling the growth and power of America as a formidable 
adversary, Yrujo was explaining to his government that the 
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purchase of Louisiana would actually produce a diversity of 
local interests which would ultimately have ill effects upon 
the future growth of the United States. He stated his ideas 
thusly: 
This diversity of local interests, which 
manifests itself daily in the Congress of 
the United States, will probably be the 
germ of the dismemberment and division of 
those states. So much the greater as is 
the progress in each one of those states, 
so much the greater will be felt the 
results of those jealousies. One does 
not need extraordinary wisdom to 
anticipate that the acquisition of 
Louisiana, far from consolidating the 
strength and vigor of this nation, will 
rather contribute to weaken it by its 
greater extension, ••• 19 
' 
18 d" · k b 12 1803 Am · Ma ison to c. Pinc ney, Octa er , , erican 
State Papers: Foreign Relations, II, 571. 
19Yrujo to Cevallos, August 3, 1803, printed in 
Robertson, Louisiana Under Spain, France, and the u. s., 
II, 72. 
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Meanwhile the arrival of French troops in conjunction 
with the formal take-over by that country of Louisiana could 
pose a more formidable problem, especially if Monroe and 
Livingston failed in their efforts on the Continent. Accor-
dingly, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn sent appropriate 
instructions to his military commanders along the Lower 
Mississippi, among whom was the controversial James 
. 20 Wilkinson. 
As yet unaware of the retrocession, the Spanish comman-
der of Upper Louisiana at St. Louis, Carlos du Hault de Lassus, 
was attempting to stave off continued threats to Spanish au-
thority by both the English and the Americans. In April, 1803, 
de Lassus asked Regis Loisel, an experienced traveler and 
trader in the upper Missouri region to give him a report 
respective to foreign intrusions in that region, as well as 
the state of Indian relations. 21 Although the report was not 
20
secretary of War to Wilkinson, March 7, 1803, WO. 
Letters Sent-Military Affairs. See also letters dated October 
31, 1803, July 19, 1803, November 29, 1803 and January 16, 
1804, ibid. 
' 
21 . . 1 f' h . t Regis Loise irst came upon t e scene in par ner-
ship with Jacques Clamorgan on the Upper Missouri. He as-
cended the Missouri with Tabeau in 1802, and apparently 
reported disconcerting things to de Lassus, which led to a 
commission in 1803-1804 to undertake a thorough investigation. 
See Abel, Tabeau's Narrative of Loisel's Expedition •••• 
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submitted until May, 1804, after the Americans had formally 
assumed control of Upper Louisiana, Loisel's concepts about 
geography and the relative ease of travel toward the South-
west reflect ideas current in the minds of both Spaniard 
and American at the time. Noting how exposed the domains of 
the King of Spain were to the undertakings of foreigners, and 
how the Indians were being continually bribed to draw them 
away from Spanish influence, Loisel further stated, 
I have discovered, • • • that one may 
travel by water in a certain manner, 
from Hudson Bay to the chain of moun-
tains in Mexico which surrounds Santa 
Fe, with the exception of one-half 
league, in order to cross the small 
tongue or isthmus which separates the 
river Blois Blanc [James or Dakota] 
from the River Qui Parle [Cheyenne] 
which empties into the Colorado [Red 
River of the North] , • • • The Rio 
Chato [Platte] which empties into the 
Missouri at a distance of two hundred 
leagues from the Mississippi must not 
be passed in silence. It rises west of 
Santa Fe, and flows between two mountains 
bordering the new Kingdom of Mexico. 
• • • It is impossible to open navigation 
with the Mexican territory by means of 
its channel, but there is no necessity 
for it, tor transportation overland is 
ea.sy and the distance but sligi<t, and 
the road which is open so far as tha 
savages are concerned, assures the 
American of ease of penetrating with-
out any trouble. [Italics mine]22 
22 . l f Mernoria o 
. Nasatir, Before Lewis 
L 
Regis Loisel, May 28, 1804, printed in 
and Clark ••• , II, 737-40. 
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Such information, while largely in the realm of 
fanciful geography, could only add to Spanish apprehension 
for the safety of its Mexican "treasures." Loisel also drew 
attention to another point, being somewhat prophetic in the 
process. Noting that the Americans accompany their "insidious 
steps" with presents to bribe the Indian tribes, he advised 
that no other means present themselves to the Spanish than 
"the resistance of the tribes. 1123 He continued, 
It is important that they be not allowed 
to be bribed by a new people of whom they 
know nothing more than the name; ••• Let 
the government cultivate their affection by 
the means by which men of all sorts may not 
be separated if they are employed suitable, 
and it may then immediately count on their 
fidelity.24 
Loisel considered the Americans as enterprising and ambitious, 
and would avail themselves of every means to win the minds of 
the savages. This became especially dangerous considering the 
American claim to the sources of all the rivers which flowed 
. t th . . . . 25 in o e Mississippi. 
' 
25 Ibid., p. 739. 
How concerned de Lassus must have 
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been when Lewis and Clark arrived in st. Louis in December, 
!803, armed with French passports to ascend the Missouri 
26 
River. 
Having acquired the whole of the Louisiana territory 
by treaty dated April 30, 1803, Jefferson set about to organize 
his expedition. The President's instructions to Lewis are 
dated June 20, 1803, and are quite detailed. The object of 
the mission was 
to explore the Missouri river, and such 
principal streams of it, as, by it's 
course and communication with the waters 
of the Pacific Ocean, whether the Columbia, 
Oregon, Colorado or any other river [Italics 
mine] may offer the most direct and practi-
cable water communication across this 27 
continent for the purpose of commerce •••• 
Within this directive so carefully spelled out for 
Meriwether Lewis was one item which is of special interest 
to this study. Jefferson drew the attention of the explorer 
26 De Lassus to Juan Manuel Salcedo and Casa Calvo, St. 
Louis, December 9, 1803, printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and 
Clark ••• , II, 719. Jefferson's Instructions to Meriwether 
Lewis, June.20, 1803, Jackson, Letters of the Lewis and Clark 
Expedition ••• , p. 61. Louisiana, having been ceded by 
Spain to France, Jefferson did not believe a Spanish passport 
would be necessary. 
27Ibid., p. 62. 
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Source: Goetzmann, William H. Exploration and 
Empire: The 'P.xplorer and the Scientist in the Winnin~ 
the American West. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966, p. 26. 
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to the fact that 
although your route will be along the 
channel of the Missouri, yet you will 
endeavor to inform yourself, by inquiry, 
of the character and extent of the coun-
try watered by it's [sic] branches, and 
especially on it's Southern side. The 
North river or Rio Bravo which runs into 
the gulph [sic] of Mexico, and the North 
river, or Rio Colorado which runs into 
the gulph [sic] of California, are under-
stood to be the principal streams heading 28 
opposite to the waters of the Missouri •••• 
68 
Lewis was also told that the character of the terrain between 
these rivers and the Missouri would be well worth enquiry. 29 
In these instructions Jefferson reflects the geographical 
concepts current for his day. 
Armed with his instructions Lewis contacted William 
30 Clark, and began the organization of his exploring party. 
The Secretary of War attempted to facilitate preparations, 
and Jefferson set about to gather any information which would 
possibly prove useful. Among the items furnished to the 
28
rbid., p. 63. ' 
29Ibid. 
30Lewis to William Clark, Washington, June 19, 1803, 
William Clark Collection, MSS, Missouri Historical Society, 
St. Louis, Mo. 
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explorers was a copy of Truteau's Journal, and a map first 
made by the explorer Evans. 31 With such material, in addition 
to a letter of introduction from the President to a M. Henri 
Peyroux (the man whom Jefferson thought had taken command of 
upper Louisiana after the transfer to France) Lewis set out 
. . . h . mb 32 for St. Louis, arriving t ere in Dece er. From this moment 
it seems the major objective of the Spanish officials in New 
Spain was to stop "Captain Meri." Could the Americans be 
prevented from becoming the "perfect masters of the river 
(Missouri], and its navigation and traffic, and the wealth 
of Sonora and Sinaloa? 1133 
Subsequent events in and around St. Louis assured the 
Spanish commandant that his worst suspicions were proving 
true. With the purchase of Louisiana Americans turned toward 
31 Beauregard, "Journal of Trudeau • • • , " p. 18. 
Washington, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, IV, 521. Lewis 
and Clark did not hesitate to secure information from any 
source available in St. Louis. 
32 Jefferson to Peyroux, Washington, July 3, 1803, 
printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 721. 
Secretary of War to Amos'Stoddard, July 2, 1803 and Secretary 
of War to M. Lewis, July 2, 1803, WD. Letters Sent-Military 
Affairs, Roll. 2. 
33 Juan M. Salcedo and Casa Calvo to Cevallos, August 
20, 1803, printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark ••• , 
II, 720. 
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the west as never before,· and st. Louis became a natural 
emporium for perspective traders and trappers. All trading 
34 parties were organized and all outfits were made up there. 
The beginnings of several American ventures into the fur 
trade and other trading activities with Santa Fe as their 
goal were witnessed by the last of the Spanish governors. 35 
De Lassus was also in a position to listen, record and for-
ward to his superiors much information relative to American 
activity, a goodly portion of which was little more than 
gossip. Since he remained in St. Louis until late 1804, he 
was in a favorable position to keep Spain well advised and 
alert to the moves of her new neighbors. 
It was in the Spring of 1804, just at the time when 
Spanish officials were becoming intensely alarmed over the 
Lewis and Clark expedition, that yet another move by the 
Americans compounded Spanish concern for United States' 
designs on her northern frontier. Particular concern was 
expressed relative to Santa Fe and the mines of Northern 
Mexico. As it turned out, however, the move had little or 
' nothing to do with official America. A merchant of Kaskaskia, 
34 h" d h . F d C itten en, T e American ur Tra e • ~ ., II, 4. 
35Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark ••• , I, 113. 
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Illinois, William Morrison, sent Baptiste La Lande, a French 
r creole, in the direction of the Pawnee villages on the Platte. 
~-
L 
La Lande was to see what kind of trade could be developed with 
the Indians, and, hopefully, find his way to Santa Fe to as-
certain the market there. The Frenchman ascended the Platte 
River to the mountains, made his way some distance south and 
then sent a delegation of Indians into Santa Fe to seek per-
mission to enter. As a result the Spanish Commander dispatched 
a few men to escort La Lande into the Capita1. 36 
The goods which he carried with him found a ready 
market, but La Lande decided not to return to St. Louis. The 
distance was great, but perhaps the offer of land by the 
Spanish Government had something to do with his decision to 
remain. No doubt the Spanish were just as happy to have him 
stay rather than return with reports that would bring still 
more Americans. There seems to be some confusion as to 
whether another Frenchman, one Laurent Durocher, accompanied 
La Lande or was sent out later by Morrison. Nevertheless, 
both men were sent to Chihuahua by Governor Real Alencaster 
' 
36 . h · 1 II M" . Issac J. Cox, "Opening t e Santa Fe Trai , issouri 
Historical Review, XXV (1931), 32. Chittenden, The American 
Fur Trade ••• , II, 491. Goetzmann, Exploration and 
Empire ••• , p. 40. 
L 
72 
in May, 1805. 37 
If the frontier governor in Santa Fe hoped his 
superior in Chihuahua would relieve him of the responsibility 
for the two "Americans" his hopes were soon dashed. In 
September, 1805, after interrogating La Lande and Durocher, 
who decided to remain in Mexico, Comrnandante Nemesio Salcedo 
y Salcedo returned them both to Santa Fe with the following 
directive: 
I have instructed them to return and arrange 
with you in this matter, since, in conformity 
with the Royal decisions, I have authorized 
you to hear, consider, and decide all cases of 
like nature which may occur of inhabitants of 
said places in Ylinois who, without violating 
the constitution, may ask to continue subjects 
of the Spanish Government within the limits 
of that Province.38 
Departures from St. Louis like those of La Lande and 
Durocher did not cease; neither were they ignored by Spanish 
37Lansing B. Bloom, "The Death of Jacques D'Eglise," 
New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. II, No. 4 (October, 1927), 
370. Harlow Lindley, "Western Travel, 1800-1820," The Missis-
sippi Valley Historical,Review, Vol. VI, No. 2 (September, 
1919), 187. 
38N. Salcedo to Alencaster, Chihuahua, September 9, 
1805, State of New Mexico Records Center, Santa Fe, New Mexico, 
The Spanish Archives of New Mexico, 1621-1821. Microfilm 
Roll 16. 
73 
officials remaining in that city until the final transfer 
negotiations had been completed. In a situation such as this 
rumors abound. Enough was true, however, to cause the 
Spanish justifiable concern. Pedro Vial had proven a "road" 
to Santa Fe was practicable. From trading in furs and other 
merchandise might not the adventurers seek more alluring 
traffic, silver and gold? There were, in fact, other traders, 
merchants and adventurers striking out from St. Louis for the 
Southwest. It should be noted again, however, that none of 
these efforts were being carried out under the direction of 
the President of the United States, the Secretary of War, or 
any other official of the American Government. 
To save France the expense of sending a special agent 
to St. Louis for a mere formality, Captain Amos Stoddard re-
ceived Upper Louisiana from Spain in the name of the French. 
Subsequently, as the American Commissioner, he received the 
territory from France. Following this final phase of the 
transfer, de Lassus noted: 
L 
It is clearly ~o be seen that the general 
opinion of [the United States] is that its 
limits will extend to Mexico itself, extending 
their boundary lines to the Rio Bravo, pene-
trating into the said kingdom at different 
points [following] other small rivers. So 
general is this persuasion that I believe 
that beforehand many are thinking of obtain-
ing a great advantage from ~hose lands, and, 
as I see it, they are already calculating 
the profit which they will obtain from the 
mines •39 
De Lassus further noted that American officials who "are 
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commanding here" were continually acquiring information about 
the Indians and the "shortest routes to New Mexico or to Santa 
11 40 Fe. 
I believe one can go from here to Mexico in 
less than two months. This can be done it is 
true with hard work and is exposed to meeting 
with various Indian Nations, ••• but by 
ak . d 41 t ing arms an some presents one can succeed. 
Rumors were about to the effect that the real aim of 
the Lewis and Clark expedition was to enter Mexico; the 
announced plan to discover a route to the Pacific Ocean was 
a mere pretext. De Lassus doubted such rumors, but perhaps 
Lewis, himself, helped give credence to an idea which would 
be so readily accepted by minds already suspicious. In 
October, 1803, while preparations were being made to depart 
39De Lassus to Casa Calvo, St. Louis, August 10, 1804, 
printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 743. 
40
rbid. De Lassus does not identify the American 
officials. 
41Ibid. 
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Louis on the trek across the continent, Lewis sketched a st. 
plan he had been considering to the President. Noting that 
he had been delayed somewhat in the preparations for his 
major expedition, and not wanting to waste time, Lewis pro-
posed a tour on horseback of some one hundred miles "through 
the most interesting portion of the country adjoining my 
winter establishment."42 He indicated that his route would 
be "toward Santa Fe," in any event on the south side of the 
Missouri. 43 Perhaps too much has been made of this plan as 
a desire to reach Santa Fe; nevertheless, Jefferson vetoed 
the whole idea before it could ever get off the ground. In 
answer to Lewis' despatch the Chief Executive responded, 
One thing ••• we are decided in. That you 
must not undertake the winter excursion which 
you propose in yours of October 3. Such an 
excursion will be more dangerous than the main 
expedition up the Missouri and would, by an 
accident to you, hazard our main object which, 
since the acquisition of Louisiana, interest 
everybody in the highest degree.44 
42Richard Dillon, Meriwether Lewis, Manuel Lisa, and 
the Tantalizing Santa Fe'Trail," Montana, The Magazine of 
Western History, XVII, No. 2 (April, 1967), 48. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Jefferson to Lewis, Washington, November 16, 1803, 
Jackson, Letters of the Lewis and Clark Expedition ., p. 
136. 
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No more was made over this affair by Meriwether 
Lewis or the President. Preparations for the expedition to 
the Columbia continued and by May, 1804, the American party 
left St. Louis on its way up the Missouri toward the Mandan 
villages. Meanwhile the Spanish officials in Mexico City, 
Philadelphia, Chihuahua and Santa Fe, spurred on by Casa 
Calvo in New Orleans, planned and plotted the disruption if 
not the outright capture of the Lewis and Clark expedition. 
The question of the western boundary of the Louisiana terri-
tory played an important role in regard to Spain's immediate 
concern over this expedition; since it will become a major 
issue in itself subsequent to the American expedition, the 
whole subject of boundaries will receive separate treatment 
in the next chapter. Meanwhile Spanish officials concen-
trated on the activities of that small band of men crossing 
the continent towards the Pacific. 
The principal Spanish official who aroused his 
countrymen to the dangers posed by the Lewis and Clark 
expedition was the Marques de Casa Calvo, newly appointed 
' 45 boundary cotnmissioner in New Orleans. Fearing that any 
45Loomis, Pedro Vial ••• , pp. 105-106, 181. 
Sebastian Calvo de la Pue rta y O'Farrill, Marques de Casa 
Calvo, was acting military governor of Louisiana from Gayoso's 
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expedition to the headwaters of the Missouri would bring the 
participants into the immediate neighborhood of the New 
Mexico settlements, Casa Calvo began a letter campaign which 
eventually brought him the odium of fellow government offi-
cials in the New World. It seems that his desire was to bring 
fame to himself by impressing his superiors with his diligence. 
AS early as January, 1804, Casa Calvo informed the Spanish 
Foreigh Minister, Pedro Cevalos, that Meriwether Lewis had 
presented himself in St. Louis armed with a French passport 
to ascend the Missouri River. The immediate action on the 
part of the commander in that city was to detain Lewis, but 
within a month de Lassus was told to put no obstacle in the 
way of the American expedition as the purchase of Louisiana 
b h . d l" 46 y t e Unite States was a rea ity. Even Casa Calvo, while 
hoping that the Americans could be stopped, knew they could 
not be, and remarked, 
death in 1799 to Manuel Salcedo's arrival in 1801. He was 
appointed to the u. s.-spanish boundary commission after the 
transfer of Louisiana, but was looked on by the Americans 
as a spy, and finally was asked to leave New Orleans. 
' 46 . 
Governor of Louisiana to de Lassus, January 28, 1804, 
printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 725. 
Casa Calvo to Cevallos, January 13, 1804, printed in Robertson, 
Louisiana Under Spain, France, and the U.S., II, 162-65. 
L 
we cannot now prevent their expeditions, 
which it is beyond question they will 
repeat, in order to make themselves 
perfect masters of the river, and its 
navigation and traffic, and of the 
wealth of Sonora and Sinaloa, ••• 47 
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Casa Calvo solicited the support of Manuel Salcedo, 
the Governor of Louisiana, and the two men dispatched a message 
to Nemesio Salcedo in Chihuahua. In their letter the two 
Spanish officials tried to impress upon the commandante-general 
the pressing danger to Spain's northern frontier. Nemesio 
Salcedo was told that it was necessary to "cut off the gigantic 
steps of our neighbors if we wish • • • to preserve intact the 
dominions of the King. ,,4 8 It is believed that only very . . . 
decisive and determined action would prevent the encroachment 
into New Spain by the Americans. "The only means which pre-
sents itself is to arrest Captain Merry Weather [sic] and his 
party, which cannot help but pass through the nations neighbor-
ing New Mexico, its presidios or rancherias." [Italics mineJ 49 
47Ibid. 
' 
48 Casa Calvo and Manuel Salcedo to N. Salcedo, March 
5, 1804, printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 
731. 
49 Ibid. 
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It was not until May, however, that Salcedo answered 
the letter from Casa Calvo and initiated correspondence to 
warn the appropriate officials on the frontier. After in-
forming the Viceroy of the correspondence he had received 
from New Orleans, the commandant-general addressed a dispatch 
to the Governor of New Mexico at Santa Fe, who would have 
immediate jurisdiction over the territory Lewis and Clark 
dl . so were suppose y traversing. The Governor was advised that 
it might prove very prudent to impede the expedition, or at 
least gain knowledge of its progress and state of being. 
Nemesio Salcedo's major advice to the New Mexico official was 
to use the Indians to do the Spaniard's work for them. In 
this manner two things of some importance could be achieved 
simultaneously -- keep the Indians allied to Spain and stop 
American intrusion. The commandant-general put it so, 
• • • it is important under the cir-
cumstances that the force of that 
province [New Mexico] occupy itself 
in continuing to punish the barbarous 
Navajo nation; that Your Excellency, 
making use of the friendship and 
' 
SON. Salcedo to the Governor of New Mexico, May 3, 
1804, printed in Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 
734. N. Salcedo to Don Joseph de Yturrigaray, May 3, 1804, 
ibid. 729. It is interesting to note that the Viceroy merely 
-;---
informed N. Salcedo that he had received his correspondence. 
L 
difference towards us in which the other· 
gentile nations find themselves, come to 
an agreement with the chief of the Co-
manches or with the Chief of any other 
[nation] • • • to send a party of indi-
viduals which you may collect to reconnoitre 
the country which lies between those villages 
as far as the right bank of the Missouri, 
with instructions and necessary provisions 
so that they examine if there are traces or 
other vestiges of the expedition of Merry 
and so that they acquaint themselves with 
the direction that it has take~ and of 51 their operations upon the territory • • • 
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In addition to using the Indians, Salcedo suggested 
that Pedro Vial, being the man most knowledgeable of the geog-
raphy of the territories in question, would prove most helpful 
in locating the Americans. 52 In what many would describe as 
typical of Spanish bureaucratic administration, months of 
indecision and "buck-passing" ensued; meanwhile, the Lewis 
and Clark expedition continued on its way across the continent 
to the Pacific. Only in September, 1805, did the commandant-
general issue definite instructions to Governor Real Alencaster 
in Santa Fe. Again the Indians were to be drawn into close 
alliance with the Spaniards, especially those tribes along 
' the Platte ·and Arkansas rivers. Alencaster was ordered 
51N. Salcedo to the Governor of New Mexico, May 3, 
1804, ibid. 
52Ibid. 
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to instill in them an "extreme dislike for the English and 
the Aroericans."53 The natives were also to be persuaded to 
openly refuse any communication to the Americans as these 
"foreigners" were only making friendly advances for the 
ultimate purpose of throwing the Indians off their land. 
of specific importance for the Spanish Governor was a re-
quest for him to make it most plain to the Indian chiefs 
that they were to intercept the Lewis and Clark expedition, 
seize its individuals and "to do everything possible to take 
away any boxes or papers that the same expedition carries."54 
such work would result in considerable advantages for Spain 
without the necessity of supporting troops among the Indian 
tribes. 
Of particular interest is the section of this im-
portant letter of September 9, 1805, referring to the extent 
of Alencaster's geographical jurisdiction. A map "drawn up 
to the minute" was included to 
instruct your Excellency of the territory 
that your province encompasses; of its dis-
tance to the rstablishments at Illinois and 
to the English possessions on the course of 
53N. Salcedo to Alencaster, September 9, 1805, 
printed in Loomis, Pedro Vial ••• , pp. 192-94. 
54Ibid. 
the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, those 
that bear the name Colorado, Arkansas, or 
Napestle, that enter the first, and those 
known as Coas, or Cancer [Kansas], Chato, 
Osages, and the others that enter the said 
. . 55 Missouri • • • 
Nemesio Salcedo was certainly attributing to Alen-
caster a territory much larger than the Americans would 
accede to, and definitely much larger than the frontier 
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governor could control given the small number of troops under 
his authority. There seems to be little doubt that Salcedo 
was telling the New Mexico governor to approach Indian tribes 
in a spirit of friendliness, especially those well within 
United States jurisdiction. Even if one accepts the paucity 
of geographic information then available to the Spanish on 
the frontier, Nemesio Salcedo could hardly have been so 
completely ignorant of the retrocession and subsequent sale 
of Louisiana by the fall of 1805. The motivation behind the 
actions of Spanish officials is not the subject of investi-
gation here, and would certainly fill volumes in itself, but 
some attention should be given to the status of geographic 
knowledge ~urrent at th! time, for it definitely had a 
bearing on Spanish-American relations. 
L 
55Ibid. 
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It will be recalled that Casa Calvo, in his original 
dispatch to the commandant-general in Chihuahua, noted that 
the Lewis and Clark expedition could not but help pass near 
New Mexico. In reply, Salcedo noted that Casa Calvo's 
noticias (maps and charts) did not jibe with the only maps 
b f h . 56 f d . he had e ore im. In act, one won ers if Spanish 
officials not only withheld their cartographic findings from 
the non-Spanish world, but also from themselves; Casa Calvo, 
the boundary commissioner in New Orleans, seemed to be much 
more certain that the Americans were penetrating the neighbor-
hood of Santa Fe than did the officials on the frontier. In 
yet another dispatch to the Spanish Foreign Minister in Ma-
drid in September, 1804, Casa Calvo, after complaining about 
the lack of interest evidenced by Salcedo, noted that he 
could not ascertain news as to the course of the Lewis and 
Clark expedition because he had no planes of the upper part 
of the Missouri River. He only calculated its proximity 
to New Mexico from 
56 
what the Indians tell us, and from the land-
marks and the'signs which are observed by the 
Indians of the Upper Missouri, which manifest 
N. Salcedo to Casa Calvo, May 3, 1804, printed in 
Nasatir, Before Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 733. 
L 
clearly their traffic with Spaniards ••• 
the writers have decided that the origin 
of that river is to the northwest. This 
in the general plan of the maps should 
bring it very near to the capital of the 
aforementioned Kingdom of New Mexico.57 
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Later in the same month Casa Calvo noted that Lewis and Clark 
were by that time probably some 300 leagues up the Missouri, 
58 
"quite advanced into the Provincias Internas." Another 
letter penned by the boundary commissioner noted that there 
was "easy and continuous communication by water from Hudson 
Bay to the Gulf of Mexico. 1159 
Given the fact that Casa Calvo as Boundary Com-
missioner for Spain relative to the Louisiana territory and 
his American counterpart were located in New Orleans, one 
might conjecture that the same published maps of the day 
were available to both. If that were the case it is little 
wonder that Casa Calvo was as confused as the Americans 
concerning the true nature of the Southwest. The famous 
57 Casa Calvo to Cevallos, September 15, 1804, ibid., 
II, 750. 
' 
58 Casa Calvo to N. Salcedo, September 20, 1804, ibid., 
II, 753. 
59 Casa Calvo to The Prince of Peace, September 30, 
1804, ibid., II, 754. 
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Arrowsmith map of North America published in 1802 was still 
iargely unmarked in the areas of the Rocky Mountain region, 
Great Basin and the southern tributaries of the Missouri. 60 
In the very year that Upper Louisiana was being formally 
turned over to the Americans, Aaron Arrowsmith and Samuel 
Lewis' New and Elegant General Atlas for 1804 was published 
in Philadelphia. About this set of maps Carl Wheat notes 
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that "they dramatize both the paucity of reliable geographic 
information available at the time, and the many erroneous 
. . h t ,.61 assumptions concerning t e Wes ern country •.•• There 
seems to be some question as to why Arrowsmith and Lewis 
included in this Atlas a map of the Louisiana territory which 
was actually a version of the Soulard map of 1795 (which it-
self was a French version of a map ordered made by Baron de 
Carondelet, the Governor of Louisiana under the Spanish). 
On this map, which had great influence on current cartographic 
thought until the publication of Lewis and Clark's own map 
in 1814, there is no hint of the Colorado (of the West), and 
streams which Soulard had originally shown as branches of 
' the Arkansas· are now unlabeled and shown flowing south into 
60 Wheat, The Spanish Entrada ••• , I, 183 
61 Carl I. Wheat, From Lewis and Clark to Fremont, 1804-
~' Vol. II of Mapping the Transmississippi West (5 vols.: 
San Francisco: The Institute of Historical Cartography, 1957-
l....___1963) I P• 4 0 
the Colorado of Texas instead of the Mississippi. The en-
f tire region of the Platte and Upper Missouri river basins is 
' 
h d t d t f t . 62 stretc e wes war ou o propor ion. 
On another map in the Atlas entitled "Spanish 
Dominions in North America," the Arkansas River is drawn 
heading just east of Santa Fe; the Red River appears almost 
correctly, but there is no Canadian. The cartographer Carl 
Wheat has drawn a most interesting conclusion about these 
Arrowsmith maps, 
If [these maps do] in fact represent en-
lightened geographic thought in England 
and the United States as of the nine-
teenth century, one must admire the 
success of Spanish efforts to withhold 
knowledge of her colonies from the rest 
of the world. (Baron von Humboldt's 
great map of New Spain, though already 
drawn, was not yet publicly availabe) ,63 
It was precisely because the available geographic 
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information about the Louisiana Territory was so lacking that 
President Jefferson began immediately upon the Purchase to 
' 62 . 
Wheat, The Spanish Entrada •.• , I, 156-59; From 
Lewis and Clark ..• , II, 6-8. Copy of map included. 
63 Wheat, From Lewis and Clark . . . , II, 10. 
L 
IV. SECTION OF LEWIS MAP OF 1804 
( 
/ 
Source: Paullin, Charles o., and Wright, John K. Atlas of 
_!he Historical Geoqraphy of th~ United States. Washington: 
Carnegie Institutions and American Geographical Society of New 
York, 1932, Plate 28. 
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rectify the situation. If he was to bargain intelligently 
with the Spanish about boundaries, rights to navigable streams, 
control over Indian tribes and numerous other points, he had 
to have facts, not myths, to back up America's claims. Further-
more, if he were actually interested in the approaches to Santa 
Fe would not considerably more knowledge of that region be 
required? The Lewis and Clark expedition was, of course, a 
part of the effort to extend knowledge of the western reaches 
of the American continent. As far as the Southwestern portions 
of Louisiana are concerned, however, other efforts at explo-
ration became more important. It was in July, 1803, that 
Jefferson sent a list of seventeen questions pertaining to geog-
raphy, population, laws, and the extent of the newly acquired 
land to important governmental and scientific figures. Thus 
began an intensive effort by the American Government to secure 
the Southwestern reaches of her recently acquired territory, 
whatever they might be. United States-Spanish relations were 
deeply affected. 
' 
L 
CHAPTER III 
THE SOUTHWEST LIMITS OF LOUISIANA: 
HOW NEAR TO SANTA FE? 
Settlement of the eastern boundary of the Louisiana 
Purchase, although tedious, time-consuming and involved with 
political and diplomatic complexities, was relatively easy to 
determine with geographic accuracy. The question of western 
boundaries, on the other hand, was complicated by a morass of 
cartographic legend, myth and fanciful geography. The lands 
along the Mississippi River and Gulf Coast had been accurately 
charted by eighteenth and nineteenth century map makers. The 
Mississippi River had been generally recognized as a major 
boundary line by all parties concerned with the Louisiana 
territory during the past two centuries. 1 West of that major 
1A full treatment of the East and West Florida contro-
versy can be found in Iisac Joslin Cox, The West Florida 
Controversy, 1798-1813 (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1967), 
in addition to numerous other articles by the same author. 
One may also refer to the works of Arthur P. Whitaker 
previously cited as well as Philip Coolidge Brooks, Diplomacy 
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river, however, the story was quite different. Thomas 
Jefferson was surely not guilty of understatement when he 
told Congress shortly following the Purchase that "the precise 
boundaries of Louisiana, westward of the Mississippi, though 
very extensive, are at present involved in some obscurity."2 
When questioned about the vagueness of the western 
limits of Louisiana Napoleon supposedly answered, "If an ob-
scurity did not already exist, it would perhaps be good policy 
3 to put one there." Doubtless the failure to indicate exact 
and the Borderlands: The Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1939). 
2 U. s., Congress, The Debates and Proceedings in the 
Congress of the United States, with an Appendix, containing 
Important State Papers and Public Documents, and all the Laws 
of a Public Nature (42 vols.; Washington: Gales and Seaton, 
1852), 8th Cong., 2d Sess., 1803, p. 1498. Future references 
will be cited as Annals of Congress. 
3Thomas M. Marshall, A History of the Western Boundary 
of the Louisiana Purchase, 1819-1841 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1914), p. 8. Such a statement shows 
that Napoleon could play the role of a fox as well as that of 
a lion. The French, for reasons of their own, would not pin 
themselves down on agreeing to any specific boundaries. When 
asked for clarification of boundaries by Livingston, Talleyrand 
retorted, "you have madJ a noble bargain for yourselves, and 
I suppose you will make the most of it." See Dumas Malone, 
Jefferson the President, First Term, 1801-1805, Vol. IV of 
Jefferson and His Time (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1970), pp. 302-10 for a good summary of the diplomatic 
negotiations relative to indecisive boundaries. 
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,, boundaries could prove advantageous for either Spain or 
runerica. Valuable time would be gained whereby more exact 
information could be gathered and evaluated, not to mention 
the possibility of enlarging a claim by occupation. Neverthe-
less, as far as Jefferson was concerned the days of guesswork 
and conjecture had to be brought to a close. The United States 
should know the extent of what it had purchased; relations 
with Spain relative to this matter had to be determined. For 
such reasons, as well as the necessity of providing Congress 
with an accurate account of what America had acquired, 
Jefferson queried a number of men who were to take up positions 
of responsibility in New Orleans. He also summoned the Congress 
to a special session for October, 1803. Included among the 
persons from whom he was seeking information was Ephraim Kirby, 
the American Boundary Commissioner, Daniel Clark, the United 
States Consul at New Orleans, William Dunbar, scientist, and 
William C. c. Claiborne, the Acting Governor of the Louisiana 
Territory. 
To each of these men the President sent a list of some 
seventeen questions. ' A few examples would serve well to 
illustrate what Jefferson was attempting to ascertain. Among 
other things he asked, 
1. What are the boundaries of Louisiana, and 
on what authority does each portion of them rest? 
L 
2. What is the distance from New Orleans to the 
nearest point of the western boundary? 
3. Into what divisions is the province laid off? 
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4. What are the best maps, general of particu-
lar, of the whole or parts of the province: Copies 
of them if to be had in print.4 
It was not until the latter part of August and into 
September that Jefferson began receiving some answers to his 
pointed inquires. Due to statements made by Thomas Jefferson 
during these months of investigation, and later, relative to 
the western reaches of Louisiana, some historians have con-
eluded that our first "geopolitician" desired to expand deep 
into Spanish-held territory. A good case for the American 
Government's interest in continental expansion at this early 
date can be and has been made using ideas expressed at this 
time. Perhaps a closer examination of Jefferson's statements 
and actions during the years of his presidency would reveal 
a Chief Executive who was more a clever diplomat playing at 
brinkmanship rather than an active expansionist. Jefferson 
the man was also a person with the curious mind of a 
' scientist, ·a characteristic which would certainly come to 
4Jefferson Papers, MSS, Missouri Historical Society, 
St. Louis, Mo. Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 
VIII, 253-54. 
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the fore now that a vast new land awaited examination. That 
he necessarily desired or expected to acquire territory 
reaching to the gates of Santa Fe within the span of his 
political career does not appear to be so evident. 
Early in August, 1803, while waiting for replies from 
New Orleans, Jefferson penned a letter to his friend John 
Dickinson concerning the subject of western boundaries. In 
this letter the President spoke of the "unquestioned" eastern 
boundaries of Louisiana, but in reference to the western 
limits he noted, "we have some pretensions to extend the 
western territory • • • to the Rio Norte, or Bravo, • • • 115 
In yet another letter, this one to John c. Breckenridge, 
Jefferson stated, "we have some claims to extend on the sea 
"6 coast Westwardly to the Rio Norte or Bravo, . . . To William 
~· Dunbar, the man who was later to attempt an expedition up the 
~ 
Red River, Jefferson insisted that "however we may compromise 
7 
on our Western limits, we never shall on the Eastern." What 
5Jefferson to Dickinson, August 9, 1803, ibid., 261. 
6 . ' Je·fferson to Breckenridge, August 12, 1803, ibid., 
242. 
7H. A. Washington (ed.), The Writings of Thomas 
Jefferson (Washington: Taylor and Maury, 1854), IV, 540. 
L 
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claims the Chief Executive did make regarding the western 
limits of Louisiana seem to have been based almost exclu-
sively on French sources. Such a basis would naturally accord 
to the 'united States an area much more extensive than Spain 
would be willing to accept. Ever since the days of La Salle's 
ill-fated landing on the coast of Texas, the French had con-
sidered their claims to extend inward from the Gulf Coast to 
the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo, Rio del Norte). Spain had never 
accepted this theory and was not about to now. Jefferson was 
well aware of the century-long controversy between Madrid and 
Paris and intended to use it to his advantage. This was his 
custom~ he would use Spain's distress to work to America's 
8 
advantage. 
Meanwhile the answers to his inquires began to arrive. 
On August 24, 1803, Jefferson received a communication from 
Governor Claiborne answering many of the questions earlier 
posed by the President. As to maps and boundaries, however, 
the Governor was of little help. He did promise to forward 
8 ' d . Jefferson, both as Secretary of State an as Presi-
dent, operated on the premise that we could eventually achieve 
what we wanted from Spain if we just waited long enough and 
took advantage of Spain's precarious European situations. 
He was also prone to stress the concept of "natural rights" 
in reference to rivers, their navigation and sovereignty of 
the land through which they flow. 
L 
at a future time some maps he had heard about, but at the 
9 
moment "none extant can be depended upon." On the subject 
of boundaries Claiborne could again offer only the vaguest 
of information. One interesting and, as it turned out, 
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prophetic point (a point neglected by the American statesmen 
for some time) was Claiborne's remark, 
It is related to me, on the authority of 
the oldest Settlers in this Territory, 
that some time previous to [the Treaty 
of 1763) a design was formed of running 
a Boundary Line, on the West of Louisiana, 
between the French possessions and those 
of Spain; and that the Mouth of the Sabine 
River ••• was fixed upon, as the point 
from which the Line should set out.10 
Although no evidence of a formal boundary survey can be found, 
the Sabine River, as a boundary between French and Spanish 
territory, seems to have been an accepted, though unofficial, 
line by the colonial settlers based upon the extent of actual 
9
claiborne to Jefferson, August 24, 1803, Clarence 
Edwin Carter (ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United 
States (25 vols.; Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1934-1960), IX, 16. 
' lOib~d. There is evidence of a map by Don Juan de 
Langara published in 1799, which gives the Sabine as the 
boundary between Spanish and French settlements. The map 
seems to have been purely a maritime effort and executed 
at a time when limits were of no interest. See Issac J. 
Cox, The Early Exploration of Louisiana (Cincinnati: 
University of Cincinnati Press, 1905), p. 37. 
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settlement by each nation during the preceding century. The 
most eastern settlement made by the Spanish during the entire 
colonial period was among the Adaes Indians at a point some 
fifteen miles west of Natchitoches. 
Daniel Clark, the American Consul still residing in 
New Orleans until the formal transfer took place, informed 
Secretary of State James Madison, "I know of no good maps 
in print of the Western part of the province, .. 11 . . . 
William Dunbar's reply added little knowledge to the situation 
except to verify the fact that the Spanish considered the 
Sabine to be the more accurate boundary to separate their 
territories from those of the United States than any river 
farther to the west. 12 · 
Only John Sibley, the controversial Indian agent at 
Natchitoches, gave encouragement that the true western border 
of Louisiana reached to the environs of Santa Fe. His infer-
mation, as the President was to learn, was not based on 
personal exploration or concrete knowledge, but on hearsay 
' 11~aniel Clark to James Madison, September 8, 1803, 
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 29. 
12
william Dunbar to Jefferson, September 30, 1803, 
ibid.' 67-68. 
-
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of elderly, long-time residents of the Natchitoches and 
surrounding area. Sibley, when queried by Governor 
Claiborne, regretted that he could not supply a map but none 
were available to him. He had often seen good charts of the 
Gulf coast, but none of the interior. The Indian agent had 
gathered some information about the rivers west of the Missis-
sippi and took the liberty of sketching a map, admittedly in-
accurate, for the enlightenment of the Governor and ultimately 
for President Jefferson. A portion of this information would 
prove quite interesting when compared to an accurate modern 
map. Sibley's geographical sketch read in part as follows, 
the first River West of Red River is the 
Quel queshoe •••• The Next in Order is 
the Sabine, ••• The Next River is the 
Angalena or Snow River • • • The Next is 
Trinity River, the next the Braces [Brazos}, 
then the Colorado or Red River, then the 
little River St. Antoine [San Antonio} on 
which the Town or Station of St. Antoine 
is Situated, then a little River called 
Guadelope [Guadalupe}, then the Nuces 
[Nueces} or Walnut River which is a 
Brance of the River Grand [Rio Grande}, 
it is a fine Country all the Way from 
Natchitoches to St. Antoine, the distance 
is about four,hundred Miles, ••• 13 
13John Sibley to Claiborne, October 10, 1803, ibid., 
72-74. Dr. John Sibley who had left the East because or--
marital difficulties was very effective at publicizing 
himself. He was appointed surgeon for the army post at 
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It was largely from the above replies that Jefferson 
formulated his report to Congress in November, 1803. From 
f a geographical standpoint the information furnished by the 
~ 
gentlemen he had contacted was meager; it certainly was not 
enough data to support a claim to the western reaches of 
the Rio Grande. As Jefferson told Congress in November, 1803, 
Of the province of Louisiana no general 
map, sufficiently correct to be depended 
upon, has been published, nor has any been 
yet procured from a private source. It 
is, indeed, probable that surveys have 
never been made upon so extensive a 
scale • • .14 
Under the circumstance Jefferson decided to somewhat 
avoid the question of limits for the time being. He knew well 
that of more immediate concern was the need to win Congressio-
nal approval of his purchase, and to secure American occupation 
of the Louisiana Territory from a rather perplexed and unhappy 
Spain. Therefore, his statement about the boundaries being 
Natchitoches and was acting Indian agent. He served in these 
capacities for a number of years, and he gained the reputation, 
' among the Spaniards, of being a revolutionary. His reports 
were important because they stirred Jefferson to go ahead 
with plans for exploration. 
14 Annals of Congress, 8th Cong., 2d Sess., 1803, 
1498. 
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involved in "some obscurity" was deemed sufficient. on the 
subject for the moment. He did not intend to have the situation 
remain thus for long. 
Similar to the events surrounding the Lewis and Clark 
expedition, the problem of boundaries became intricately bound 
to the whole problem of Spanish reaction to the Purchase; more 
accurately, it was the reluctance of Spain to accept a fait 
accompli. The Spanish argument that France did not have the 
right to sell Louisiana to any other nation has been previously 
discussed. Concurrent with this argument was Spanish in-
sistence that "if" America did truly occupy Louisiana the 
western boundary was to be nowhere near the Rio Grande. 
Recognition of such a boundary would, of course, mean giving 
up Texas. On this point Spain held firm. 
The negotiations relative to the matter of boundaries 
(a discussion which continued until 1819) point up several 
interesting features. First, there was the lack of accurate 
knowledge on the part of all parties concerned as to what 
Louisiana included; second, there existed the lack of a real 
' determinati~n on the part of the United States to include the 
approaches to Santa Fe as a sine qua non in its dealings with 
Madrid. It is believed that the latter point can be adequately 
Substantiated, even though the diplomatic moves and public 
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statements during the years of negotiation might appear to 
indicate otherwise. 
The prime basis for all the obscurity about bound-
aries can be traced to earlier treaties between France and 
spain, particularly those of 1763 and 1800. For example, 
Article III of the Treaty of San Ildefonso expressly stated, 
His Catholic Majesty promises and 
pledges himself on his part to 
retrocede to the French Republic • • 
• the colony or the Province of 
Louisiana with the same extension 
that it now has in the possession 
of Spain, and that it had when 
France owned it • • .15 
This same vague statement was again used when America pur-
chased Louisiana from France in 1803. Now the need for being 
more explicit could no longer be avoided, and the American 
Government naturally turned to French sources for clarifi-
cation. To the extent that France wanted to keep both the 
United States and Spain happy she resorted to the old game 
of diplomatic double-talk • 
. There was no doubt that the French claimed as far 
' to the west' as their traders and explorers had penetrated. 
French cartographers were prone to extend the western limits 
15 See Chapter II, footnote 1. 
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of Louisiana to the Rio Grande. The important map found in 
the equally important work Histoire de La Louisiane by Le 
page du Pratz gave the French this western limit. 16 The Le 
Page du Pratz volumes were available and known to American 
officials as well as the statesmen of Europe. 17 
As early as October, 1802, Talleyrand, that most 
shrewd and clever of statesmen, noted that the boundaries 
of New Mexico and Louisiana had been determined at least up 
to the thirtieth degree of latitude on the Rio Bravo, which 
is somewhat above the Big Bend of Texas but well below El 
Paso. From that point, however, the line was less exact. The 
Frenchman further noted, "it does not appear that any con-
vention of boundaries was ever held for that part of the 
frontier. The farther north one goes, the more vague is the 
lG d ' ' d 1 ' . Th Le Page u Pratz, Histoire e a Lou1s1ane. e 
importance of this work has been discussed in Chapter I. 
Also see Marshall, A History of the Western Boundary ••• , 
chapters I and II. 
17
c1ark to Madison, September 8, 1803, Carter, 
Territorial-Papers, IX, 29. In his Essay "The Limits and 
Bounds of Louisiana," printed in Documents Relating to the 
Purchase and Exploration of Louisiana (Boston: Houghton, 
Mifflin & Company, 1904), Jefferson based his discussion 
of limits almost entirely on Le Page du Pratz. 
L 
I 
I' 
! 
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. .,18 I t . demarcation. n some secret instructions to the Cap ain-
c;eneral of Louisiana, dated November 26, 1802, and approved 
by Napoleon, mention was made that Louisiana must now be 
"restored with the same extent that it had when France owned 
.,19 it, . . . According to the directive such limits included 
the "Rio Bravo, from its mouth to the thirtieth degree, its 
line of demarcation has not been traced beyond ••• and it 
appears no convention has ever been held concerning this 
. f h . .,20 point o t e frontier. As might be expected, the French 
Commissioner in New Orleans followed this line of reasoning 
when queried by both American and Spanish officials. 21 
It is quite obvious from the documentation that the 
French believed the United States favored the view of the 
Rio Bravo constituting the western boundary of Louisiana, 
and they were of no mind to cast any doubt on the matter. 
18 Talleyrand to Decres, October 2, 1802, Robertson, 
Louisiana Under Spain, France and the u.s., II, 141. 
19
secret Instruction for the Captain-General of 
Louisiana. Approved by the First Consul, November 26, 1802, 
~·I .I, 361-62. 
' 
21Laussat to Salcedo and Casa Calvo, January 18, 1804, 
ibid., II, 171. Madison to Robert R. Livingston, January 31, 
18ci"i, American State Papers: Foreign Relations, II, 574. 
L 
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consequently, the American statesmen diligently pressed their 
claims with the Spanish for the next several years. Secretary 
of state James Madison kept Robert Livingston in Paris abreast 
of our moves and instructed Charles Pinckney and James Monroe 
in Madrid to press the Spanish government for a settlement 
according to theories we felt had French backing. 22 
To rely on French support proved to be a mistake, for 
Talleyrand also wished to appease Spain at this crucial time. 
While assuring the United States that Louisiana was indeed 
quite vast he was concurrently informing Senor Gavina, the 
Spanish Ambassador at Paris, that the intention of the French 
King was "to assure by all friendly means the good relations 
of two powers which have so much interest in remaining united, 
• • • 
that 
Accordingly, the Spanish Ambassador was informed 
since the western boundary of 
Louisiana was not fixed in so precise 
a manner by the treaties preceding that 
of [San Ildefonso] • • • the uncertainty 
22 Ibid. 
ibid., 575:--
-
' Madison to Livingston, March 31, 1804, 
23 -Talleyrand to Senor Gavina, August 30, 1804, 
Robertson, Louisiana Under Spain, France and the U.S., 
II, 195-96. 
b 
that could exist on the direction 
of its frontiers must have still 
remained since the cession of the 
United States. France even could 
not take it upon itself to indi-
cate to the United States what 
that precise boundary must be, 
••• 24 [Italics mine] 
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To the French Minister in the United States Talleyrand 
wrote, 
If the Mississippi and Iberville 
Rivers mark precisely the eastern 
limits of that colony, toward the 
west its boundaries are less precise. 
• • • There are often such wide 
expanses, that it may be difficult25 to agree on a line of demarcation. 
The minister was further urged to dissuade the United States 
from attempting to extend its boundaries westward in such a 
way to "cause annoyance to the court of Madrid. 1126 Talleyrand 
continued, 
24 Ibid. 
' 
25 Talleyrand to General Louis Marie Turreau, August 
a, 1804, ibid., 193-95. 
26 Ibid. 
l 
Whatever exaggeration there be in the 
anxiety of the court of Madrid, it was 
my duty General, to inform you of it, 
so that you may judge by the mutual 
inclinations of the two governments 
how necessary it is for you to employ-
all your care, ••• for the maintenance 27 of a system of reliable information • • • 
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Spanish protestations to both the United States and 
France over the basic purchase itself are well known, and 
Spain finally, though reluctantly, accepted the fait accompli. 
The boundary question, once the transfer of territory had 
been accepted, continued for years to be a point of bitter 
argument. Perhaps the Spanish view of American claims to 
the Rio Grande was best expressed by Casa Calvo when he 
referred to the matter as a "classic absurbity. 1128 Spain 
may have had to give-in on the Purchase but she was deter-
mined not to lose Texas and New Mexico, or have her northern 
frontier fall into the hands of the greedy Americans. 
Spanish determination in this matter can be readily seen 
by the fact that the dispute remained unsettled until the 
year 1819. When the Transcontinental Treaty was signed 
' 
27Ibid. 
28 Casa Calvo to Cevallos, January 13, 1804, ibid., 
163. 
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in that year, Texas and the remainder of the Southwest con-
tinued under the flag of Spain, albeit not for long. 
As indicated earlier, from the time of the earliest 
discussions between the American and Spanish officials the 
latter insisted upon the Sabine River (the present-day 
boundary between Texas and Louisiana) as the line of demar-
cation between Louisiana and the Province of Texas. 29 Every 
lengthy argument on the part of Monroe and Pinckney to push 
the American claims was met with equal verbosity on the part-
of the Spanish ministers who felt the utmost need to "combat 
the sophistries of the Arnericans." 3° From New Spain warnings 
and pleas were reaching Madrid stressing how imperative it 
was to keep the ambitious Americans as far as possible from 
the Provincias Internas, especially from luring the Indian 
tribes away from Bourbon influence. 31 
29 Casa Calvo to Laussat, March 31, 1804, ibid., 184. 
Salcedo to Cevallos, August 20, 1804, Nasatir, Befere Lewis 
and Clark ••• , II, 745-50. 
30 Cevallos to Casa Calvo, April 2, 1804, Robertson, 
Louisiana Under Spain, France and the U.S •••• , II, 177. 
31 Salcedo to Cevallos, August 20, 1804, Nasatir, 
Before Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 745-50. 
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Through 1804 and into 1805 the argument continued; 
correspondence mounted and the Spanish remained determined. 
several interesting developments occurred over the question 
of boundaries in early 1805. Acting upon the directives of 
the Secretary of State, Pinckney and Monroe began taking a 
firmer stand with the Spanish government. In a dispatch 
dated March 30, 1805, the American Ministers indicated to 
Cevallos that his continual delays could only lead the 
former to "suspect that his silence is intended as an 
intimation of his desire that negotiation should cease. 1132 
The message continued, 
But, if it is still his Excellency's 
desire to continue the negotiation, 
they have to request that he will be 
so obliging as to give them the 
sentiments of His Majesty's Govern-
ment respecting the western limits of 
. . 3 3 Louisiana • • • 
Cevallos, of course, evidenced shock at this line of 
approach. It was not until Mid-April, however, that any 
' 32 . 
Pinckney and Monroe to Cevallos, March 30, 1805, 
American State Papers: Foreign Relations, II, 657. 
33 Ibid. 
L 
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answer worthy of the label was forthcoming from the Royal 
court. On April 13, 1805, Cevallos submitted to the American 
envoys a most lengthy discourse on the necessity of gathering 
material from many sources not readily available. The Spanish 
Foreign Minister began his argument with the often cited 
phrase, "the western limits of Louisiana never having been 
fixed in [an] exact manner, "34 Basing his case on the . . . 
facts of discovery, exploration and colonization Cevallos 
attempted to illustrate that the French could never, under 
any pretext, have considered Texas or any land west of that 
Province to have been theirs. He continued, 
that claim must be extremely illusory 
and unfounded which shall attempt to 
carry the western limits of Louisiana 
to the Rio Bravo, including therein a 
great part of the interior provinces 
of New Spain, acquired and established 
at the cost of the treasures -0f Spai~5 
and the blood of her subjects, ••• 
Lengthy and detailed as it was, this explanation was 
apparently not accepted by the American envoys. The United 
States was continuing to base its claims on French sources. 
' 
34 Cevallos to Pinckney and Monroe, April 13, 1805, 
ibid., 660-62. 
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Basic to this stand was the idea that when a nation takes 
possession of any seacoast, it is understood that this pos-
session extends into the interior country, to the sources of 
rivers emptying within that coast, "to all their branches and 
h "36 the country t ey cover, ••• This was an argument 
Jefferson had also previously used in justifying America's 
claim to the Rio Grande. And so the argument continued. 
on the surface it appeared that the American Government was 
determined to have Santa Fe. 
Concurrent with these developments, however, was the 
evolvement of another approach towards some kind of solution. 
As early as 1804, Madison stated that he might suggest a line 
not far west of the Mississippi River be drawn leaving a wide 
unoccupied tract of land between the possessions of Spain 
and American settlements. He was actually suggesting a type 
of buffer zone. In early 1805 when, as indicated above, 
negotiations were heavy, Madison again suggested the 
36Pinckney and Mpnroe to Cevallos, April 20, 1805, 
~., 664.· Jefferson, still basing his claims on French 
sources, argued that because of the explorations and settle-
ments made by La Salle and Iberville, France had actual 
possession of the coast from st. Bernard Bay {Matagorda 
Bay) to Mobile. 
L 
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establishment of a neutral ground for twenty years. 
secretary of State Madison was closely following President 
Jefferson's thinking on the subject. Although Jefferson 
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would hold to the concept of our "right" to the country from 
the Rio Bravo east, as early as July, 1804, he was considering 
the idea of a tract of land to be laid off in which no further 
settlement was to be made by either country for "say thirty 
' 38 years." The tract of land as envisioned by Jefferson and 
Madison would have lain between the Rio Grande and the Rio 
Colorado of Texas, an area some 250 miles in breadth. 39 
Although criticized by his contemporaries Jefferson defended 
the move to relinquish land to the westward in proportion to 
what could be obtained east of the Mississippi. He further 
believed "successive sacrifices were marked out, of which 
37Monroe and Pinckney to Cevallos, January 28, 1805, 
~., 637. Marshall, A History of the Western Boundary •• 
• , pp. 32-33. This work, although emphasizing the Treaty of 
1819 and subsequent events, has an excellent summary of the 
issues and negotiations prior to the actual treaty. There 
are also a number of maps illustrating the various "neutral 
ground" propositions. 
' 38 . Jefferson to Madison, July 5, 1804, Ford, The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, VIII, 309-10. 
39 Ibid. 
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even the Colorado was not the last." 
It is important to remember that in all the ne-
gotiations surrounding the boundary question the matter of 
western and Eastern Florida was of prime concern. Madison 
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held the Floridas to be of much greater importance than the 
western Boundary issue. He considered West Florida "essential" 
and East Florida "important" and, as time proved, he was 
willing to yield if necessary on western claims to obtain the 
Floridas. When James Monroe and Charles Pinckney left Spain 
in the Summer of 1805, the new American diplomat to Madrid, 
James Bowdoin, was instructed to continue pressing his 
country's cause along the same line. Political as well as 
diplomatic considerations are at the bottom of America's views 
concerning the Floridas. The basic question can again be 
found in geographic obscurities. Whether or not the Floridas, 
or as least West Florida, was originally a part of the 
Louisiana Territory was not clear to either the French or the 
Spanish, and was not specified in either the cession of 1762 
or the retrocession of 1800. It should also be borne in mind 
' that the original move on the part of Jefferson to acquire 
40 Jefferson tow. A. Burwell, September 17, 1806, ibid., 
469. 
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New Orleans included the idea of purchasing West Florida. 
It was felt the area was needed to assure the security of 
Americans' use of the Mississippi River. The fact that 
America's population was rapidly expanding in the old South-
west towards the Floridas must also be considered. 41 
Meanwhile, the increasingly close relationship 
between France and Spain, in addition to a growing Spanish 
reluctance to retire beyond the Sabine, caused Jefferson and 
Madison to walk cautiously regarding a boundary settlement. 
France had made it clear she would support her neighbor south 
of the Pyrennees in any conflict which may be forthcoming. 
French interest in the well-being of the Spanish Bourbons 
did not stem from altruistic motives. It was all part of 
Napoleon Bonaparte's grand design. On the throne of Spain 
was the easily duped Charles IV. The heir to the throne 
41 For a full discussion of the relationship between 
the Floridas and the Louisiana Purchase see, Cox, The West 
Florida Controversy ••• , pp. 64-101. Jefferson's concern 
over the right of Americans to use the Mississippi can be 
traced back to the treaties of 1763 and 1783. Under the 
earlier treaty British colonists had the right to navigate 
that river, and when they became American citizens they 
did not lose this right~ Jefferson also asserted that 
inhabitants on the upper course of a river had the right 
to pass in and out of its mouth. He cited a case in 
International Law (Antwerp on the Scheldt) to substantiate 
his case, see, Cox, The West Florida Controversy ••• , 
pp. 27-28. The importance of the Floridas will again 
receive attention in Chapter v. 
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was Prince Ferdinand who was in his early twenties; the actual 
ruler of the country, however, was the ambitious Manuel de 
Godoy, the Prince of Peace. He is viewed by most historians 
as being a vain and grasping adventurer who understood little 
of the New World situation. 
The situation in Spain enabled the clever Napoleon 
42 gradually to reduce that state to a position of vassalage. 
Meanwhile Jefferson, as was his custom, preferred "time to 
await and avail ourselves of events. 1143 The increasing control 
over Spanish affairs by ~apoleon led Jefferson to inform 
Madison, 
Yet these acts shew a purpose both in 
Spain & France against which we ought 
to provide before the conclusion of a 
peace. I think therefore we should 
take into consideration whether we 
42The Napoleonic involvement in Spain has been the 
subject of numerous works including biographies, monographs 
and national histories. Two reliable works in which one may 
conveniently find brief but excellent accounts are: Charles 
E. Chapman, A History of Spain, Founded on the Historia de 
Espaffa y de la Civilizac\on Espaii'.ola of Rafael Altamira (New 
York: Macmillan Company, 1918), and Jean Descola, A History 
of Spain (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963). · 
43Jefferson to Gallatin, April 3, 1805, Ford, The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, VIII, 350. 
ought not immediately to propose 
to England an eventual treaty of 
alliance, ••• 44 
In addition to the tense European situation the President 
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was also keeping abreast of Spanish activity in Texas relative 
to their blocking any American advance in that direction. Jef-
ferson did not intend to be caught unprepared in an emergency. 45 
Jefferson's patience with Spain must have worn thin 
during the years of his second administration. In November, 
1805, he presented the whole picture to his Cabinet. The 
decision of his official family was, in part, 
44 Jefferson to Madison, August 4, 1805, ibid., 374. 
45 Jefferson to Madison, September 16, 1805, ibid., 
379. In this dispatch to the Secretary of State Jefferson 
put forth the suggestion that should Spain continue to block 
America's move west the Congress should authorize the 
Executive to suspend intercourse with Spain at discretion 
and to dislodge the new Spanish establishments between the 
Mississippi and the Rio Grande. He concluded, however, that 
"these ideas [are] merely for consideration." Governor 
Claiborne was also alert to the need for military preparedness 
in case a move against the Spanish was necessary. See the 
correspondence between tlaiborne and The Secretary of War, 
The Secretary of State and General James Wilkinson in Dunbar 
Rowland (ed.), Official Letter Books of w. c. C. Claiborne, 
1801-1816 (6 vols.; Jackson: State Department of Archives 
and History, 1917). 
Ford, 
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1. Spain shall cede & confirm to the us. 
East & West Florida with the islands & 
waters thereon depending & shall deliver 
possn. immedly. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4. The boundary between the territories 
of Orleans & Louisiana on the one side 
& the damns. [sic] of Spain on the other 
shall be the river Colorado from its 
mouth to it's [sic] source then due N. 
to the highlands inclosing the waters 
which run directly or indirectly into 
the Missouri or Misipi [sic] rivers, 
& along those highlands as far as they 
border on the Span. damns. 
5. The country between the Western 
boundary of the territories of Orleans 
on the one side - & Louis~ on the other 
(the Rio Bravo & Eastern or Salt river 
branch thereof Rio Colorado) from its 
main source & by the shortest coast to 
the highlands before ment~ as the sd. 
Western bound¥ shall remain unsettled 
for 30 years from the date of this 
treaty. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
t 7 •••• the us. shall permit no settlem •. 
within the sd. country for the term of 30. 
years before mentioned.46 
' 
46 b. . . S . N mb Ca inet Decision on pain, ove er 
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, VIII, 
14, 1805, 
383-84. 
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An interesting note relative to point number 5 above is that 
the manuscript for this document indicates that Jefferson 
originally intended the statement to read "Guadaloupe, if 
to be cbtd, Colorado if not." 47 Why he struck the line is 
not readily discernible. 
Thus the negotiations over the western limits continued 
for many years. Jefferson continued to assert America's 
"right" to the Rio Grande, but, if actions speak louder than 
words, he was more realistic and concentrated on exploring the 
Sabine and Red River areas. The Red P~ver seemed to have been 
gradually accepted by both Spain and the United States as their 
common boundary, although neither nation would openly admit 
as much for a nu.'l\ber of years. Meanwhile Thomas Jefferson, the 
perennial student of scientific advancement, as well as the 
dedicated statesman, set about to organize more expeditions 
for the purpose of exploring the Louisiana Territory. 
Lewis and Clark were tracking the upper reaches of 
the Missouri and to the Pacific Coast. Someone was needed to 
venture up the Red and Arkansas rivers. As early as March, 
' 1804, President Jefferson contacted William Dunbar in New 
Orleans. This scientist was asked to lead an expedition 
47 Ibid. 
L 
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to the headwaters of the aforementioned rivers. Dunbar was 
told that Congress would probably authorize an exploration 
of "the greater waters on the western side of the Mississippi 
48 
and Missouri to their sources." "In this case," the 
President continued, 
I should propose to send one party up the 
Panis river to its source, thence along 
the highlands to the source of the 
Radoncas river and down it to its mouth, 
• • • These several surveys will enable 
us to prepare a map of Louisiana, ••• 
and will give us a skeleton to be filled 
up with details hereafter.~9 
A chemist from Philadelphia, Dr. George Hunter, was 
also assigned to the expedition. The doctor was quite delayed 
in arriving at New Orleans. Because of his delay and other 
problems of supply and manpower, by the time the expedition 
was ready to get under way circumstances caused a major change 
in plans. The Osage Indians had taken to the warpath, and, 
as a reaction to the Lewis and Clark expedition, the Spanish 
evidenced a great reluctance to permit any American on any 
' 
48 Jefferson to Dunbar, March 13, 1804, Washington, 
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, IV, 540-41. 
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pretext to approach the Texas frontier. Dunbar and Hunter 
did conduct an expedition of some four months, but the di-
118 
rection was changed to the Washita River and Ozark Plateau, 
an area less in controversy at the moment. Though of more 
limited value Jefferson accepted the change in plans as some 
compensation for the postponement of his more extensive 
50 plans. 
During the winter of 1804, Jefferson received infer-
mation about the Red River region from Dr. John Sibley who 
soon would be appointed Surgeon and Indian Agent at the 
Natchitoches Post. As indicated earlier Sibley's information 
was based more on hearsay than fact. Regardless, this man's 
correspondence spurred Jefferson on to order another 
expedition up the Red River in May, 1805. Congress appro-
priated additional money, and William Dunbar received his 
orders. Because of the Osage danger and possible difficulty 
in transferring baggage from the headwaters of the Red to 
the Arkansas River, it was decided to ascend the Red River 
to its source and descend the same stream. Jefferson deemed 
' 
50Dunbar's Journal is printed in Documents Relating 
to the Purchase and Exploration of Louisiana. A summary of 
the same journal appears in Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 
2nd Sess., 1106-1146. 
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this a better opportunity to ascertain "that which, in truth, 
next to the Missouri, is the most interesting water of the 
. . . .,51 b . Mississippi. Dun ar was instructed to await orders from 
the Secretary of War~ meanwhile, a Spanish passport was to 
~ be obtained from Casa Calvo. In concluding his letter 
Jefferson advised the leader of the expedition that, 
In the present state of things between 
Spain and us, we should spare nothing 
to secure the friendship of the 
Indians within reach of her.52 
In his letter to Governor Claiborne concerning 
acquisition of a passport for the Dunbar party, Jefferson 
stressed the fact (a fact subsequently stressed to the Spanish) 
that the object of the mission was to ascertain the geography 
of the country -- a purely scientific expedition. The members 
were expressly forbidden to venture beyond the headwaters of 
the Red River, but as they might come upon some Spanish 
subjects along the way a passport was deemed advisable. In 
order to ease the suspicions or fears of the Spanish Jefferson 
suggested to Claiborne ~at he encourage Casa Calvo to send 
51 Jefferson to Dunbar, May 25, 1805, Washington, The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, IV, 577. 
52Ihid. 
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"one or two persons of his own choice as witnesses of our 
proceedings , • .,53 The President further confided to . . 
the Governor, 
as we have to settle a boundary with 
Spain to the Westward they cannot 
expect that we will go blindfold 
into the business. Both parties 
ought to be free to make surveys 
of experiment preparatory to 
settlement, and each having a 
certain claim to the country 
must have equal right to procure 
the information necessar~ for 
elucidating their right. 4 
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When Claiborne approached Casa Calvo on these matters, 
the latter was more than a little embarrassed to know what 
to do. Earlier, when the first Dunbar expedition was pre-
paring to advance up the Red River, Casa Calvo had advised 
the Governor of Texas to take measures to either impede or 
d t h d . . 55 es roy t e expe ition. Now in his perplexity the Marques 
53 Jefferson to Claiborne, May 26, 1805, Carter, 
Territorial Papers, IX, 451. 
54 Ibid. 
' 
55 . f h . . Issac J. Cox, "The Exploration o t e Louisiana 
Frontier, 1803-1806," Annual Report of the American Historical 
Association For the Year 1904 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1905), pp. 162-63. 
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decided to grant the passport and appoint someone to repre-
t 
r sent Spain. At the same time, Casa Calvo concluded that 
L 
since the upper part of the Red River "runs into the Province 
of Texas and perhaps into another Province more remote, it 
seems to me prudent to communicate intelligence [of the 
expedition] to the Commandant-General in Chihuahua. 1156 The 
Spanish Boundary Commissioner was trying to avoid offense 
to the American authorities who were already suspicious of 
him. At the same time he was striving to remain in good 
standing with his superiors in Madrid, and throw the 
responsibility for a final decision about the expedition on 
Nemesio Salcedo. In other words the Spanish officials were 
reacting to the proposed Dunbar venture in a manner quite 
reminiscent of their reaction to Lewis and Clark. 
The Commandant-General was not reluctant to take a 
firm stand against the Dunbar party just as he had pre-
viously done relative to the Lewis and Clark expedition. 
He saw the present effort to explore the Red River as simply 
an attempt to gain military knowledge of the country or to 
' tamper with the allegiance of the Indians. Salcedo saw no 
56 Casa Calvo to Claiborne, July 5, 1805, Rowland, 
Claiborne Letter Books, III, 129. 
L 
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need in further geographical exploration, especially by 
Americans. If the United States wanted geographical information, 
he surmised, all they had to do was apply through proper 
S7 
channels. 
Meanwhile preparations continued. Records indicate 
that William Dunbar was having a difficult time finding 
abl f 't bl h t f t k' b . 58 cap e men o sui a e c arac er or a ing o servations. 
Finally a Lieutenant Thomas Freeman was selected to head the 
expedition under the general supervision of William Dunbar. 59 
Following more delays, however, it was not until April 19, 
1806, that the expedition set out for Natchitoches on the Red 
River. This was actually a most inauspicious moment for the 
party of thirty-seven to set-out from Fort Adams on the 
Mississippi just above the mouth of the Red River. 60 It was 
57
salcedo to Casa Calvo, October 8, 180S, cited in 
Cox, "Exploration of the Louisiana Frontier .•• ," p. 163. 
S8Dunbar to Henry Dearborn, June 8, 1805, National 
Archives, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 
Record Group 107, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, 
Main Series, 1801-1870 (Microcopy No. 221). Future refer-
ences will be cited as WD. Lette:.:s Received. Dunbar to 
Henry Dearborn, October,8, 1805, ibid. 
59 Cox, "Exploration of the Louisiana Frontier ••• ," 
p. 160. 
6
°Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The 
United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (London: The 
Macmillan Company, 1969), p. SS. Fort Adams was established 
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during the early part of 1806 that General James Wilkinson 
was so actively engaged in meeting Spanish reluctance to 
fl;' t move back to the west side of the Sabine. The crisis was 
r,~ 
finally settled by Wilkinson and the Spanish commander, Simon 
de Herrera, in the field by November, but the whole atmosphere 
at the time was definitely not conducive to an attitude of 
1 . th f s . 61 friend iness on e part o pain. 
Nevertheless Freeman led his group up to Natchitoches 
where Sibley gave warning that Spanish soldiers might inter-
cept them should they continue up that river. The warning was 
prophetic, for some 200 miles above Natchitoches a Spanish 
garrison under the command of Don Francisco Viana met the 
Americans and insisted they burn back. Following the Presi-
dent's instructions and realizing the superior force of the 
Spanish, Freeman acceded to the demand. 62 
by General James Wilkinson on Loftus Heights about six miles 
above the Spanish border as defined by Pinckney's Treaty 
along the Mississippi River. Prucha described this post as 
a watchtower to keep an eye on the Spanish in West Florida 
and in Louisiana, and it could stop any large-scale move-
ment up or down the Mississippi. 
61A·discussion of the Neutral Ground Agreement may be 
found in various works on Texas History. One excellent account 
may be found in Odie B. Faulk, A Successful Failure (Austin: 
Steck-Vaughn Company, 1965), pp. 189-96. 
62 Cox, "Exploration of the Louisiana Frontier ••• , 
p. 173. 
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Thus by the end of 1806, Jefferson's plans for 
exploring the Southwestern reaches of Louisiana had apparently 
failed. The immediate results of several years of planning 
and expense were rather meager on the surface. Freeman had 
penetrated the Red River some 635 miles above its mouth, but 
this was no further than French and Spanish traders and 
explorers had ventured years earlier. Furthermore, knowl-
edge of the head waters of the Red River and the Arkansas 
River continued to remain in the area of fanciful geography. 
The long-range results, however, were to be more fruitful. 
Not unmindful of the need to obtain the good will of 
the Indians, Jefferson gathered to his library the reports 
of Dr. John Sibley. The President used these reports, in 
addition to the more official accounts corning in from Dunbar, 
Lewis and Clark, to impress upon Congress the need to con-
tinued exploration of Louisiana. Given the paucity of 
accurate geographical knowledge of the Southwest, Sibley's 
inaccurate and exaggerated reports of the road to Santa Fe 
only further confused the picture. For example, Sibley, 
' using information supplied to him by a man himself relying 
on forty years of memory, put the Panis towns (in present-
day Nebraska) some 300 miles from Santa Fe. 63 
63Message From the President of the United States 
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Cartographic efforts during 1805, although benefiting 
from the reports sent back by Lewis and Clark, remained little 
improved where the Southwest was concerned. Jefferson's 
friend Nicholas King prepared several maps in 1805 based on 
information furnished by the above duo, but the maps were 
still quite vague when depicting the Rocky Mountain region; 
the Rio Grande was confused with the Green River extending 
north meeting the headwaters of the Snake. The geography 
in these maps is quite reminiscent of Arrowsmith's 1802 
64 
efforts. 
In connection with the events thus far discussed 
there remains a need to elaborate somewhat on the idea that 
President Jefferson and the United States Government were 
not particularly determined to push to the gates of Santa 
Fe. The willingness of the President and his Secretary of 
State to bargin with the Spanish over various river boundaries 
Communicating Discoveries Made in Exploring the Missouri, Red 
River and Washita, By Captains Lewis and Clark, Doctor Sibley 
and Mr. Dunbar: With a Statistical Account of the Countries 
Adjacent, February 19, 1806 (Washington, 1806), pp. 110-11. 
Considering that ZebulOll Pike encountered the Pawnees at the 
Republican.Fork of the Kansas River (in eastern Nebraksa) that 
same year, Sibley's information seems a bit inaccurate. 
64 Wheat, From Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 43-44. 
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from the Rio Bravo eastward to the Sabine has been pointed 
out. Likewise, the idea of creating a "buffer-zone" has 
been discussed. These approaches certainly indicate no 
intense drive to "take-over" key Spanish posts in the South-
west. Perhaps much of the "wait-and-see" policy of Jefferson 
stemmed from his concept of what Louisiana was in a physical 
sense and how it could best serve the needs and security of 
the nation. As early as July, 1803, Jefferson stated, 
I presume the island of N. Orleans 
and the settled country on the 
opposite bank will be ann~xed to 
the Mississippi Territory ••• 
The rest of the territory will 
probably be locked up from 
American settlement, and under 
the self-government of the native 
occupants.65 
The matter of what to do about the populace already 
living in Louisiana, and regulations concerning future 
American settlement had come up during the debate over 
ratification of the Purchase Treaty. The Federalists voiced 
opposition to the Purchase on many points, but were 
particularly accusatory On Constitutional items as they knew 
65 Jefferson to Horatio Gates, July 11, 1803, Ford, 
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, VIII, 250. 
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bow scrupulous Jefferson was on such issues. They also knew 
he had some qualms about the constitutionality of the basic 
treaty itself. Citizenship by incorporation was, or could 
be, a complex constitutional problem in relation to the acqui-
sition of Louisiana, and the opposing Federalists well knew 
it. Such a method of naturalization had never been used 
before and would certainly take a broad interpretation of the 
constitution to carry out. Jefferson used the doctrine of 
implied powers, and all the Federalist bombardment about the 
"great waste, a wilderness unpeopled with any beings except 
wolves and wandering Indians," did little to dim the success 
of the Republican President. 66 
The problem of what to do with the territory acquired 
remained. As indicated earlier the President had his own 
ideas, but he also sought advice, and the advice was forth-
coming. Thomas Mann Randolph, a Senate friend of the Chief 
Executive, informed Jefferson that the Senate would no doubt 
ratify the treaty, but he stressed it would be absolutely 
• 66 . 
Jerry w. Knudson, "Newspaper Reaction to the 
Louisiana Purchase," MHR, LXIII (January, 1969), 198. 
Marshall Smelser, Thel5'emocratic Republic, 1801-1815 (New 
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968), p. 98. Federalist 
opposition to the Purchase is well discussed in Merrill D. 
Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 767-72. 
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necessary to prevent Americans from settling on the west bank 
of the Mississippi, by force if persuasion was not sufficient. 
He further observed, 
we cannot in any other way quiet Spain; 
she is jealous of her Mexican subjects 
and so fearful lest our people should 
hold intercourse with them, ••• 
our peace would be in danger unless we 
can satisfy her by obliging ourselves 
to let all the country over the river 
remain.in the ha~ds ~?the Indians for 
a considerable time. · 
Randolph, like the President, knew that numbers of 
people would be anxious to get into Louisiana, but as there 
were "so many great reasons for shut ting up the country, " 
h ld h ·d 1 h l" 68 e wou support t e Presi ent a ong t ese ines. 
Accordingly, no land office had been opened in Upper Louisiana, 
and no one was permitted to settle on the public lands there. 
The military was to insure compliance. 69 Jefferson saw to 
it that knowledge of his sentiments reached the eyes and ears 
67 Thomas M. Randolph to Jefferson, October 29, 1803, 
Jefferson Papers MSS, M~ssouri Historical Society, St. Louis, 
Mo. 
68
rbid. 
69 Jefferson to Lewis Waugh, January 6, 1805, ibid. 
l 
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of the Spanish. Some of the Spanish officials, however, had 
also seen the acquisition of Louisiana as a possible force 
to contain the American population rather than provide an 
area of immediate settlement. Shortly after the Purchase had 
been concluded Casa Yrujo, the Spanish Minister in Washington, 
o.c., brought to the attention of his country that the United 
States Government was well aware of "the evils that will 
f 1 . . L . . 11 70 follow • • • rom co on1z1ng ou1s1ana. Continuing, he 
noted, 
All their efforts will be directed 
on the contrary to concentrate 
their population in the lands 
that they actually occupy, re-
garding as necessary the acquisition 
of Louisiana only in so far as it 
excludes the French whom they feared 
. hb 71 as neig ors •••• 
A few months later Yrujo again wrote to his superior 
in Madrid that American ownership of Louisiana would provide 
Spain with 
t f 70casa Yrujo to'Cevallos, November 5, 1803, Robertson, f Louisiana u·nder Spain, France and the u. s. , II, 118-20. 
t 
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a natural and powerful barrier between 
the population of the American citizens 
and our possessions of New Mexico, ••• 
in addition to the settlements of the 
Indians, an immense desert which will 
serve us equally for protection.72 
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Many factors -- administrative, military, diplomatic --
led Jefferson to follow a particular course. The vastness of 
the territory alone was enough to make any responsible of-
ficial proceed with caution. Historians continually credit 
the "Great American Desert" myth to explorers such as Zebulon 
N. Pike and Stephen H. Long, but one wonders if this concept 
formalized at a later date by these men was not actually given 
birth by the earlier explorers. The concept definitely 
colored the thinking of Jefferson and his official family. 
From Sibley, Freeman and Dunbar the President, when comparing 
their accounts with the French and Spanish sources, could have 
easily drawn a picture of a vast inhospitable land: land fit 
for little more than to house the roaming tribes of Indians. 
The "Great Prairie" was seen by many travelers· as a dry, 
broken and hilly region where scarcity of water could easily 
force one back. ' The country extending between the Panis 
72
casa Yrujo to Cevallos, January 17, 1804, Nasatir, 
Before Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 723. 
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towns and Santa Fe was described as all "country, prairie, 
73 
a few scattering cedar knobs excepted." 
As late as June, 1807, Jefferson talking about the 
expeditions of the past few years concluded, 
For the day must be very distant when 
it will be either the interest or the 
wish of the United States to extend 
settlements into the interior of that 
country.74 
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The more immediate issue confronting the President was 
military in nature. It was necessary that the United States 
make some display of authority over the new land and its 
inhabitants. Frontier defense, of course, necessitated some 
type of Indian policy. The frontier disturbances in the 
Northwest Territory and south of the Ohio during the 1790's 
indicated that as the white man advanced westward the con-
frontations with the Indians would only increase unless some 
better policy could be advanced. The Indian was not accepting 
the white man's civilization as readily as many wished or 
73 Message From the President ••• , February, 1806, 
p. 111. 
74Terry L. Alford, "The West as a Desert In American 
Thought Prior to Day's 1819-1820 Expedition," Journal of The 
West, VIV (October, 1969); Jefferson to Henry Dearborn, June 
22, 1807, Andrew A. Lipscomb (ed.), The Writings of Thomas 
Jefferson (19 vols.; Washington: The Thomas Jefferson 
Memorial Association, 1903-1904), p. 102. 
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expected. Therefore, some men were suggesting that the two 
races be kept apart until some kind of adjustment program 
could be formulated. When the Louisiana Purchase was con-
eluded many thought the answer had arrived. All the lands 
east of the Mississippi could be reserved for white settle-
ment, and the Indians could be relocated in the vast terri-
tory west of the river. The process of "removal" was thus 
born. Francis Prucha, in his recent work, The Sword of the 
Republic, gives Thomas Jefferson credit for originating 
"this noble dream of moving the Indians to a permanent reser-
. f th . . . . "75 vation west o e Miss1ss1pp1 • • • 
Throughout his adult life Jefferson had always been 
prone to extol the virtues of the Indian. Thomas Jefferson, 
the rationalistic product of the Englightenment, let senti-
mentalism blur his scientific vision when his thoughts turned 
to the "noble savage." Taking into account the differences 
in environment between the Indian and the white man, and 
recognizing that the former were still barbarians, Jefferson 
defended them against charges of "deficiency in sexual ardor 
' and lack of· domestic affection," and praised them "for 
75Prucha, Sword of the Republic, p. 74. 
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d f • I 76 courage an orti. tude. ' 
Now as President of the United States he had the 
obligation to defend his nation's borders. He was forced to 
divest himself of tne sentimentality he had previously mani-
fested toward the Indian and remove him from the east bank 
of the Mississippi. Typical of his character, Jefferson 
felt a need to rationalize his deeds; therefore, one can see 
a stress on the humanistic factor of seeking to lead the 
Indian into "the paths of peace and blessings of agricultural 
society. 1177 The fraternal addresses to the Indians came 
forth from the White House as never before. 
Previous to informing Congress of his plans for the 
Indians, Jefferson outlined his ideas to Secretary of War 
Dearborn. Hoping to establish a strong line of American 
settlements along the Mississippi Jefferson suggested that, 
Our proceedings with the Indians should 
tend systematically to that object [pro-
curing Indian lands] leaving the ex-
tinguishment of title in the interior 
country to fall in as occasion may arise. 
' 76 . Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, Vol. 
II of Jefferson and His Time (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1951), p. 102. 
77 Malone, Jefferson the President ••• , p. 273. 
I 
I 
11 
' 
The Indians being once closed in 
between strong settled countries 
on the Mississippi & Atlantic, will, 
for want of game, be forced to agri-
culture, will find that small portions 
of land well improved, will be worth 
more to them than extensive forests 
unemployed, and will be continually 
parting with portions of them, for 
money to buy stock, utensils & 
necessities for their farms & families. 78 
Despite all that he had said in the past about the 
aborigines, he now felt a paternalistic authority must be 
imposed upon them for their own good. To William Henry 
Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory he wrote: 
78 
In this way our settlements will 
gradually circumscribe & approach 
the Indians, & they will in time 
either incorporate with us as 
citizens of the U.S. or remove 
beyond the Mississippi •.•• As 
to their fear, we presume that our 
strength & their weakness is now so 
visible that they must see we have 
only to shut our hand to crush them, 
& that all our liberalities to them 
proceed from motives of pure humanity 
only.79 
' 
Jefferson to Henry Dearborn, December 29, 1802, 
cited in ibid., p. 274. 
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79 Jefferson to William Henry Harrison, February 27, 
1803, ibid., p. 275. 
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As noted above the military situation necessitated 
some display of authority. It was here that differences 
of opinion loomed forth. By the end of 1804, a survey of 
the troop distribution in the Mississippi Valley showed the 
following: 
Fort Massac 61, Kaskaskia 80, St. 
Louis 57, New Madrid 16, Arkansas 
Post 16, Ouachita 19, Attakapas 
14, Opelousas 47, Natchitoches 75, 
New Orleans 375, Fort st. Philip 
67, Fort Adams 4, Fort Pickering 
16.80 
Wilkinson was calling for more posts especially on the upper 
Mississippi and Missouri rivers, but the War Department felt 
the establishment of trading posts with garrison support was 
sufficient for the moment. Were military preparations on the 
frontier adequate or not? The answer depends upon one's 
analysis of the whole Indian problem facing the Jefferson 
Administration, as well as the potentially explosive diplo-
matic situation. In 1805, however, General James Wilkinson 
felt a need to expand military posts. He had been appointed 
Governor of. the Territofy of Louisiana (Upper Louisiana) in 
March, 1805, and was charged to "conciliate the friendship & 
80 Prucha, Sword of the Republic, p. 73. 
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esteem of the Indians generally of that extensive country, & 
to produce pease & harmony • • • between them & the white 
. "81 f . inhabitants. A ter surveying the situation Wilkinson 
observed to the Secretary of War, 
When I estimate the number and force 
of the Indian nations, who inhabit 
the Country watered by the Missouri 
and the Mississippi, and who if not 
made our friends will become our 
enemies -- when I survey the 
Jealousies and the rivalry which 
exist on the side of Canada, --
When I anticipate the fears, 
alarms and counteractions, which 
must necessarily be exertsd on the 
side of New Mexico, -- When I cast 
my eyes over the expanse of Terri-
tory to be occupied or controuled, and 
glance at futurity, I hope you will 
pardon me Sir for observing, with all 
due deference and respect to my 
superiors, that we are not in suf-
ficient strength, of men or means, 
to meet the occasion and profit by 
the favourable circumstances of the 
moment __ 82 
The Secretary of War did not share Wilkinson's con-
cern for immediate precautions. James Wilkinson had a very 
' 81· Secretary of War to Wilkinson, April 19, 1805, 
Carter, Territorial Papers, XII, 116-17. 
82
wilkinson to Secretary of War, September 22, 
1805, ibid., XIII, 230. 
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personal interest in the Southwest; doubtless this interest 
colored his professional attitude. His role in affecting 
Governmental policy will be discussed in the following 
chapter. For the moment, however, it seems to be well 
established that as Jefferson ended one term and advanced 
deep into his second administration, the Federal Government 
was not anxiously pressing at the doors of the rich (?) 
mines of Northern Mexico. 
' 
CHAPTER IV 
THE AMERICAi"lS REACH SA."lTA FE 
It is impossible to discuss any phase of South-
western history for the early nineteenth century without 
mentioning the name of James Wilkinson. Few Americans in 
an official capacity were more directly tied to the destinies 
of United States-Spanish relations than this controversial 
figure. Due to his military and civilian administrative 
positions, which he held concurrently for a period of time, 
Wilkinson was able in a large way to direct American in-
volvement in the trans-Mississippi West. The fact that this 
"backstairs Brigadier" was also on the Spanish pension rolls 
as Agent Number 13, only complicates any evaluation of the 
man and his activities. His nefarious activities as a spy 
and double agent, as well as his attachment to the unsavory 
machinations of Aaron Burr, are only too well known. The 
' man that John Randolph described as "from the bark to the 
very core a villian," has been the subject of numerous 
139 
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h . h d d' l biograp ies, monograp s an other stu ies. When all is· 
said and done, however, one still finds it most difficult 
to label Wilkinson with the onerous title of "traitor." 
True, he did sell information to the Spanish, true, he did 
cavort with Aaron Burr in some type of intrigue which prob-
ably called for the invasion of Mexico, or the separation 
of the Ohio Valley region from the United States, or both. 
The exact nature of the intrigue has never come to light. 
Yet it is difficult to deny that as an American military 
officer he served his country well on more than one occasion. 
Perhaps Marshall Smelser expresses.this man's career well 
when he states, "Wilkinson panned the dregs of international 
intrigue for easy money, which he used for inconspicuous 
consumption. Quite inadvertently, his humbug and avarice 
2 
may have saved his country." 
1Thomas P. Abernethy, The South In the New Nation, 
1789-1819 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1961), p. 294. Among the biographies of James Wilkinson 
the one most recommended is James Ripley Jacobs, Tarnished 
Warrior: !1ajor-General James Wilkinson (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1938). As Wilkinson was so intimately 
tied to the Burr Conspiracy, one should not fail to note 
Thomas P. Abernethy, The Burr Conspiracy (New York: Oxford 
Press, 1954) • 
2 Smelser, The Democratic Republic ••• , p. 112. 
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No attempt will be made here to convict Wilkinson 
of malfeasance in office or acquit him of all charges. His 
biographers have been trying to do both for many years, albeit 
inconclusively. He will be evaluated in light of his positions 
as General of the United States Army and Governor of the Terri-
tory of Louisiana, two positions from which he actively contri-
buted to America's official stand relative to the Spanish 
Southwest, and, in a very special way, affected United States -
Spanish diplomacy. 
James Wilkinson was trusted by several Presidents and 
numerous other officials including his immediate superior, 
3 Secretary of War Henry Dearborn. While Dearborn and Jeffer-
son may have disagreed with the strategy of General Wilkinson, 
they felt his judgement to be in the best interest of the 
nation. It is only years after the events described here that 
the questionable aspects of Wilkinson's life became a topic 
3 General Dearborn cast his fortunes with the party of 
Jefferson, and was regarded as a leading representative of 
the Republicans in New England for many years. On the acces-
sion of Thomas Jeffersoh to the Presidency in March, 1801, 
Dearborn was appointed Secretary of War, a position which he 
occupied for the following eight years. There seems to be 
no reason to question his honesty or ability, but he was 
definitely susceptible to Wilkinson's slyness. Interesting 
comments on his penchant for details may be found in Prucha, 
The Sword of the Republic, pp. 172-74. 
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. 4 
of official investigation and public scandal. The Federal 
Government accepted Wilkinson's plans and moves at face 
value, and any analysis of his role vis-a-vis this nation's 
official position must take such a fact into consideration. 
Therefore, while taking note of questionable motives where 
pertinent, Wilkinson's official acts will be discussed pri-
marily on the basis of his official correspondence and public 
records. 
James Wilkinson, of course, had been personally 
interested in the Spanish Southwest for many years. His 
journey down the Mississippi in the late eighteenth century 
to confer with high ranking Spanish officials was the 
beginning; his tenuous partnership with Aaron Burr, in what 
is now known as the "Burr Conspiracy," furthered his 
4The trial of Aaron Burr brought to light many of 
General Wilkinson's machinations and certainly placed a cloud 
over his name, but he was able to explain away most of what 
he had done. He did not satisfy all present, however, and 
in December, 1807, John Randolph asked for an investigation 
of the rumors that Wilkinson had received money from the 
Spanish while an officer of the United States Army. Wilkin-
son, in turn, asked the President for a court of inquiry. 
In July, 1808, the cour~ made its findings public. It de-
clared that no evidence had been discovered of corruption 
and Wilkinson had behaved "with honour to himself and fidelity 
to his country." Several more investigations and a second 
court martial faced the General before the end of his career, 
but no convictions were obtained. Details of the various 
investigations may be found in Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior. 
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involvement, and Zebulon Pike became his instrument to pene-
trate the Spanish bastion of Santa Fe. When appointed 
Governor of the Louisiana Territory in the Spring of 1805, 
Wilkinson had the perfect opportunity to further any design 
he may have had relative to the penetration of Northern New 
Spain, be it military or commercial penetration. Neverthe-
less, he also had a difficult legitimate task to master. 
As noted in the previous chapter he was charged with 
the pacification of the Indians and responsibility for 
carrying out the Indian policy of the Jefferson administration. 
It has already been noted that the General did not see eye to 
eye on military strategy with the Executive Department, par-
ticularly Secretary of War ~earborn. But a point well worth 
emphasizing is that General Wilkinson had been on the 
Louisiana frontier from the time of the Purchase and even 
before. He had first-hand knowledge of the politics, military 
defense, social matters and diplomatic activities, knowledge I 
he put to good use. 
Shortly following the formal transfer of Upper 
' Louisiana, Wilkinson began pressuring the War Department for 
more troops and more posts. The Jefferson administration, on 
the other hand, was pledged to a regular military force of 
Ii 
: 
' I 
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the bare minimum necessary to police the frontier. 5 Given 
the precarious situation between the United States and Spain 
at the moment, and possibly for reasons of self interest, 
Wilkinson worked diligently to impress upon Dearborn the need 
for extended military posts. Citing the views of another 
military officer, Major James Bruff, who had previously served 
as commander of Upper Louisiana, the General noted that the 
militia was poorly armed and organized, "nor even rolls of 
companies taken or the number ascertained. • .. 6 The General 
further stated, 
Suffer me now to suggest, that if a 
Military Post was established on the 
Missouri at the mouth of the river 
Platt [sic] between whose waters 
and those of the del nord [Rio 
Grande] there is but a short carrying 
place; where Traders from Santa Fe 
meet ours -- as is absolutely the 
case at this moment. • • • They 
5Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians, A Study in 
Administrative History, 1801-1829 (New York: The Free Press, 
1951), pp. 211-12. L. D. Ingersoll, A History of the War 
Department of the United States, with Biographical Sketches 
of the Secretaries (Wash'ington: 1879), pp. 100-01. One 
could also refer to Prucha, Sword of the Republic. 
6
wilkinson to Dearborn, November 2, 1804, Carter, 
Territorial Papers, XIII, 59. 
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might check; if not prevent; 1711e 
depredations of Indians • • • 
Relations with Spain during the months subsequent 
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to the Louisiana Purchase were most precarious; the national 
government was quite aware of the situation. In early Feb-
ruary, 1805, Wilkinson received an interesting missive from 
the Secretary of War. Given the General's personal interest 
in the Southwest and the tone of later directives from the War 
Department, this letter takes on added importance. Drawing 
attention to Spanish military activities in the Texas-
Louisiana region Dearborn instructed Wilkinson to alert his 
officers, 
as will result in satisfactory 
intelligence as to what move-
ments are in operation, or have 
been effected, within the boundaries 
of Louisiana, between the Rio Bravo 
and our advanced posts to the West-
ward of the Mississippi; from the 
Red River to the borders of the Bay 
of Mexico. • • • It will be particu-
larly desirable to know what is 
doing at St. Antonio •••• 
Individuals in the character 
of hunters or traders may probably 
, 
7Ibid. This information is actually taken from the 
i enclosure-Wilkinson included in his letter to Dearborn: Bruff 
~to Wilkinson, September 29, 1804. 
be emplo~ed with secrecy and 
success. 
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Was this directive not encouraging to a man who was 
already busily engaged in "sounding out" the situation on the 
frontiers of New Spain? For some sixteen years Wilkinson had 
studied the strategic value of Santa Fe and New Orleans as 
approaches to Mexico. The adventurer and trader Philip Nolan 
served as a source of information for many years but his 
untimely death in 1801 deprived the General of a valuable 
9 
agent. A few years later Wilkinson's interest again became 
active when he received an invitation from Jefferson to come 
to Washington and meet Baron Alexander von Humboldt. This 
eminent scientist had concluded his now famous expedition 
throughout much of Spain's New World empire, and was visiting 
8
oearborn to Wilkinson, February 26, 1805, WD. Letters 
Sent-Military Affairs, Roll. 2. ,j 
9Loomis, Pedro Vial •.• , pp. 206-25. Issac J. Cox, 
"Opening the Santa Fe Trail," Missouri Historical Review, XXV 
(1931), 36. Philip Nolan was an associate of Wilkinson, on 
good terms with Miro and Carondelet, and an adviser at one 
time to Thomas Jefferson: He was a prodigious adventurer, 
daring and ambitious, but apparently without deep loyalty 
to anybody but himself. Like his associate Wilkinson this 
mustanger was able to work both sides of the road at once, 
although he proved to be less clever than the American 
General. 
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Washington, D. c., on his way back to Europe. The Baron gave 
Jefferson a nineteen-page "tableau statistique," reporting 
population and other data on Mexico. The information was 
submitted by von Humboldt upon request of the American Presi-
dent who was obviously interested in all data relative to the 
f th d . t d t b d f L ' · lO area o e ispu e wes ern oun ary o ouisiana. 
Wilkinson was unable to accept the President's invitation at 
the moment and lamented the fact that the Baron would have to 
depart the United States before a meeting could be arranged. 
Wilkinson related to the President, "I feel a strong Interest 
in haveing [sic] his answers to the queries which I take the 
liberty to inclose you, because by such answers [I] shall be 
able to determine the accuracy of his information. 1111 The 
10 Donald Jackson (ed.), The Journals of Zebulon Mont-
gomery Pike With Letters and Related Documents ( 2 vols.: 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), II, 370. Hum-
boldt visited Washington in June, 1804. He loaned Albert 
Gallatin a copy of his map (yet to be published) , and sub-
mitted the "tableau statistique" to Jefferson in response to 
a request made on June 9, 1804. Contrary to what others 
have said about Humboldt presenting a copy of his map to the 
President, Donald Jackson cites evidence to support his claim 
that a copy was merely loaned for a brief period of time to 
the Secretary of the TreJsury: a copy which Humboldt received 
back on June 27, 1804. During the time the map was in 
Washington, however, Aaron Burr secured it for a brief time 
and had it copied. This map, or portion thereof, found its 
way to Wilkinson and subsequently to Pike. 
11Ibid. 
L 
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"queries" in Wilkinson's letter, however, suggest that he was 
asking for information he already possessed, such as the 
population of the province of Nueva Leon. 12 
Meanwhile, following his appointment as Governor of 
the Louisiana Territory and initiating his plans with Aaron 
Burr, Wilkinson headed for St. Louis to take up his new 
administrative duties. Upon reaching the city General Wilkin-
son first met and dined with Auguste Chouteau, instead of 
Major Bruff, the more logical person to contact according to 
military protocol. Chouteau was a leading civil figure in 
the city, being a magistrate. The Chouteau family had been 
leading and influential traders out of St. Louis for several 
generations. 13 Wilkinson was not unaware of Chouteau's position 
in the community and knew the latter had received trading 
rights from the Spanish government before Upper Louisiana 
12Ibid. The above incident is also described in Issac 
J. Cox, The-Ea°rly Exploration of Louisiana (Cincinnati: 
University of Cincinnati Press, 1905), p. 91, but the author 
gives no explanation or analysis concerning the queries of 
Wilkinson. 
13Loornis, Pedro'Vial •.• , p. 62. At the age of 
fourteen Chouteau had been sent by Laclede (his stepfather) 
to help in the building of St. Louis. He early gained 
experience in dealing with the Indians, and had a monopoly 
on Osage trade from 1794 to 1802. He was one of the first 
three judges of Louisiana under the United States, and in 
1808 was made colonel of the St. Louis militia. 
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became American territory. Chouteau was also one of the 
chief promoters of the local fur trade in which Governor 
Wilkinson would demonstrate more than a passing interest. 
By the end of July, 1805, the clever Wilkinson had 
already made use of his successful overtures to Chouteau 
and had arranged for a Lieutenant George Peter with a military 
escort to accompany Chouteau to the Osage country. The de-
clared purpose of the expedition was to invite some of the 
Indians to visit the nation's capital and meet their new 
r "Chief," but the trader was also to direct his attention to 
gathering geographical information, particularly about the 
14 distances to Santa Fe. Wilkinson could thus carry out the 
wishes of the President and at the same time serve his own 
d h th . h b 15 en s, w atever ey mig t e. Perhaps it was Auguste 
Chouteau who convinced Wilkinson, however unwittingly, that 
a road to Santa Fe was actually in the making. 
Not satisfied with this sole effort, Wilkinson, around 
the same time, dispatched Lieutenant Zebulon Montgomery Pike 
to the source waters of the Mississippi. This was the first 
' 
14
wilkinson to Chouteau, July 30, 1805, Carter, 
Territorial Papers, XIII, 183. 
15
cox, "Opening the Santa Fe Trail," p. 41. 
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"errand" the young army officer was to perform for his com-
mander. Pike was to note geographical and scientific infer-
mation, and ascertain key locations for military posts be-
tween St. Louis and Prairie du Chien. He was likewise to 
arrange settlements of land acquisition from the Indians for 
d . l' . t 11 t. 16 the propose mi itary ins a a ions. Pike left St, Louis 
in July, 1805, and was back by the end of October. The de-
tails of his Mississippi adventure are not of immediate con-
cern here. Whether the expedition was successful or not re-
mains a debatable question, but it did serve to give the young 
lieutenant some experience before his major trek west. As 
General Wilkinson later phrased it, "they [the expeditions 
of George Peter and Zebulon Pike] serve to instruct our young 
officers and also our soldiery, on subjects which may hereafter 
become interesting to the United States. 1117 
Meanwhile Wilkinson continued his efforts to convince 
a frugal administration to expand its military budget. The 
16 b . f . t' A rie descrip ion 
can be found in Prucha, 'sword 
The full Journals and related 
Jackson, Journals of Pike, I. 
of the Mississippi expedition 
of the Republic, pp. 88-91. 
documents can be located in 
17
wilkinson to Dearborn, August 25, 1805, Jackson, 
Journals of Pike, I, 232. 
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secretary of War had left no room for doubt as to projected 
military spending when he informed the frontier commander 
in early 1805 that "as no permanent Military Posts, can, 
with propriety, be immediately established, it will be im-
proper to incur any considerable expense, for works or 
18 buildings at present." Leonard White in his work, the 
Jeffersonians, aptly describes the situation when he states, 
"the election of Thomas Jefferson in 1800 and the appointment 
of Albert Gallatin as Secretary of the Treasury • • • fore-
ld l "ttl 1 f th f . 1 ld" 1119 to i e g ory or e pro essiona so ier •••• 
Undaunted, Wilkinson wrote Dearborn shortly after taking 
over his new position, 
On the Subject of Indian affairs in 
this New World, it must occur, that 
to extend the name and influence of 
the United States to the remote 
Nations, will require considerable 
disbursements: our relations to 
Spain & Britain on our Southern, 
Western and Northern unexplored 
frontiers Suggest the expediency 
of attaching to us, all the Nations 
who drink of the waters which fall 
' 
18 b "lk. Dear orn to Wi inson, April 19, 1805, Carter, 
Territorial Papers, XIII, 116. 
19
white, The Jeffersonians, ••• , p. 211. 
into the Gulph of Mexico; • • • 
The Comrnanches, who resort the 
tract of Country between the 
Osages and S~ Afee [sic], during 
the temperature Seasons, merit 
particular attention, because they 
••• have it in their power to 
facilitate or impede our march to 
New Mexico, should such a move- 20 
ment ever become necessary • • • 
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Wilkinson further informed the Secretary that he intended to 
hold a conference with both the Osages and Comanches, who 
were usually warring factions, by the following Spring. 21 
The phrase, "our march to Santa Fe," in the above 
letter has been cited often to emphasize the personal am-
bitions of Wilkinson. Could the remark not be in line with 
military preparedness for a potentially explosive border war? 
Even Dearborn, whose parsimony has already been noted, saw 
the strategic value of a "Santa Fe highway" stretching forth 
from St. Louis. 22 In fact, according to the official 
20
wilkinson to Dearborn, July 27, 1805, Carter, 
Territorial Papers, XIII, 169. 
21Ibid. ' 
22
wilkinson to Dearborn, September 8, 1805, Jackson, 
Journals of Pike, II, 100. This letter clearly indicates that 
Wilkinson and Dearborn had discussed the military value of 
a road to New Mexico. In a letter to General Wilkinson dated 
il.··...... October 16, 1805, Dearborn states "I am more fully convinced, 
by your communication, of the practicability, if necessary, 
correspondence, it was not until late 1805 that Wilkinson, 
himself, considered any land expedition from St. Louis to 
Santa Fe practical. In a letter to the Secretary of War 
in September Wilkinson stated, 
I recollect having once disagreed 
with you as to the Practicability 
of carrying an expedition from this 
point into New Mexico, and my ob-
jections were founded on the length 
of the March, and the difficulty of 
Subsisting the Troops -- but these 
Obstacles have vanished, before 
the information I have obtained 
since my arrival here; for I find 
we may derive abundant supplies 
of meat from the fields and Forests 
• • • and that the practicable 
distance does not exceed 900 miles, 
over a surface in general Smooth 
23 
. . . 
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Meanwhile Wilkinson had informed the Government about 
the expeditions up the Mississippi and to the Osages, flat-
tering himself that the results would "justify the toil and 
of a military movement, either by the Platt, the Osage or 
the Arkansas, to the Eastern part of Mexico; -- and I am 
not sure that a project .pf that kind may not become neces-
sary." See· Carter, Territorial Papers, XIII, 240. 
23 
'lk' b s t rnb 8 1805 J k W1 ins on to Dear orn, ep e er , , ac son, 
Journals of Pike, II, 100-01. 
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expense. 1124 He then proceeded to draw up a detailed project 
for military deployment throughout the territory: 
Taking it for granted, that we shall 
not be able to controul the Indians, 
before we get possession of the in-
terior of their Country, I beg leave 
to submit to your consideration, the 
expediency of making enquiry, for the 
most critical points of occupancy, on 
both Rivers. . . • I would recommend 
a Position on the River plate [Platte] 
• • • at the Panis Towns on the right 
bank of the said River, fifty leagues 
(french computation) from its con-
fluence with the Missouri, and Thir-
teen Days moderate walk, from the 
Settlements of New Mexico -- 25 
Later the same month Wilkinson again brought the 
Secretary of War's attention to the strategic importance of 
Santa Fe. Obviously quoting from various bits of information 
brought to St. Louis by traders and trappers, Wilkinson in-
formed Dearborn that he had discovered a "most direct route 
to St. Afee [sic] ." 26 Perhaps the most interesting and curious 
24
wilkinson to Dearborn, August 10, 1805, Carter, 
Territorial Papers, XIII, 183. 
' 25
rbid. The actual distances involved to New Mexico 
obviously remain vague in the mind of Wilkinson. 
26
wilkinson to Dearborn, August 25, 1805, Jackson, 
Journals of Pike, I, 232-33. 
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item in this letter of August 25, 1805, was the General's 
statement concerning geography. Referring to the famous 
map of Baron von Humboldt, Wilkinson noted that the river 
"of which the mouth is said to be unknown, is the Arkansaw 
[sic] which gives also the small branch marked R. Rouge near 
Af ,.2 7 to St. ee. Wilkinson is saying here that the river 
rising in the vicinity of Santa Fe, believed to be the Red 
by von Humboldt, was actually a branch of the Arkansas. 
The German scientist had relied extensively on the earlier 
maps of Mier y Pacheco for his delineation of Northern New 
Spain, which meant that all of the cartographic errors of 
the eighteenth century were perpetuated by the influential 
Humboldt map. The Baron showed the Red River rising in the 
mountains east of Taos, a mark which he borrowed from Mier 
y Pacheco, and merged it with the Pecos calling the result 
28 
"The Rio Rojo de Natchitoches ou Rio de Pecos." As Donald 
Jackson so cogently points out, Wilkinson's statement to 
' 28Ibid., 455. Although not published until 1812, the 
map was actually drawn in 1803, and von Humboldt had it with 
him when he visited President Jefferson in 1804. The facts 
are not clear, but somehow the information on the. Humboldt 
map found its way to General Wilkinson and was transmitted 
to the charts carried by Pike. See footnote tlO. 
l 
oearborn mentioned above was a correction on the Humboldt 
map. If the General truly knew what he had corrected from 
Humboldt's map and passed this information on to Pike, the 
whole motive factor of the Pike "mistake" would have to be 
taken in a different light. 29 To rely upon Donald Jackson 
once more, he believes that the confused wanderings of 
30 Pike "are ample proof he accepted Humboldt." 
Throughout the months of August and September 
Governor Wilkinson continued to dwell upon the same ideas 
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of needed posts on the frontier and an increased Indian paci-
fication program. He felt the two points were inseparable. 
Until peace could be restored between the Osage and the 
Comanches, and an understanding reached with the Pawnees, 
no allegiance could be counted upon. Our military prepared-
ness would also be jeopardized. The single best summary of 
Wilkinson's defense plans can be found in his letter of 
September 8, 1805, to Secretary of War Dearborn. Due to the 
subsequent actions of Wilkinson this letter becomes quite 
important and should be quoted at some length. 
' 
29Ibid., I, 456-57. Donald Jackson does not believe 
Pike knew of or accepted Wilkinson's "corrections," but 
accepted Humboldt's notations. 
)Oibid. 
L 
The nearest water approach from the 
Missouri to St. Afee, will be found by 
the superior right branch of the Osage 
River, which is navigable in general 
from the 1st March to the 10th of June, 
to a village of traders & hunters, 
standing about fifteen leagues above the 
fork, called Choeatou [Chouteau] -- from 
this place to the crossing of the Arkan-
s aw river in the route, is five days easy 
march. I have not been able to ascertain 
the distance from this [place] to the 
Mountains but the Mountain is refuted 
[sic] to be, about 100 miles [from] St. 
Afee where you cross it, the country 
campaign &c. abounding with sheep, 
cattle, and horses .•.• 
It appears from my information, that the 
Arkansaw river is navigable, far above the 
crossing to light Batteaux, and of course 
should there be no obstructions below, 
that river will furnish us the nearest 
water approach to New Mexico. It there-
fore becomes extremely desireable it 
should be reconnoitred, and this cannot 
be done, with any prospect of safety, or 
Success, before we have brought the 
numerous Erratic nation of Y,a, tans, 
or Commanchees to a conference, be-
cause they reign the uncontrouled Masters 
of that Country •••• 
Should We be involved in a War, (which 
Heaven Avert) and it should be judged 
expedient to take possession of New 
Mexico, magazines of flour, ammunition 
and arms, par~icularly Cavalry equip-
ment with ten field Pieces, should be 
dispatched up the Arkansaw or Osage 
River about the 1st of March, and a 
Corps of 100 Artillerists, 400 Cavalry, 
400 Riflemen and 1100 Musquetry, should 
move from this place about the 20th of 
April •••• These dispositions with 
judicious and rapid movements, ••• 
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and we should take possession of 
the Northern Province without 
opposition •••• The uncertainty 
of human life and the instability 
of political affairs, induce me to 
lodge this information with you in 
its present crude State, ••• 31 
Wilkinson felt that Spain, especially in a hostile 
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situation could employ the Indians "to obstruct our enter-
prizes and to harass our frontiers. 1132 He knew the Spaniards 
were just as well aware of their potential advantage and he 
wanted to forestall any headway they might be making. 33 It 
was in this same letter that the Secretary of War was given 
notice of Wilkinson's plans to send out an expedition to the 
River Platte in the fall to construct a military post. 
The result of these plans was an expedition headed 
by the General's own son, Lieutenant James B. Wilkinson, up 
the Missouri to the mouth of the Platte in October, 1805. 
31
wilkinson to Dearborn, September 8, 1805, ibid., 
II, 100-102. 
32wilkinson to Uearborn, September 22, 1805, Carter, 
Territorial· Papers, XIII, 229. 
33Ibid. Wilkinson to Dearborn, October 8, 1805, 
ibid., 235. 
--------
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The expedition failed to reach its destination. About 300 
miles up the Missouri a clash occurred with Indians, and the 
encounter was sufficient to check the enterprise. The group 
34 
was bacl( in St. Louis by December. 
The United States Government was not particularly 
happy with what James Wilkinson was doing, and by October, 
1805, the General knew it. Even before Lt. Wilkinson had 
started to ascend the Missouri, the Secretary of War had 
penned a directive (which did not reach St. Louis before the 
expedition h_ad set out) again emphasizing the government's 
policy of consolidation rather than dispersa1. 35 The di-
rective was followed a few weeks later by another "reminder" 
of the current sentiment of the administration. There was 
no excuse for any misunderstanding on Wilkinson's part when 
he read the following: 
34 
no detachment should be made, to any 
distant new post, at present. And, as 
the establishment of new & distant posts 
will, at all times, be a proper subject 
for Executive discretion, the appro-
bation of the President of the United 
States, should,be considered necessary 
Cox, "Opening the Santa Fe Trail," 43-44. 
35
oearborn to Wilkinson, October 10, 1805, Carter, 
Territorial Papers, XIII, 239. 
previous to any actual arrange-
ments for such objects. 
I hope you have not made any 
detachments or taken steps, 
which may not accord with the 
foregoing observations. 36 
Interestingly enough, in light of the above, the 
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' secretary also informed Wilkinson that relations with Spain 
were very cloudy and he was becoming more convinced that in 
the event of a rupture a military movement by the Platte or 
Arkansas rivers to New Mexico would be advisable. 37 Never-
theless the operations by the Genernl out of St. Louis were 
being officially frowned .upon. A rather stinging reprimand 
was forthcoming in the latter part of November. Secretary 
Dearborn wrote General Wilkinson, 
251-52. 
239. 
Sir, Your ordering a detachment to 
the River Plat [sic] especially with 
a view of establishing a Military Post 
at a distance from 600 to 800 miles 
from St. Louis, is very much to be 
regretted. Indeed, it was not believed 
you would undertake the execution of 
36 ' oe·arborn to Wilkinson, November 2, 180 5, ibid. , 
37
nearborn to Wilkinson, October 16, 1805, ibid., 
such distant projects without the 
express approbation of the Presi-
dent of the u.s .... 38 
Wilkinson was further instructed to recall his 
expedition and take no such further moves unless directed 
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.d 39 by the Presi ent. As already mentioned, other factors had 
caused the return of the General's son and his men. Wilkin-
son did not let the reaction of the War Department hinder his 
future plans concerning investigation of the West. In fact, 
he penned a lengthy defense of his actions to the Secretary 
of War strongly emphasizing the necessity of making American 
strength visible to the Indians between the Missouri and the 
Spanish settlements in New Mexico. He saw a definite need to 
draw the natives away from Spanish influence; to Wilkinson 
th d . . 40 e nee was imperative. Official Washington apparently 
was not impressed, and with trouble increasing on the Texas-
Louisiana frontier troops were being concentrated in that area. 
By May of the following year Wilkinson himself was in command 
38
oearborn to Wilkinson, November 21, 1805, ibid., 
290. 
39Ibid. 
40
wilkinson to Dearborn, December 30, 1805, ibid., l 355-56. 
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along the Sabine. The military emergency, however, did not 
deter this army commander from setting afoot one of the most 
famous and controversial of all western expeditions. 
Zebulon Pike had barely returned from the upper reaches 
of the Mississippi when Wilkinson dispatched him to the South-
west. Exactly what part the Pike expedition played regarding 
the General's personal ambitions is not readily discernable. 
The Burr Conspiracy was well underway at this time, and 
Wilkinson was a major figure in it. Any information he could 
obtain about Spanish strength in the Santa Fe region could 
only prove advantageous. From a military point of view, how-
ever, the Pike expedition could not be considered out of line 
with military preparedness. The Indian problem did not need 
attention, and the explosive military situation was real. 
In light of the above the question arises, did the 
General purposely set the stage? Again, the answer is not 
easily found. What role did Zebulon Pike play in the drama? 
To his dying day Pike would contend that his expedition to 
the west had no connection with the Burr Conspiracy. If the 
' explorer's words may be accepted at face value, one can refer 
to his Account published in 1810, where he states, 
The great objects in view by this 
expedition (as I conceived) in 
addition to my instructions, were 
to attach the Indians to our 
government, and to acquire such 
geographical knowledge of the 
south-western boundary of 
Louisiana as to enable govern-
ment to enter into a definitive 
arrangement for a line of de-
markation [sic] between that 
territory and North Mexico.41 
The official correspondence of the Pike expedition 
tends to support this statement completely, but many his-
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torians have a strong suspicion that the Lieutenant received 
additional secret instructions of a less savory nature. What 
about the personal character of Zebulon Montgomery Pike? 
Here again there is little agreement among historians. One 
respected author describes Pike as an "ambitious young of-
f . h 1 k. f d . ' . . .. 4 2 icer, w o was oo ing orwar to a captain s commission. 
Another writer states that Pike's actions were "prompted by 
selfishness and vanity and carried out in stupidity -- on 
which last count, certainly it would not be hard to sustain 
a conviction. 1143 One can read elsewhere that he was an 
41Pike's Preface. Jackson, Journals of Pike, I, xxiv. 
42 Cox, "Opening the Santa Fe Trail," 47. 
43Loomis, Pedro Vial ••• , p. 235. 
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"innocent pawn." Donald Jackson, the foremost present-day 
scholar on the Pike expeditions, believes the young junior 
officer to have been basically honest and loyal, a "rather 
simple soldier. 1145 Jackson concludes that Pike was guilty of 
nothing more than attempting to explore the West and spy for 
his country. 46 He was a spy and proud to be one. The fact 
does remain, however, that General Wilkinson ordered the Pike 
expedition on his own authority without seeking prior authority 
from Washington, D.C. -- a point on which he had been care-
fully briefed. 
Pike received his orders in June, 1806. By this date 
Lewis and Clark were back on the upper reaches of the Missouri 
on their return trek and the Freeman expedition up the Red 
River had been turned back by the Spanish. At the moment 
there were legitimate reasons existing for sending Pike west. 
44 Smelser, The Democratic Republic, p. 131. 
45Donald Jackson, "The American Entrada: A Spanish 
Point of View," printed in John Francis McDermott (ed.), 
The Frontier Reexamined' (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1967), p. 20. 
46 Donald Jackson, "How Lost was Zebulon Pike?" 
American Heritage (February, 1965), 75-80. 
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some Osage Indians needed to be escorted back to their 
villages; the Kansas had sought American aid in making peace 
with the Osages, and, as no successful contact had been made 
with the Comanche tribes, the General felt the time was 
appropriate. To these duties Wilkinson added instructions 
for Pike to explore the headwaters of the Arkansas River. 
Upon the completion of this reconnaissance he was to proceed 
to the Red River and descend that river to the United States 
post at Natchitoches. This part of the expedition could 
easily have been scientific and military purposes to benefit 
the nation, Wilkinson's personal ambitions notwithstanding. 
The instructions to Pike read in part, 
As your Interview with the 
Cammanchees [sic] will probably 
lead you to the Head Branches of 
the Arkansaw [sic] , and Red Rivers 
you may find yourself approximate 
to the settlements of New Mexico, 
and therefore it will be necessary 
you should move with great circum-
spection, to keep clear of any Hunt-
ing or reconnoitring parties from 
that province, & to prevent alarm or 
offense because the affairs of Spain, 
& the United States appear to be on 
the point of amicable adjustment, 
and more over it is the desire of 
the President, to cultivate the 
Friendship & Harmonious Intercourse 
of all the Nations of the Earth, & 
particularly our near neighbors the 
Spaniards •••• 
L 
It is an object of much Interest with 
the Executive, to ascertain the 
Direction, extent, & navigation of 
the Arkansaw, & Red Rivers; as far 
therefore as may be compatible with 
these Instructions and practicable 
to the means you may Command, I wish 
you to carry your views to those 
ub . t 47 s Jee s, ••• 
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Additional instructions were issued to Pike on July 
12, 1806, informing him that a Dr. John Hamilton Robinson 
. . h 1 48 was to JOl.n t e party as a vo unteer surgeon. It is this 
move that greatly increases the factors of intrigue and 
espionage surrounding the motivation of Wilkinson and the 
whole Pike expedition. In addition to his stated duties, 
Robinson was entrusted with the ostensible mission of col-
lecting the monetary claims that the St. Louis merchant 
William Morrison had against the trader Baptiste La Lande, 
who had departed for Santa Fe in 1804 and had never 
49 
returned. Many works on the Pike expedition, including the 
47 'lk. Wi. inson to Pike, June 24, 1806, Jackson, Journals 
of Pike, I, 285-87. 
' 48w~lk' i inson to Pike, July 12, 1806, ibid. I 288-89. 
49The Morrison-Lalande incident was developed in 
Chapter II, above. 
1.I 
dated but respected edition of Pike's Journals by Elliot 
coues, see the addition of Robinson to the expedition as 
proof that Santa Fe and not the Red River was the primary 
50 
objective of the venture. Wilkinson's motives remain a 
question mark. 
Zebulon Montgomery Pike with his detachment of one 
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lieutenant (James B. Wilkinson, the General's son), nineteen 
men, an interpreter and a volunteer surgeon, set out on July 
15, 1806. They headed up the Missouri to the Osage River, 
following that river to its source and continuing to the 
Kansas, on whose Republican Fork they held council with the 
Pawnees. They then turned southwest, crossing the branches 
of the Kansas River including Smokeyhill Forks, to the · 
Arkansas. It was here that Lt. Wilkinson was sent down 
50Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire •.• , p. 47. 
Professor Goetzrnann relies on Coues for most of his con-
clusions about the Pike expedition. Issac J. Cox believes 
Robinson's real purpose for being a member of the expedition 
was to carry out Wilkinson's object of exploring a trail 
directly to Santa Fe. See Cox, "Opening the Santa Fe Trail," 
48. In his two volume work on the fur trade Chittenden notes 
that "every_ circumstanc~ of the expedition indicates that it 
Was all a scheme to get into Santa Fe ••• ,"The American 
Fur Trade •.• , II, 493. Donald Jackson disagrees com-
pletely. He notes that Robinson brought no private com-
munications from Wilkinson to Salcedo, and that the former 
Was not a party to "the General's shadowy intrigues with 
Spain." See Jackson, Journals of Pike, II, 206. / 
river with despatches and a map of the region thus far 
51 traversed. The remaining group, alarmed somewhat by 
evidence that a large Spanish party had recently visited 
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the .area (a point discussed below), turned west rather than 
continuing in a southerly direction. The Rockies were first 
sighted in mid-November which Pike described as 
a spur of the grand western chain 
oflilOUntains which divide the waters 
of the Pacific from those of the 
Atlantic oceans, ••• they appear 
to present a natural boundary 
between the province of Louisiana 
and New Mexico and would 0e a de-
fined and natural boundary. 52 
This statement by Pike seems to be further evidence 
that he was relying on the Humboldt map. It has been indi-
,, cated above that Baron von Humboldt relied heavily upon 
l 
Mier y Pacheco's map of the famous Escalante expedition for 
his "Map of the Kingdom of New Spain." By his own admission 
the German scientist noted that most of the western part of 
53 North America was "still but very imperfectly known," and, 
' 51 . 
Jackson, Journals of Pike, II, 17-18. 
52 Journal Entry for November 15, 1806, ibid., I, 345. 
53 Wheat, The Spanish Entrada ••• , I, 132-33. 
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although he was reluctant to "draw from suspicious sources," 
he incorporated the cargographic efforts of the Spanish for 
the entire northwestern third of his famous map published in 
1811. Since Mier y Pacheco (and Humboldt) had pictured the 
Rocky Mountains as the spine or backbone of North America in 
which all the major rivers of the continent had their source, 
it is little wonder that Pike came to his geographical con-
. 55 
clusions. 
To continue with the expedition, the remainder of 
November .and December were spent exploring the Rockies north 
to the sources of the South Platte and as far south as the 
Sangre de Cristos Mountains of southern Colorado and New 
Mexico. It was during these weeks that Pike came to the 
conclusion that the sources of the Platte and Arkansas came 
from "that grand reservoir of snows and fountains, 1156 a 
54 Ibid., 134. Humboldt's "Map of the Kingdom of New 
Spain," was published in two large sheets and extends from 
Natchitoches on the east to the head of the Gulf of Cali-
fornia on the west, and from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec 
on the south, to the "Lac de Timpanogos" on the north. 
' 55 . Alter, "Father Escalante' s Map," p. 67. 
56Pike's Dissertation on Louisiana, Jackson, Journals 
Of Pike, II, 26. 
L 
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reservoir which also fed the other major rivers flowing forth 
from the Rocky Mountain chain, including the Red River. Carl 
Wheat calls this idea the most forceful expression to date 
of the long-held hypothesis of a common continental river 
57 
source. William Clark swallowed this notion lock, stock, 
and barrel, and added the information later to his famous 
manuscript map of the Western country. Yet another step in 
58 the perpetuation of mythical geography. 
In mid-January, after leaving some of his men in a 
small fort on the Fountain river, a tributary of the upper 
Arkansas, Pike set out with Dr. Robinson and twelve men to-
ward the south. Two weeks later the party reached the Rio 
Grande which Pike believed (?) to be the Red River. On the 
Rio Consejos, a small branch of the Rio Grande, the 
57 Wheat, From Lewis and Clark .•• , II, 18. 
58Ibid. Some inferences about Western geography 
indicate that Pike may have seen a copy of William Clark's 
map of 1805. This map was drawn while Lewis and Clark were 
wintering with the Mandans in 1804-05 and was sent down the 
Missouri in the spring. for the country west of the Mandan 
Villages, Clark relied wholly upon second-hand knowledge and 
legend. On this map the headwaters of the Yellowstone and 
the South Platte intertwine, and the sources of the Arkansas, 
Rio Grande and the Colorado are close by. Donald Jackson 
notes that Pike himself "could hardly have drawn a better 
representation of his reservoir of snows and fountains." 
Jackson, Journals of Pike, I, 461. 
. ; 
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half-frozen party constructed a rude stockade. It was here 
on February 26, 1807, that a detachment of Spanish soldiers 
arrived to "escort" Pike and his men to Santa Fe. When told 
he was on the Rio Grande, Pike's retort was simply "is not 
this the Red River. 1159 
Whether he was truly lost or not has remained a con-
troversial point among historians. Given the state of 
geographic knowledge and cartographic accuracy at the time, 
one could easily agree with Carl Wheat's evaluation of Pike's 
geographic conclusions. He contends that Pike, using the 
maps available to him, should hardly be condemned for not 
recognizing the distinction between the various rivers, none 
of which he had seen. Pike's confusion regarding the rivers 
of the West and his "reservoir of snows" idea were both "part 
60 
and parcel of the ideas of the age." 
Accident or no, Pike and his men were on Spanish soil 
and were escorted to the New Mexican Capital as closely 
guarded "guests" of the Spanish government. If he were a 
spy he surely had an opportunity seldom afforded men in that 
' 
59 Journal Entry for February 26, 1806, ibid., 384. 
60 Wheat, From Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 26-27. 
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profession. Before his sojourn was complete he had ample 
time to observe everything about New Mexico, and, as it 
turned out, much of Northern New Spain. By the second of 
March the American party was in Santa Fe. From there Pike 
and his group were escorted to Chihuahua where the Commandant-
General could make a final decision on the future of the ex-
pedition. Although his notes and papers were confiscated, 
Pike was treated in a manner befitting his rank and position. 
~" f After several weeks at the Provincial headquarters of Nemesio 
i,~ 
r Salcedo, the Americans were escorted across Texas to Natchi-
~ toches, reaching that post on July 1, 1807. 61 Back on 
l 
American soil Zebulon Pike had completed what one writer 
describes as the most successful espionage operation ever 
. h. 62 conducted in recorded American istory. 
61For an interesting description of Santa Fe see 
Pike's Journal Entry for March 2, 1806, Jackson, Journals 
of Pike, I, 391-92. Among his other impressions of the town 
he noted, "Its appearance from a distance, struck my mind 
with the same effect as a fleet of the flat bottomed boats, 
which are seen in the spring and fall seasons, descending 
the Ohio River. There are two churches, the magnificence 
of whose steeples form a striking contrast to the miserable 
appearance of the houses'." For information regarding the 
trip to Chihuahua and reception in that city see Alencaster's 
Memorandum, April 10, 1807, and Pike to Nemesio Salcedo, 
April 14, 1807, ibid., II, 193-97. 
62Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire ••• , p. 50. 
Professor Goetzmann no doubt bases his remark on the fact 
that Pike returned to the United States able to give 
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Another aspect of the Pike expedition which only 
further confuses the issue was the fact that General Wilkin-
son, knowing the mistrust and fear of the Spaniards to Ameri-
can encroachment, seems to have warned them that Pike was 
coming. Historians generally accept that Wilkinson had now 
decided to abandon Aaron Burr and used Pike and his men as 
hostages to assure the Spanish of his good faith, and, at 
the same time, Pike could act as a spy for the General's own 
personal gains. It was thus .to prevent a border clash that 
Wilkinson probably leaked the secret of Pike's mission, even 
before the young officer departed St. Louis. 63 
Regardless of how the Spanish were alerted they acted; 
:, almost simultaneously with the departure of Pike, the greatest 
expedition the Spanish had ever sent out from New Mexico left 
American officials much information about the Spanish in the 
Southwest. 
63
writing after his return to the United States, 
but included as a footnote to the journal entry for September 
25, 1805, in the 1810 edition of his Journals, Pike states 
that the news of his ex9edition was furnished Salcedo 
through Cap·tain Stephen Minor of Natchez. Minor was the 
last Spanish commandant at Natchez and was an associate of 
Wilkinson. In fact, when the General was ordered from St. 
Louis to the border at Natchitoches in 1806, Mrs. Wilkinson 
lodged with the Minor family. See Jackson, Journals of Pike, 
I, 323. 
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Santa Fe to detain this latest American effort to reach the 
Rockies. The expedition that the Spaniards dispatched con-
sisted of regular troops from Nueva Vizcaya to which were 
added 400 militia and 100 Indians at Santa Fe. The com-
mander, Lieutenant Facundo Melgares, led this number, plus 
2000 horses and mules and supplies for six months, down the 
Red River for several hundred leagues. They then turned to 
the Republican River and the Pawnee country of Kansas. 
Melgares had a multiple mission to accomplish: explore the 
t territory between New Mexico and the Missouri, intercept the 
l 
American party coming up the Red River (Freeman expedition) , 
and intercept the Pike expedition. In retrospect the Spanish 
endeavor did not accomplish too much. Another Spanish force 
had already met and turned back Freeman, and Melgares pre-
ceded the Pike group to the Pawnees by about a month. He 
did make a show of strength to the Indians, but the effort did 
not prove long lasting. Taking into custody a few traders he 
found along his route, Melgares returned to Santa Fe. His 
were the Spanish troops reported by Pike in September, 1806. 64 
' 
64Ibid., 323-25. 
William Clark Collection, 
St. Louis, Mo. 
Clark to Dearborn, May 18, 1807, 
MSS, Missouri Historical Society, 
l 
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To say that the Spanish were disturbed by the Pike 
mission would greatly understate the case. Beginning in 
April, 1807, the correspondence between the various Spanish 
frontier officials, and between Salcedo and Wilkinson mounted. 
Early in April the Commandant-General vigorously protested 
to Wilkinson about American projects into territory "unques-
tionably belonging to his majesty. 1165 Salcedo informed the 
American commander that Pike's papers would be retained, and 
further stressed that 
the documents contain evident, un-
equivocal proofs, that an offense 
of magnitude has been committed 
against his majesty, and that every 
individual of this party ought to 
have been considered as prisoners 
on the very spot, notwithstanding such 
substantial and well grounded motives 66 that would have warranted such a measure. 
Before two more months had passed every Spanish 
frontier official, the Viceroy in Mexico City and the Spanish 
Minister in Washington had been well apprised of the Pike 
' 65 . Salcedo to Wilkinson, April 8, 1807, Jackson, Journals 
Of Pike, II, 185. 
66~., 185-86. 
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d . . 67 expe ition. Real Alencaster, the Governor in Santa Fe, was 
naturally the most concerned should Pike's venture be followed 
by other Americans. In fact a rumor had been "planted" by 
men in the Pike group that several thousand troops would soon 
be on their way to rescue the Americans. Accordingly, in the 
months following the presence of the Pike party in Santa Fe, 
Governor Alencaster sent out several parties to reconnoiter 
68 the areas of possible American approach. 
James Wilkinson actually "directed" the Pike expedition 
from his headquarters in New Orleans and on the Sabine. It 
will be recalled that the Summer of 1806 was a most trying 
period along the Texas-Louisiana border. The Spanish were 
determined to establish a garrison on the east side of the 
Sabine, and America would not allow such a move. The danger 
of war was great. Governor Claiborne of the Orleans Terri-
tory called for more troops as his military strength was weak. 
Responding to the plea, Secretary of War Dearborn ordered 
67
oonald Jackson prints a number of these letters 
in his two volume editio'n of Pike's Journals. 
68Loomis, Pedro Vial ..• , pp. 241-42. Alencaster 
must have had little knowledge of America's actual military 
strength along the frontier. 
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Wilkinson to proceed without delay to the troubled area. 
"You will • • • take upon yourself the command of the Troops 
in that quarter," the Secretary directed, "and you will, by 
all the means in your power, repel any invasion of the 
Territory of the United States, East of the River Sabine 
• • 
,,69 The order was dated May 6, 1806, but Wilkinson did not • 
reach the trouble spot until September. In typical Wilkinson 
fashion his delay was explained away in official correspon-
dence with the Secretary of War, but the Pike endeavor and 
the Burr conspiracy probably figured large in his itinerary. 
In all fairness to the General, however, it should be 
mentioned that his wife was suffering a terminal illness in 
St. Louis. She did eventually accompany Wilkinson as far 
70 
as Natchez. 
Actually Jefferson was thankful for an opportunity 
to remove Wilkinson from the Governorship in St. Louis. The 
latter had alienated both the military and civilian factions 
in the city because of his rather stringent regulations. He 
• 69
oearborn to Wilkinson, May 6, 1806, Carter, Terri-
torial Papers, XIII, 505-07. 
70
see footnote number 63. 
L 
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had become quite unpopular. Jefferson could see no reason 
to keep an unpopular governor in the Territory of Louisiana, 
but he did need a competent general along the Sabine; hence 
the order from Dearborn. 71 
There is yet a major point about the whole Pike 
enterprise which needs some examination. Zebulon Pike was 
ordered to the headwaters of the Arkansas by General Wilkin-
son, not by the War Department or by the President. What 
reaction did the officials in Washington have to this move 
by their frontier general and governor, a type of activity 
about which he had been so earnestly cautioned? It is here 
that the records provide little. As the Pike expedition was 
not a secret mission in the strictest sense, Secretary of War 
Dearborn was obviously informed, but to what extent? The 
Register of Letters Received by the Secretary of War contains 
an entry for a letter from Wilkinson dated June 28, 1806; 
the notation reads: "Mode proposed to send the Indians &c. 
to their Villages," but the letter has not survived. 72 Later 
' 71· Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior ••• , pp. 225-29. 
72
wilkinson to Dearborn, June 28, 1806, National 
Archives, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 
Record Group 107, Registers of Letters Received by the 
Secretary of War, Main Series, 1800-70 (Microcopy 22), Roll 
3. The Wilkinson Papers, MSS, Chicago Historical Society, 
l 
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statements, however, clearly indicate that the administration 
gave its approval if not always officially so stated. 
Jefferson, in his annual message to Congress in December, 1806, 
had only praise for Pike's Mississippi exploration. 
Very useful additions have also been 
made to our knowledge of the Mississippi 
by Lieutenant Pike who ascended to its 
source, and whose journal and map, giving 
the details of the journey, will shortly 
be ready for communication to both houses 
of Congress. Those of Messrs. Lewis and 
Clarke, and Freeman, will require further 
time to be digested and prepared. These 
important surveys, in addition to those 
before possessed, furnish materials for 
commencing an accurate map of the Mis-
sissippi, and its western waters. Some 
principal rivers, however, remain still 
to be explored, ••• 73 
In the Summer of 1807, when the correspondence between 
the Spanish and Americans over the Pike expedition was rather 
Chicago, Illinois, do not throw any light on this matter. In 
fact, the Wilkinson Papers are very limited in their value 
for this investigation; the greater part are written to 
Wilkinson, but the letters from Pike are conspicuous by their 
absence. 
' 73
sixth Annual Message to Congress, December 2, 1806, 
Ford, The-writings of Jefferson, VIII, 315. A search of the 
correspondence between the President and his Secretaries of 
War and State reveal no comments on the Pike expedition prior 
to the above. 
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heavy, the President, in a communique to Dearborn,·suggested 
some ideas that Wilkinson might use in answering Commandant-
General Salcedo. Re-stating this nation's argument that the 
land to the Rio Grande was included in the Louisiana Purchase, 
President Jefferson was quite emphatic that there could be no 
question about the Red River of Texas. Spain had never made 
a settlement on that river, whereas the French had made several. 
Jefferson also defended the scientific purpose of Pike's mis-
sion and seems to have been fully convinced that the American 
explorer must have been lost when he "got on the waters of 
the Rio Norte, instead of those of the Red River. 1174 That 
Jefferson also saw the diplomatic advantage of such an argu-
ment may be prudently inferred. Nevertheless he maintained 
this stand throughout the years of Spanish protestations. 75 
In 1808, when Pike's Journals were sent to the Presi-
dent by Dearborn, the latter suggested that it might be proper 
to give Pike some "extra compensation, or other notice," for 
74 Jefferson to Dearborn, June 22, 1807, Ford, Writings 
of Thomas Jefferson, IX, 85-86. 
' 75 Jefferson to Madison, August 30, 1807, Jackson, 
Journals of Pike, II, 268. Madison to Fornoda, September 2, 
1807, ibid., 269. Valentin de Foronda was consul general and 
charge<:i'affaires to the United States from Spain, April 17, 
1805 - September 26, 1809. 
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76 his efforts. The following month Pike received a letter 
from the Secretary of War which clearly stated the attitude 
of the administration. Henry Dearborn had the following to 
say to the young explorer: 
76 
77 
I ••• can with pleasure observe that 
altho' the two exploring expeditions 
you have performed were not previously 
ordered by the President of the U.S. 
there were frequent communications 
on the subject of each, between Genl. 
Wilkinson & this Department, of which 
the President of the U.S. was acquainted 
from time to time, and it will be no 
more than what justice requires, to 
say that your conduct in each of those 
expeditions met the approbation of the 
President and that the Information you 
obtained and communicated to the 
Executive in relation to the sources 
of the Mississippi & the natives in 
that quarter, and the country gene-
rally,as well on the upper Mis-
sissippi as that between the Arkan-
sas, & the Missouri, and on the 
borders of the latter extensive river 
to its source and the adjacent country, 
has been considered as highly inte-
resting in a political, geographical, 
& historical view. And you may rest 
assured that your services are held 
in high estimation by the President 
of the U.S., and ••• I consider the 
public much i~debted to you • • • 77 
Dearborn to Jefferson, January 29, 1808, ibid., 289. 
Dearborn to Pike, February 24, 1808, ibid., 300-01. 
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The above letter made it quite obvious that, given 
the boundary question, the Indian problems and the diplomatic 
situation faced by his administration, Jefferson was fully 
aware of the value of Pike's ventures, and was not going to 
quibble over discrepancies in protocol no longer pertinent. 
Before leaving the subject of the Pike expedition it 
would be well to look briefly to some of the longer range 
effects of this mission. Pike's report, compiled largely 
from memory, came out in 1810 (several years earlier than 
the published Lewis and Clark journals), and was the most 
significant work on the Southwest up to that date. Several 
things he had to say affected American attitudes towards 
the Great Plains and the Spanish Southwest for many years. 
In describing the "internal deserts" over which he had 
traveled to Santa Fe, Pike noted, 
These vast plains of the western 
hemisphere may become in time 
equally celebrated as the sandy 
desarts [sic] of Africa; for I 
saw in my route, in various places, 
tracts of many leagues, where the 
wind had thrown up the sand, in 
all fanciful forms of the ocean's 
rolling wave, and on which not a 78 
speck of vegetable matter existed. 
78 · · ' L . ' 'b. d 27 Pike's Dissertation on ouisiana, ~·· • 
Pike continued his description emphasizing an idea 
that would have certainly appealed to President Jefferson. 
But from these immense prairies may 
arise one great advantage to the 
United States, viz: The restriction 
of our population to some certain 
limits, and thereby a continuation 
of the union. Our citizens being so 
prone to rambling and extending them-
selves, on the frontiers, will, 
through necessity, be constrained 
to limit their extent on the west, 
to the borders of the Missouri and 
Mississippi, while they leave the 
prairies incapable of cultivation 
to the wandering and uncivilized 
aborigines of the country. 79 
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It is largely because of the above statements that historians 
see Pike as one of the early promoters of the Great American 
Desert idea; an idea which was perpetuated for a number of 
decades by other explorers and traders. 80 
The maps published by Zebulon M. Pike were the first 
maps of the Southwest to be derived from actual exploration 
80 1 I . Terry L. A ford, "The West As A Desert n American 
Thought Prior to Long's 1819-1820 Expedition," Journal of The 
West, VIII (October, 1969), 516-20. Alford notes that even 
18th century accounts, namely The Journals of Trudeau, re-
ferred to the plains as great wastelands, sterile, with 
little grass. 
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by Americans, and in that sense are of great historic value. 
Th~ Red and Canadian rivers were still confused, but the 
lower Arkansas region was charted with much more accuracy 
than on previous maps. The Provincias Internas, however, 
were still largely a plagiarism of the Alexander von Hum-
boldt map of New Spain, which was likewise, as indicated 
earlier, based on other cartographic efforts. Despite the 
errors and misconceptions prevalent at the time, Carl Wheat 
sees the Pike maps as "milestones in the mapping of the 
American West." 81 
The return of Zebulon Pike in July, 1807, just as 
the return of Lewis and Clark the previous September, opened 
the flood gates to adventurous traders and trappers. Trade 
with the Indians up the Missouri and the western rivers was 
nothing new, but the return of these two major expeditions 
encouraged adventurers that the prospect for vast sources of 
fur bearing animals and profitable markets were better than 
they had ever hoped. Trade was the chief occupation on the 
frohtier; even General Wilkinson, while directing the Pike 
' 
mission, engaged in a trading venture. It was not success-
ful, but the organization of trading companies in St. Louis 
81 Wheat, From Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 20-25. 
185 
was a favorite occupation, and Wilkinson, with an eye for 
1 t . . b 82 easy money, e no opportunity pass him y. 
Except for the fact that the Federal Government had 
set down specific rules and regulations concerning the 
licensing of traders, and determined the areas of exclusive 
trading rights, the many trading expeditions out of St. Louis 
and other points were private in character -- a number being 
clandestine ventures to evade government restrictions. Many 
of the traders directed their efforts to the upper Missouri 
and into the area watered by the Yellowstone, Big Horn and 
Snake rivers. Their adventurers, while interesting and of 
great importance to the history of the American West, are 
not of immediate concern here. The lure of Santa Fe also 
attracted more than a few traders and trappers; the names of 
Jacques Clamorgan (a name already noted in earlier trader 
activity) and Manuel Lisa being only two of the better 
82 Very soon after the departure of Zebulon Pike, 
Wilkinson sent a John McClallen to the Platte with goods to 
trade. Mcclallen was an army captain who had come west witi1 
Wilkinson in 1805. He brought several thousands of dollars 
worth of goods with him'to use in the Indian trade after 
resigning his commission. This is the man wilkinson was 
referring to in a letter to Secretary of War Dearborn when 
he stated that he had "engaged a bold adventurer, who 
served under me during the late Indian War • • • to look at 
St. Afee in person pending the Winter ••• " Wilkinson to 
Dearborn, September 8, 1805, Carter, Territorial Papers, 
XIII, 199. Lewis-and Clark met Mcclallen on September 17, 
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known. In fact, these two figures were secret partners for 
a time. In the game of trading and trapping, partners today 
could easily become competitors tomorrow. 
In the very year of Pike's return Chamorgan, now well 
advanced in age, with money and goods furnished by Lisa, made 
a trip to Santa Fe, arriving in that city on December 12, 1807. 
He had earlier received a license to trade with the Pawnee 
Republic, and this served as a ruse for his larger schemes. 
He reached Santa Fe, but did not find the warm welcome he 
possibly expected and was quickly escorted to Chihuahua as 
Pike had been. In that city he sold his goods and returned 
to St. Louis the following year. Clamorgan has t~e dis-
tinction of being the first American to earn profits on a 
trip to Santa Fe. He did not repeat his venture, but the 
information he offered to the public about trade possibilities 
83 
no doubt whetted the appetite of many. 
1806, and he told them that he was on "reather"[sic] 
a speculative expedition to the confines of New Spain with 
the view to entroduce [sic] a trade with those people." 
Journal Entry for Septel'hber 17, 1806, Bernard DeVoto (ed.), 
The Journals of Lewis and Clark (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1953), p. 474. There is no evidence that Mcclallen 
ever reached Santa Fe. 
83Joseph J. Hill, "An Unknown Expedition to Santa Fe 
in 180'/," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. VI, 
No. 4 (March, 1920) 560-62. Nasatir, "Jacques Clamorgan ••• ," 
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The more important and controversial trader to appear 
on the scene at this time was Manuel Lisa. His activities 
were many and varied, being the subject of several schol-
arly studies. Hardly anyone engaging in merchandizing and 
trade, i.ncluding Auguste Chouteau, had not worked in partner-
ship with Lisa, only to find in him a bitter competitor a 
short while later. He was one of the most dynamic men in 
the Missouri country, having been active in and around St. 
Louis for years. One historian describes him thusly: "He 
made the wild Missouri River his highway, and the savages 
along its shores were his suppliers and his customers. He 
II 84 
was a schemer and a driver •• . . Chittenden, in his 
famous work on the fur trade, remarks that in boldness of 
enterprise and restless energy Lisa was "a fair representative 
85 
of the Spaniards of the days of Cortez. " 
84Loomis, Pedro Vial ••• , pp. 246-47. For an excel-
lent detailed study of this controversial figure who seemed 
to be always present and active when there was a profit to 
be made, and far away when bills were to be collected, one 
may refer to Walter B. Douglas, Manuel Lisa, Edited by A. P. 
Nasatir (New York: Argo~ Antiquarian Ltd., 1964). Another 
excellent study is Richard Edward Oglesby, Manuel Lisa and 
Opening of the Missouri Fur Trade (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1963). 
85
chittenden, The American Fur Trade ••• ,I, 114. 
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Although Lisa's major activity was to the north of 
the Santa Fe region, the possibility of lucrative connections 
with that Spanish outpost was given more than a passing 
thought. The Pike expedition interested him very much. In 
August, 1806, while tracking the Great Plains, Pike received 
a message from Wilkinson warning him that Manuel Lisa was 
contemplating some type of commercial venture with the 
Spanish in Santa Fe. Wilkinson noted that such a contract 
would be "injurious to the United States. 1186 The General 
further commented, 
I understand [the project] will be 
attempted without the sanction of 
Law, or the permission of the 
executive, you must do what you 
can consistantly to defeat the 
Plan. No Good can be derived 
to the United States from such a 
project, because the prosecution 
of it will depend entirely on the 
Spaniards, & they will not permit 
it unless to serve their politi- 87 
cal as well as personal Interests. 
' 
86
wilkinson to Pike, August 6, 1806, Jackson, 
Journals of Pike, II, 134. 
87Proclamation Against Burr's Plot, November 27, 1806, 
Ford, The Writings of .Thomas Jefferson, X, 301-02. 
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Lisa apparently dropped the plan at this time only to revive 
it more forcefully in 1812. 
The years following the Clamorgan and Lisa attempts 
to interest the Spanish in American trade saw many more indivi-
dual traders and trappers head for Santa Fe; the long list in-
eludes such names as Maria Raphael Henderson, Joseph Mc-
Lanahan, Reuben Smith, James Patterson and Emanuel Blanco, 
to name a few of the better known. The exact number of 
fearless men who tracked the vast American West can only be 
speculated, for documentary evidence is slim. Following the 
Pike expedition and the trouble along the Sabine, most of these 
men were not welcomed by the Spanish at Santa Fe, and only 
served to further alarm His Majesty's frontier officers. To 
distinguish clandestine from legitimate enterprises became an 
almost impossible task for the Spaniards. 
Meanwhile other events began to occupy the minds and 
efforts of American officials. The problems with England and 
France were mounting. These two nations were once again at 
war, and the United States as a neutral nation was finding it 
' more difficult each month to maintain its neutrality. The 
British Orders in Council and the Continental System laid 
down by Napoleon made it quite unsafe for American ships to 
ply the Atlantic Ocean. Impressment of American seamen by 
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the British was an especially thorny issue. 
In an attempt to meet these problems Jefferson drew 
up his famous Embargo which was implemented in 1807. The 
soundness of this boycott is still a subject of debate among 
historians. The immediate effects of the Embargo Act were 
less than Jefferson had hoped for, as neither England nor 
France substantially changed their tactics relative to Ameri-
can shipping and maritime rights. Meanwhile a domestic 
crisis developed because of the embargo, and Jefferson was 
faced with a barrage of criticism. The Federalists made 
political capital out of the misfortunes consequent on the 
embargo. Much of their case was manufactured, for the embargo 
did not cause all the harm they claimed, but actual damage was 
sufficient to further their political hopes for a victory in 
1808. 
With the nations of Europe again forming alliances, 
the opportunity for Jefferson to take advantage of Europe's 
"distress," at least in regard to Spain, once more presented 
itself. The diplomatic problems between the United States 
' and Spain during the years 1806 and 1807, such as the Texas-
Louisiana border dispute and the Pike expedition, have 
received mention. It should be kept in mind that these were 
also the years of the Burr Conspiracy, as well as the con-
tinued negotiations between America and Spain over the Floridas 
l 
192 
and the over-all western boundary settlement. It is inte-
resting to observe how all these questions became inter-
twined, and how President Jefferson attempted to make the 
most out of each situation to the advantage of his nation. 
The Burr Conspiracy caused Jefferson many agonizing 
months, and the great (one might even say exaggerated) desire 
on the part of the President to see Burr convicted of treason 
is well known. It was on November 27, 1B06, that Jefferson 
issued a proclamation prejudging Aaron Burr guilty of crime 
and ordering his arrest. In the proclamation the President 
enjoined and warned 
all faithful citizens who have been 
led to participate in the sd [sic] 
unlawful enterprises without due 
knolege [sic] or consideration 
to withdraw from sa~e without 
delay • • • to cease all further 
proceedings therein as they will 
answer to the contrary at their 
peril, and will incur prosecution 
with all the rigors of the law.BB 
In the above proclamation, as well as in subsequent 
communiques, the Governcµ:s of Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio and 
88Proclamation Against Burr's Plot, November 27, 1806, 
Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, X, 301-02. 
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Mississippi, and General Wilkinson, were expressly enjoined 
to search-out and bring to account anyone attempting to con-
duct or join any type of filibustering expedition into Spanish 
territory. At the same time Jefferson made it perfectly clear 
that Spanish activity on the western side of the Mississippi 
made it necessary for all governors of the aforementioned 
states and territories to keep their respective militias in 
readiness. The men would not be called upon unless there was 
some form of aggression, but when called "it will not be for 
1 · b t f t' h d' t t · •• 89 a ounging, u or an ac ive, & per aps is an , service. 
Jefferson used the fact that he took such stern action 
in the case of Aaron Burr as a lever to indicate to the 
Spanish that he was sincere in wanting to arrive at an arni-
cable settlement with them. At the same time, knowing the 
predicament she was in vis-a-vis France, the President wanted 
to impress upon Spain the power of America and what this nation 
was capable of doing if it so desired. It was now that Jeffer-
son followed a line of argument which lends credence to those 
historian.s who like to see an expansionist-minded American 
' President. In directives to the United States Minister in 
89
circular Letter to the Governors of Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Ohio, and Mississippi, March 21, 1807, ibid., 
IX, 34-35. 
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Spain Jefferson does outline a rather bellicose approach 
that our minister should follow in his discussion with the 
Spanish. After noting that the Spanish should realize our 
good faith by the "vigor with which we have acted, & the 
expense incurred in suppressing the enterprise meditated 
lately by Burr against Mexico," he further implied that should 
she so desire, the United States could "be in possession of 
the city of Mexico" in but one month. 90 
In another letter in August of the same year referring 
to "western intrigues" by the Spanish, Jefferson noted, 
Our southern defensive force can take 
the Floridas, volunteers for a Mexican 
army will flock to our standard, and 
rich pabulum will be offered to our 
privateers in the plunder of their 
commerce & coasts. Probably Cuba 91 
would add itself to our confederation. 
The above remarks by President Thomas Jefferson do indeed 
smack of the concepts of Manifest Destiny; yet when put in 
their proper perspective they lose some of the character of 
' 
90Jefferson to the u.s. Minister to Spain, April 2, 
1807, ibid., 40-41. 
91 
. Jefferson to Madison, August 16, 1807, ibid., 124-
25. 
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a consciously thought-out plan of action, and assume more the 
flavor of diplomatic pressure. 
Thus with the political and diplomatic situations 
in such a precarious state during the last months of his 
administration, Jefferson's attention was understandably 
focused on matters of more immediate concern than exploring 
a road to Santa Fe. He did not ignore the western fringes 
of Louisiana, nor did he forget about the Indian problems 
facing the government. In fact, the trouble between the 
United States and England was directly related to our Indian 
policy. The British were still in Canada, and British traders 
were quite active along the Upper Mississippi and !'1issouri rivers 
as well as along the rivers of the Pacific Northwest. The in-
fluence of British traders among the American Indians had given 
United States officials concern for a number of years. 
It is interesting to note that the bulk of correspon-
dence between Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, who had been 
appointed Governor and Indian Agent for the Territory of Loui-
siana respectively, was concerned with the danger of British 
' . . 92 traders among the Indian tribes of Upper Louisiana. 
92Meriwether Lewis became Governor of the Territory 
in March, 1807; William Clark was appointed Indian Agent in 
the same month. Carter, Territorial Papers, XIV, 107-09. 
l 
196 
Governor Lewis drew attention of the War Department to the 
situation and informed Dearborn that he had dispatched spies 
to learn the designs of the Indians; 
The design of the indians are soon 
changed by interest; the Spaniards 
have no merchansize to attach them 
firmly to them -- the british have, 
[sic] and it is to them that I look 
more particularly for all our pending 
evils on the frontier, and I sincerely 
hope that the general government in 
their philanthropic feelings towards 
the indians will not loose [sic] sight 
of the safety of our defenceless [sic] 
and extended frontiers.93 
Again, Dearborn and the President were being reminded 
that the defense of the frontier was inadequate. An exami-
nation of the correspondence of both Lewis and Clark to the 
Secretary of War reveal that they stressed the same points 
urged so often by James Wilkinson. In June, 1807, Clark 
informed the Secretary of War that, 
the Militia (when organized) are so 
scattered that they will afford but 
a feeble defence to extensive 
frontiers of tpis Territory against 
the Indians •••• To prevent the 
93Lewis to Dearborn, July 1, 1808, Carter, Terri-
torial Papers, XIV, 200. 
probebility [sic] of an Indian war 
(which can only be effected by Spanish 
or British influence and intreague [sic] 
it will in my oppinion [sic] be neces-
sary to have some establishments of 
troops in the Indian Country; ••• 94 
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Men on the frontier were also in line with Jefferson's 
idea of concentrating the white population east of the Mis-
sissippi River. One official suggested to the President that, 
transfer [of the) inhabitants of a 
great portion of this upper Terri-
tory to some other part of the Union 
or territory, say New Orleans or the 
east side of the Mississippi, there-
by making the settlements more compact, 
facilitating the administration of 
justice and making us more strong in 
those parts where we are the most ex-
posed and vulnerable from the attacks 
of foreign enemies • 95 
Meanwhile the Spanish were reverting to an "iron 
curtain" frontier policy and continuing to protest the Pike 
94
clark to Dearborn, June 1, 1807, ibid., 126-27. 
Other than the two letters cited above, Lewis and Clark do 
not seem to express concern for the Spanish in any of their 
correspondence. ' 
95Edward F. Bond to Jefferson, October 17, 1806, 
Jefferson Papers, MSS, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, 
Mo. 
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expedition including the motives behind it. The position 
of the Spanish government relative to its New World colonies 
was also quite unsettled at the moment: Napoleon's march into 
Spain did little to better the situation. When Napoleon's 
brother Joseph was placed on the throne of Spain, the people 
did not accept him and continued to resist the imperial army 
until it was forced to return to France in 1813. During the 
period of French occupation the Spanish Cortez declared 
for Ferdinand VII, and the governments throughout the Spanish 
colonies largely followed suit. The vacillating Ferdinand, 
however, soon caused disillusionment among colonial leaders 
and the groundwork for the independence movement was laid, 
destined to break forth in 1810. The movement would grow 
during the next decade until the cry for independence spread 
throughout Spain's entire colonial empire. 
Amidst the precarious political and diplomatic 
situations facing the United States, spoken of earlier, the 
country was witness to another constitutional change of govern-
ment. In the election of 1808, Thomas Jefferson chose not to 
' run for office and the Republican mantle fell to James Madison. 
Jefferson retired to Monticello and the problems of state were 
then taken up by President Madison who defeated his Federalist 
opponent in the election. The approaching War of 1812 
199 
occupied the attention of Madison to a greater degree than 
any other matter, but the frontier problems remained and the 
interest of Americans in the Southwest continued to grow. 
' 
I 
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CHAPTER V 
THE WESTERN BOUNDARY IS SETTLED 
When the Marques de Casa Yrujo left the United States 
in 1807, effective representation of Spain in this country 
came to an end for several years. It is true that Valentin 
de Foronda and Jose Ignacio Viar, were left behind as charges 
d'affaires, or, more properly, encargodos de negocios, but 
these two men seemed to have spent more time arguing among 
themselves than representing their home government. At this 
same time the relations between the United States and England 
were deteriorating and Spain was placed in a rather precarious 
position should war break out between these two nations. 
Accordingly the encargodos stopped bickering long enough to 
pressure their government to appoint a minister of sufficient 
rank and powers to adequately represent Spain in America. 
The.result of their plea was the appointment of Don Luis de 
Onis by the Junta CentrAl in 1809. 1 
1Foronda to Consul of Baltimore, September 18, 1809, 
National Archives, Records of the Department of State, Record 
200 
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It was essential for Spain to have accurate infer-
mation concerning the ambitions of American relative to 
westward expansion. Likewise, every effort had to be made 
to influence the United States Government on all matters 
touching Spain to the advantage and well-being of the latter. 
The appointment of Onis did not immediately rectify the 
situation, however, for the United States declined to ac-
knowledge the monarchy of Joseph, Napoleon's brother, or the 
Junta Central. Therefore, Onis was not officially received 
by President Madison. George w. Erving, our representative 
in Madrid, was officially in much the same position as on!s 
was in this country; that is, he was little more than an 
observer. Erving finally gave up even that position and left 
2 Spain in August, 1810. 
Group 59, Notes From the Spanish Legation in the United States 
(Microcopy 59), Roll 4. Future references will be designated 
as SD, Notes From the Spanish Legation. Brooks, Diplomacy 
and the Borderlands ••• , pp. 8-13. Luis de Onis had been 
chosen as minister to the United States in 1792, but the fall 
of the Floridablanca cabinet prevented his serving in this 
capacity. He was active in the Peace of Amiens in 1802, and 
went to Bayonne at the request of Cevallos from where he wrote 
his opinion of Ferdinand's renunciation of the Spanish crown. 
On1s felt the King neither could nor should make such a con-
cession; this stand made it necessary for him to flee Spain 
and he joined the Junta central. He arrived in the United 
States on October 4, 1809. 
2
rbid., p. 13. 
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Meanwhile, Luis de On1s made friends, listened, 
communicated and traveled. He distrusted the Republican 
Party, and seems never to have become friendly with either 
President Madison or James Monroe, who took up the duties of 
Secretary of State in 1811. On1s made the most of his friend-
ships among the Federalists using them as sources of infor-
mation as well as of influence. 3 Failing to receive official 
recognition, the Spanish Minister retired to Philadelphia, 
where he found more convenient channels of communication, 
especially through his association with Alexander J. Dallas, 
the United States district attorney for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania. 4 
The troubled Spanish Government faced another grave 
crisis in the opening guns of violent revolutions in the 
Western Hemisphere which were eventually to tear her colonial 
empire to shreds. It was September 16, 1810, in the village 
of Dolores that Father Miguel Hidalgo sounded his Grito for 
Mexican independence. True, the Hidalgo uprising was soon 
quelled, and the priest himself faced a firing squad the 
3
rbid., p. 17. 
4
rbid. 
• 
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following July. The flames of revolution had been ignited, 
however, and the independence movements throughout Mexico 
and the rest of Spain's colonial empire did not come to a 
rest until their goals had been reached. 
Of especial interest to this study would be the course 
of the Mexican revolutionary movement, particularly as it 
affected those areas adjacent to United States territory. 
Spanish subjects in Texas and New Mexico, attempting to free 
themselves from the yoke of the mother country, could not but 
give added encouragement to Americans already eyeing the vast 
Northern Provinces of New Spain. Possible wealth in the form 
of silver, furs, or trade seemed ready at hand to adventurous 
souls. Again one can find a decided difference in the atti-
tudes of individual Americans and the United States Government. 
Even among key governmental officials there were variant ideas 
and plans relative to the Spanish Southwest. 
These variant ideas and plans were not enhanced by 
advances made in geographic knowledge of the approaches to 
Santa Fe, the expedition of Zebulon Pike notwithstanding. As 
' noted in the previous chapter, Pike's Journals and maps were 
published in 1810, but his cartographic efforts gave America's 
officials little more accurate information of the Provincias 
Internas than· they had up to that date. True, his route up 
l 
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the Missouri and Osage rivers to the Pawnee villages on the 
Republican are fairly accurate, but farther west he relied 
on earlier maps from various sources. Since all of Pike's 
sketch maps from the Great Bend of the Arkansas westward were 
taken from him by the Spaniards, it was obviously necessary 
for him to rely on other than personal observations for 
his published maps. 5 
The year 1810 also saw another major cartographic 
work published. In that year Aaron Arrowsmith brought out 
an imposing map entitled "A Map of Mexico and adjacent 
provinces compiled from original documents." This map was 
actually a composite of the just-published Pike effort and 
Baron von Humboldt's famous cartographic work, although 
"h 1 ' d . 6 neit er gent eman s name appeare on it. Thus the two im-
portant geographic publications of 1810 added little to 
accurate scientific knowledge of the vast Spanish Southwest. 
Returning to the Latin American revolutionary move-
ments, when news of the Hidalgo uprising reached San Antonio, 
the principal Spanish bastion in Texas, the local officials 
' 
5 Jackson, Journals of Pike, I, 457-64. 
6 Wheat, From Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 27-28. 
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declared their loyalty to Ferdinand VII. By January, 1811, 
however, a revolt against royal authority was led by one 
Juan Bautista de Casas, who captured Governor Manuel Salcedo 
and had himself elected to the position of governor ad interim. 
The revolutionists enjoyed a short-lived power, for royal 
authority was soon restored, only to be challenged once more 
in 1812 by filibustering expeditions from the Louisiana-Texas 
f . 7 rontier. Thomas Jefferson, in retirement at Monticello, 
viewed the happenings in Latin America and observed pro-
phetically, 
Another great field of political 
experiment is opening in our 
neighborhood, in Spanish America. 
I fear the degrading ignorance 
into which their priests and 
kings have sunk them, has dis-
qualified them from the maintenance 
or even knowledge of their rights, 
and that much blood be shed for 
little improvement in their 
7An excellent account of the early revolutionary 
activities in Texas may be found in Rupert N. Richardson, Texas 
The Lone Star State (~ew York: Prentice-Hall, 1967). More 
specialized studies include, Julia Kathryn Garrett, Green Flag 
Over Texas (Dallas: Cordova Press, 1939). Mattie Austin 
Hatcher, The Opening of Texas to Foreign Settlement, 1801-1821 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1927). Issac Joslin Cox, 
"The Louisiana-Texas Frontier," Southwestern Historical Quar-
terly, X, No. l (July, 1906), and XVI, No. 4 (April, 1913), 
and XVII, No. l (July, 1913), and XVII, No. 2 (October, 1913). 
condition. Should their new rulers 
honestly lay their shoulders to 
remove the great obstacles of 
ignorance, and press the remedies 
of education and information, they 
will still be in jeopardy until 
another generation comes into 
place, and what may happen in the 
interval cannot be predicted, nor 
shall ••• I live to see it.8 
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In Santa Fe there was no open revolt against Spanish 
authority as in San Antonio, but the people of that city 
were definitely affected by the political crisis in Spain and 
the New World. The Junta Central in Spain issued its decree 
on January 22, 1809, recognizing the Spanish dominions in 
America as integral parts of the Spanish nation and declaring 
their right to representation in the Cortes. Representatives 
to the Spanish congress were to be selected in each provincial 
capital by the local ayuntamiento (municipal council) from a 
list of names of the leading citizens. Santa Fe elected its 
representative in August, 1810. Pedro Bautista Pino, the 
9 
man chosen, embarked for Spain in October, 1811. Historians 
8Jefferson to Dupont de Nemours, April 15, 1811, Ford 
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, IX, 322. 
9 Marc Simmons, Spanish Government in New Mexico 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968), p. 203. 
11.: 
207 
will be eternally grateful to Pino for the lengthy report or 
Exposicion he prepared for the Cortes. This document pro-
vides one of the best sources extant for New Mexican history 
at the end of the Spanish period. For example, one can learn 
that New Mexico was still a rather "poor" province with no 
physician, surgeon or pharmacist for its citizens; agri-
culture, furnishings and clothing were as yet in a primitive 
state. According to Pino the state of education was pitiful, 
and he bemoaned the fact that "for a period of more than two 
hundred years since the conquest, the province has made no 
provision for [its citizens] in any of the literary careers. 1110 
Loomis concludes that it was the lack of artisanship that 
created the great demand for goods in Santa Fe and was the 
real reason for the continual attempts at penetration by 
S . d 11 non- paniar s. 
10H. Bailey Carroll and M. Villasana Haggard (eds. 
and trans.), Three New Mexico Chronicles (Albuquerque: The 
Quivira Society, 1942), p. 94. It should be borne in mind 
that Pino was attempting to make the government of Spain 
pay more attention to his province; therefore, he did tend 
to exaggerate to some ex~ent the poor conditions in New Mexico. 
The poor state of education was also noted by various Spanish 
officials in New Mexico. See Simmons, Spanish Government •• 
:_1 PP • 172-7 4 • 
11Loornis, Pedro Vial ••• , p. 7. 
In light of the continual Spanish fear of American 
encroachment the observations of Pino in his Exposici6n 
on the subject are of interest here. Under the section 
entitled "Legal and Judicial Affairs" he had the following 
to say, 
these official instructions will prove 
to your majesty the imminent danger of 
these provinces' falling prey to our 
neighbors, thus leaving the other 
provinces to tbe same fate, one 
after another. I trust your majesty 
may become aware of this fact, be-
cause the purchase of Louisiana by 
the United States has opened the way 
for the Americans to arm and incite 
the wild Indians against us; al.'30 
the way is open for tne Americans to 
invade the province. Once the terri-
tory is lost, it will be impossible 
to recover it. Since there is still 
time to prevent this disaster, your 
majesty should take advantage of this 
warning, which incidentally has been 
brought over by me, because a delay 
in furnishing remedial relief may 
permit the development of the evils 
which are feared by the one who has 
the honor of making them known to your 
majesty.12 
The warning by f ino was not news to the ears of 
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Spanish officials in Madrid; they had been aware of foreign 
12 Carroll and Haggard, Three New Mexico Chronicles, 
p. 59. 
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penetration of their northern frontier for many years. The 
unrest in Mexico at this time, however, caused renewed alarm, 
especially since more than a few Americans were ready and 
willing to aid the revolutionaries by joining filibustering 
expeditions. The interest of Anglo-Americans in Mexican 
affairs only proved to Spanish authorities that their fear of 
many years was justified. The greedy American was only waiting 
h . . t 13 is opportun1 y. 
Statements by United States officials such as Governor 
William c. c. Claiborne of the Territory of Orleans could 
easily convince the Spanish that "official" America was en-
couraging the activities of its adventurous citizens. Governor 
Claiborne was a known expansionist, and was not reluctant to 
voice his ideas relative to United States occupation of 
Spanish colonial territory. In a letter to the Secretary of 
the Navy in December, 1811, Claiborne pointed out that if the 
"Friends of Independence" in Mexico needed money they should 
14 turn to America for help. Land as a compensation for aid 
' 13Fray Angelico Chavez, O.F.M. Archives of the 
Archdiocese of Santa Fe, 1678-1900 (Washington: Academy of 
American Francisacan History, 1957), p. 74. 
14
c1aiborne to Hamilton, December 26, 1811, Rowland, 
Claiborne Letter Books, VI, 21. 
l 
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would be our reward. In another letter the following month 
the energetic young governor said, 
Mexico is again represented to be in 
a State of Revolution, it would not 
be difficult to give such direction 
as might accord with the views & 
Interests of the United States. 
Five thousand Regular Troops marched 
to St. Antoine & fifty thousand stand 
of Muskets would give Independence 
to Mexico, & banish forever European 
Influence; --15 
Yet another letter of the same tenor went to a 
Congressman in January, 1812. The gentleman was informed, 
p. 40. 
It is indeed time for the Nation 
& Government to unite in avenging 
our wrongs •••• The Canada's surely 
will present no serious obstacles 
to our Northern Brethren -- and in 
this quarter the Florida's will be 
an easy acquisition. -- Cuba, Mexico, 
and the Spanish American possessions 
generally deserve our particular 
attention. The occasion is favorable 
to free them from all European In-
fluence either Commerical or Politi-
cal, & to effect whatever else, the 
Interests of the United States may 
suggest.16 
' 
15
c1aiborne to Hamilton, January 23, 1812, ibid., p. 38. 
16
c1aiborne to Senator Varnum, January 26, 1812, ibid., 
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During the latter part of 1812, and into 1813, the 
Gutierrez-Magee filibustering expedition was making headway 
in Texas; Governor Claiborne wanted his government to take 
advantage of the situation and not let a golden opportunity 
slip through its fingers. To the Secretary of State he wrote 
on June 21, 1813, 
the movements in the Neighbouring 
Province of Texas, Deserve the 
attention of Government. The 
Revolutionists have got possession 
of the Capitol of their Province, 
St. Antonio and are likely for the 
present to maintain their possession. 
Their Chiefs manifest no disposition 
to be Dependent upon the American 
Government, or to grant any peculiar 
privileges to the American people; 
• • • They may become useful Neigh-
bours, -- but as we have no certainty 
of it, I wish sincerely, it comported 
with the Policy of the American Govern-
ment to take possession of the country 
as far as the River Grande. -- Under 
the Louisiana Convention, we claim 
the tract extending from the Sabine 
to the River Grande, or River Bravo, 
as it is sometimes called.17 
Thus as late as 1813 the long-held American claim to 
the Rio Bravo as the western boundary of the Louisiana 
17
claiborne to the Secretary of State, June 21, 1813, 
ibid., pp. 227-29. 
-
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Purchase was still being cited as justification to move west. 
Such a boundary would, of course, bring Santa Fe within the 
orbit of American control as the Rio Grande flows just west 
of that Spanish village. Zebulon Pike had brought this fact 
home several years earlier. So strong were Claiborne's 
feelings on the subject that he penned a letter very similar 
to the above to President Madison the following month. 18 The 
response Governor Claiborne received from the President and 
his Secretary of State were assuredly not to the Governor's 
liking. 
It has been indicated earlier (Chapter III) that James 
Madison, when Secretary of State, held the Floridas to be of 
more importance than the western boundary question. His 
attitude apparently did not alter when he became President. 
Here again the records show that President Madison demon-
strated grave concern over the East and West Florida questions, 
while giving only scant attention to the expansionist po-
tential west of the Mississippi and Missouri rivers. Further-
more, the Indians of the Plains gave Madison less concern than 
' they did Thomas Jefferson. Obviously the deteriorating 
relations with England and the forthcoming War of 1812 occupied 
18
c1aiborne to Madison, July 9, 1813, ibid., IV, 236. 
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the greater part of the Chief Executive's attention. Given 
his intense concern for the Floridas, their strategic location 
relative to military and commercial interests of both England 
and the United States, the President could keep his eye on 
English maritime depredations while not losing sight of the 
Floridas as land for possible American expansion. The 
Spanish to the west of the Mississippi did not seem to pose 
an immediate threat to the well-being of the United States. 
A thorough search of the writings of President Madison 
as collected and edited by Gaillard Hunt, and Richardson's 
Messages of the Presidents reveal that Madison gave little if 
any attention to the Spanish, the Indians, trade routes, or 
military expeditions, between the American settlements along 
the Mississippi and Missouri rivers and the Spanish outpost of 
Santa Fe. Likewise the records of the War Department reveal 
that the Secretary of War, during the eight years of Madison's 
administration, focused his attention relative to military 
matters and Indian affairs to the geographical area east of 
19 the Mississippi from the Great Lakes south to New Orleans. 
' 
19Gaillard Hunt (ed.), The Writings of James Madison 
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1908). Richardson, Messages 
of the Presidents. Eustis to Wilkinson, May 4, 1809, Wilkin-
son Papers, MSS, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois. 
! " 
11 
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Given the real and fancied influence which the British exer-
cised among the Indian nations of that general region, such 
an outlook is easily understood. 
When Madison did speak of a southwest frontier prob-
lem, he thought more in terms of the Territories of Orleans 
and Mississippi, as well as the Floridas. The other frontier 
region which concerned the President was the Old Northwest. 
It was there that the white man continued to covet the tillable 
soil and was continuing to press upon the lands of the Miami, 
Shawnee, Winnebago, Pottawattamie and other tribes indigenous 
to the land north of the Ohio River. It seems that Madison 
did not share Thomas Jefferson's desire to move the Indians 
across the Mississippi into land largely uninhabited by the 
white man. The President was more concerned with the manner 
of purchasing land from the Indians. Madison was not to fare 
well in his attempt to keep on amicable terms with the red 
man. As Irving Brant so cogently points out, "had he wished 
to stop the purchases he could not have stood against the 
. . ,.20 torrential drive of the westward flowing masses. 
' 
20
rrving Brant, James Madison: The President, 
1809-1812 (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1956), 
p. 190. 
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Indian hostility on the frontier, heightened by the 
actions of William Henry Harrison in such engagements as 
the Battle of Tippicanoe, made the Indian problem an integral 
part of the worsening relations between this country and Eng-
land. The war fever quickened. Here again President Madi-
son's major biographer captures the predicament of the Chief 
Executive: 
He desired friendship and peace with 
the Indians but continued a long-
established land policy which made 
the first unattainable and the second 
depend on the degeneration of the 
dispossessed tribes and the weak- 21 
ness of despair in those more distant. 
Throughout most of the War of 1812, the admini-
stration's attitude toward the Indian as far as any over-all 
policy went, may be seen in the statement by the President in 
his Second Annual Message to Congress, December 5, 1810, a 
sentiment which he echoed many times during the following years. 
With the Indian tribes also the peace 
and friendship of the United States are 
found to be so,eligible that the general 
disposition to preserve both continues 
to gain strength.22 
21Ibid., p. 388. 
22Madison's Second Annual Message, December 5, 1810, 
Hunt, The Writings of James Madison, VIII, 126. In Madison's 
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of course, those Indian tribes aiding the British cause were 
considered enemies of the United States and were approached 
as any enemy would be. 
As noted previously, the Jefferson administration 
frowned upon any type of filibustering activity originating 
within the United States for the purpose of harassing the 
Spanish colonies. Madison continued to support such a policy. 
As Secretary of State under Jefferson he was largely respon-
sible for transferring the President's policy into action in 
such matters, and he came to the Presidency with much 
experience along these lines. 
The early Latin American revolutionary movements seem 
to have received little attention from President Madison. The 
major edition of Madison's writings indicates that the Presi-
dent penned one letter to Joel Barlow, Minister to France, on 
November 17, 1811, concerning the independence movement which 
had broken out in the Spanish colonial empire. In this letter 
Madison refers to the movements in Venezuela and Mexico, noting 
that the former country had asked for United States recog-
' nition. As for Mexico, "according to our intelligence, which 
is difficult & obscure, [she] is still in the struggle between 
Third Annual Message there is no mention of the Indians, and 
his Fourth Message echoes the one quoted above. 
I 
, I 
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the revolutionary & royal parties. 1123 Even here, however, 
Madison's major concern seems to be how the Latin American 
situation will aid or hinder the power of Great Britain, 
24 given her commercial interests in that region of the world. 
The fact that some of these early attempts at independence 
were largely quelled by royal force as in Mexico, and that 
others were not successful until Madison had left office, 
can offer some explanation for his less than avid interest 
in them. It should be specifically noted, however, that 
Madison's policy relative.to the areas immediately adjacent 
to American territory, was the same as his predecessor. 
The enthusiastic Governor Claiborne was not encouraged 
in his dreams of American expansion at the expense of Spain. 
In fact, he was expressly reminded that any activity on Ameri-
can soil for the purpose of invading Spanish-held land would 
be considered as treasonous. A case in point was that of 
Dr. John Robinson, the controversial gentleman of the Pike 
expedition. Robinson had remained in Spanish territory 
following the aforementioned expedition. His motives are still 
' 
23Madison to Joel Barlow, November 17, 1811, ibid., 
pp. 171-72. 
24 Ibid. 
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somewhat of a mystery. Nevertheless he later became involved 
in a crusade to liberate Mexico from Spanish rule. Seeking 
25 
aid in the United States he evidently returned to Natchez. 
Lacking everything except nerve Robinson contacted Secretary 
of State James Monroe about his proposed plans to help liber-
ate the people of Mexico from monarchial tyranny with the help 
of willing Americans. Monroe's reply could have left little 
doubt in the mind of the ambitious doctor as to the official 
attitude of the United States Government. In his answer to 
Robinson on February 14, 1814, Monroe stated, 
The measures in which you are engaged 
being contrary to law and wholly un-
authorized, have excited no little 
surprise, especially as you knew this 
to be the case from your instructions 
while acting under the authority of 
the government on the recommendation 
of the late general [sic] Pike. Your 
conduct is the more reprehensible from 
the circumstance that as you were em-
ployed some time past in making friendly 
communication to the governor of the 
internal provinces of Spain it may be 
inferred that you are still in the 
service of the government, and acting 
in conformity to its views, and by 
its authority~ [italics mine] ••• 
25Monroe to Dr. Robinson, February 14, 1814, National 
Archives, General Records of the Department of State, Record 
Group 59, Domestic Letters, Roll 14. Future references will 
be cited as SD, Domestic Letters. 
I now write to inform you that 
if you do not immediately desist 
from your illegal measures and 
pursuits, the most decisive 
steps will be taken to give 
effect to the legal restraint 
applicable to them.26 
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On the very same day the Secretary of State wrote to 
Governor Claiborne briefing him on the situation. Again 
emphasizing the fact that Robinson's activities could be 
easily construed by the Spanish to represent the official 
position of the United States due to his former connection 
with the government, Monroe pointed out that Robinson's 
activities were "repugnant to the views of the government, 
d t t 1 .. 27 an con rary o aw. 
upon Claiborne that, 
Furthermore, the Secretary impressed 
While at peace with Spain, whatever 
may be the injuries heretofore 
received from her government, it is 
highly improper for any of the 
citizens of the U.S. to violate 
that relation. The president 
therefore expects that you will 
take the necessary and proper 
steps to prevent any measures of 
the kind imput~d to Dr. Robinson 
being carried into effect.28 
26Ibid. 
27 Monroe to Governor Claiborne, February 14, 1814, ibid. 
28Ibid. 
r 
' 
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Claiborne had actually written the Secretary of 
State the previous November that he was concerned with some 
filibustering plans which were rumored to be afoot in 
Louisiana. Monroe believed these preparations to be a part 
of the Robinson endeavor and instructed the Governor to let 
his [Monroe's] letter of February 14, 1814, apply to that 
29 
case as well. The desire to help the people of Mexico 
liberate themselves from the yoke of Spain continued, but 
the Madison administration maintained its policy, at least 
officially, of "hands-off." The matter of Latin American 
independence was a problem between the New World colonies and 
the mother country. That most Americans were sympathetic 
to the cause of the colonials cannot be denied. The official 
policy of the nation, however, w~s one of non-interference. 
It might be interesting to note here that during the period 
1809-1815 there were no official attempts to explore or chart 
the approaches to Santa Fe. While that may have been the 
story for the United States Government as such, the private 
trader and adventurer had other ideas. 
' 
29Monroe to Governor Claiborne, February 17, 1814, ibid. 
In yet another letter the following August the Secretary of~~ 
State reiterated his concern that any and all attempts to in-
vade Spanish territory by filibustering parties must be stopped. 
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As mentioned earlier the Missouri Fur Company under-
went reorganization in 1809. The new company's roster in-
eluded the names of Manuel Lisa, as might be expected, and 
William Clark, Auguste and Pierre Chouteau, Major Andrew 
Henry and many other leading traders of St. Louis. The 
company's first expedition towards the Lower Rockies was in 
the spring of 1809. This particular expedition was rather 
interesting in that it was, in part, tied-up with a government 
contract. When Lewis and Clark had returned to St. Louis 
several years earlier they had brought with them a Mandan 
Chief, Shehaka. It was the responsibility of the Federal 
Government to return this warrior to his people once the Chief 
had completed his visit. All previous attempts had failed due 
to the warlike activity of the Arikaras, who were located 
along the Missouri just south of the Mandan villages. Now 
the Secretary of War contracted with the Missouri Fur Company 
to do the job for the United States Government. 
Governor Meriwether Lewis of the Territory of 
Louisiana was the official who carried out the actual con-
tracting procedures. Tha contract was made with M. Pierre 
Chouteau, Indian trader and Agent, in the amount of seven 
thousand dollars. With this money Chouteau was to "raise, 
organize, arm & equip at their own expense one hundred and 
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forty Volunteers and to furnish whatever might be deemed 
30 
necessary. This all seemed innocent enough, but the per-
sonalities involved and the lure of profits resulted in a 
rather different situation than officials in Washington en-
visioned. By July, 1809, it can be seen that the War Depart-
ment had become quite disturbed over this enterprise, ques-
tioning the additional monies requested by Governor Lewis for 
Chouteau. The motives of the traders were definitely under 
suspicion. The letter from the Secretary of War clearly 
illustrates that the Government's attitude toward expendi-
tures on the frontier had not changed substantially since the 
31 days of Jefferson. 
After informing Governor Lewis that a draft for an 
additional five hundred dollars to purchase "Tobacco, Powder, 
&c. intended as Presents for the Indians, through which this 
expedition is to pass," had not been honored, the Secretary 
went on to say, 
30 
It has been usual to advise the 
Government of the United States 
' 
Secretary of War to Governor Lewis, July 15, 1809, 
Carter, Territorial Papers, XIV, 285. 
when expenditures to a considerable 
amount are contemplated in the 
Territorial Governments. In the 
instance of accepting the volunteer 
services of 140 men for a military 
expedition to a point and purpose 
not designated, which expedition 
is stated to combine commercial as 
well as military objects, and when 
an Agent of the Government appointed 
for other purposes is selected for 
the command, it is thought the 
Government might, without injury 
to the public interests, have been 
consulted. As the object & desti-
nation of this Force is unknown and 
more especially as it combines 
Commercial purposes, so it cannot 
be considered as having the sanction 
of the Government of the United States, 
or that they are responsible for con-
sequences. 32 
The letter further stated that since Chouteau accepted the 
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command of the expedition his position as Indian Agent would 
automatically become vacant, and Governor Lewis should recom-
d 1 f h . . 33 men someone e se or t e position. 
Meriwether Lewis was quite upset at the above letter, 
and on August 18, 1809, penned a most direct reply. Lewis 
went into some detail trying to explain that his motives had 
' 
32
rbid., p. 286. 
L 
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always been of the highest order, and flatly denied any 
charges that his financial situation was not in good order. 
Referring specifically to the Chouteau case Lewis stated 
explicitely, 
I do most solennly [sic] aver, that the 
expedition sent up the Misoury [sic] 
under the command of Mr Pierre Chouteau, 
as a military Command, has no other 
object than that of conveying the Man-
dane [sic] Chief and his Family to their 
Village. -- and in a commercial point of 
view, that they intend only, to hunt 
and trade on the waters of the Misoury 
[sic] and Columbia Rivers within the 
Rockey-Mountains [sic] and the Planes 
[sic] bordering those Mountains on the 
east side -- and that they have no in-
tention with ~hich I am acquainted, 
to enter the Dominions, or do injury 
to any foreign Power. 34 
He then requested that Chouteau be able to retain his post as 
Indian Agent, as the latter had now been ordered to return to 
St. Louis as soon as the military part of the expedition was 
35 
over. Lewis felt written explanations would not be suf-
ficient, however, and it was over this matter that he 
• 
34 Governor Lewis to Secretary of War, August 18, 1809, 
ibid., p. 290. 
35
rbid., p. 292. 
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subsequently set out for Washington, a trip which he would 
never complete due to his untimely death at a roadside inn. 36 
Another member of the Missouri Fur Company, and a man 
well known to students of western history, was Manuel Lisa. 
When last mentioned, Manuel Lisa, the controversial and ener-
getic trader, had apparently dropped active participation in 
any kind of Santa Fe adventure. He became no less active in 
trading activity per se, however, turning his attention north 
and west from St. Louis. With great intensity he set out to 
expand his control over the fur trade of the Upper Missouri 
and into the Great Basin. With the help of experienced men 
such as John Colter and George Drouillard, both of the famous 
Lewis and Clark expedition, he engaged in a series of expedi-
tions which by the War of 1812 brought him much personal 
prestige and influence. Lisa was ultimately recognized by 
the American Government in an official capacity in 1814, when 
he was made Indian Agent for the tribes of the Upper Missouri. 37 
36
rbid. Lewis u~doubtedly took the remarks of the 
Secretary as personal affronts to his honesty. In this same 
letter Lewis stated that the United States could never make 
"A Burr" out of him. 
37 Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire ••• , p. 29. 
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Lisa's general plan was to set up a series of trading 
posts which would serve as permanent bases of operation. From 
these posts traders could move out in every direction at all 
times of the year, and would always be able to keep an eye 
out for competitors. Returning to an area a year or so later 
only to find your caches destroyed or your influence super-
ceded by another trader would be largely eliminated. Operating 
on this premise Lisa made his way far up the Missouri and down 
the Yellowstone into virtually unknown territory as far as the 
junction of the Big Horn River. It was in this locale, in 
present-day Montana, that Lisa had Manuel's Fort constructed. 
Manuel's Fort became the focal point for many important 
38 trading expeditions in the early and mid-nineteenth century. 
It could be expected that a man of Lisa's enterprising 
nature would attempt once more to contact the Spanish who, he 
believed as did most other traders of the time, were located 
only a short distance to the south of the Yellowstone region. 
The Spanish themselves had been trading far to the north of 
Santa Fe for several decades. It is possible they were active 
' 38Llsa's activity can be traced in detail by referring 
to one of several scholarly studies such as Walter B. Douglas, 
Manuel Lisa, edited by Abraham P. Nasatir (New York: Argosy 
Antiquarian Ltd., 1964), and Richard Edward Oglesby, Manuel 
Lisa and the Opening of the Missouri Fur Trade (Norman: Uni-
versity of Oklahoma Press, 1963). 
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along the Green and Snake rivers as well as reaching the 
39 Yellowstone. Lewis and Clark had reported in their journal 
that the Shoshones had horses and mules obtained from the 
Spaniards via the Yellowstone River. In his journal entry for 
August 20, 1805, Lewis noted, 
They [the Shoshones] informed me that 
they could pass to the Spaniards by the 
way of the yellowstone [sic] river in 
10 days. I can discover that these 
people are by no means friendly to the 
Spaniards. Their complaint is, that 
the Spaniards will not let them have 
fire arms and amunition, that they 
put them off by telling them that if 
they suffer them to have guns they 
will kill each other, thus leaving 
them defenceless and an easy prey to 
their blood-thirsty neighbours to the 
East of them, ••• 40 
.
39Joseph J. Hill, "Spanish and Mexican Exploration 
and Trade Northwest from New Mexico Into the Great Basin, 
1765-1853," Utah Historical Quarterly, III, No. 1 (January, 
1930), 3-23. David J. Weber, "Spanish Fur Trade From New 
Mexico, 1540-1821," The Americas, XXIV (1967), 130-32. 
The Comanches provided a source of furs for the people of 
New Mexico in the late 18th century which whetted the ap-
petites of the Spaniards,for more trade in furs. Contact 
was made with the Utes, and by the end of the century the 
Spanish had ventured well into the Southern Rockies and 
the Great Basin for the purpose of trade. 
40 Devoto, Journals of Lewis and Clark, p. 213. 
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There seems to be some evidence that the f arnous John 
Colter's treks out of Manuel's Fort were, at least in part, 
41 for the purpose of opening trade with Spanish settlements. 
In 1808, George Drouillard conducted two expeditions south of 
Manuel's Fort. Historians recognize that one of the most irn-
portant results of these explorations was the crude map that 
Drouillard made, a map later used by William Clark in corn-
piling his maps of the West. An examination of the Drouillard 
map reveals several interesting notations. Primarily, the 
Spanish settlements are mentioned as being accessible by way 
of the Big Horn River, and the "number of days" distance as 
figured by the Indians is also recorded. One scholar notes 
that the estimates of travel time quoted from the Indians are 
hardly accurate, or at least confusing, for a day's travel 
might be based upon the distance covered by an entire band 
42 
moving at a leisurely pace, or a forced march of a war party. 
preter 
dale: 
41M. o. Skarsten, George Drouillard, Hunter and Inter-
for Lewis and Clark and Fur Trader, 1807-1810 (Glen-
The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1964), p. 265. 
42Ibid. The aulhor draws a question as to whether 
Drouillard actually ascended the Big Horn to anywhere near 
these settlements. The marks on the map that appear to be a 
continuation of his route, could simply have been placed there 
to indicate that a trail was extant rather than to indicate 
an actual itinerary of the trapper. See Also Burton Harris, 
John Colter, His Years In the Rockies (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1952), p. 97. 
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This hardly seems a vital question at this point; the fact 
remains that the proximity of Spaniards to the American 
trading posts was believed to exist, and the idea that a 
few day's ride from the Upper Missouri or Yellowstone would 
put American traders in the heart of the Spanish Empire was 
real. It is interesting to note here that the geography 
furnished by Drouillard was used in both the manuscript and 
published maps of William Clark, and would thus perpetuate 
the misconceptions about the geography of the West for years 
43 to come. 
With such attractive news even a man of lesser 
imagination and energy than Manuel Lisa would have been 
encouraged to attempt once more to open trade with the Spanish. 
Trade with the Spanish had never been far from Lisa's thoughts, 
and by 1810, he felt it was time to again seek rewards to the 
south. Sometime during the summer of that year the trapper 
Jean Baptiste Champlain and a party of some twenty-three 
hunters returned to Fort Mandan from an expedition to the 
Arapaho nation on the headwaters of the Platte. The 
' Arapahos, Indians of the Algonquin language group, were 
43Wheat, From Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 54. 
L 
located generally between the hunting grounds of the 
Northern and Southern Cheyennes, in the eastern part of 
the present-day state of Colorado. 44 
Champlain advised that the Spaniards made contact 
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with the Arapaho for trade at least once each year. This was 
exciting news to Lisa and he immediately determined to con-
tact his former countrymen. If a trading connection could be 
made with Spanish subjects, thought Lisa, his trading company, 
the Missouri Fur Company, would possibly be able to succeed. 
He figured this would happen even if the shaky relations 
between the United States and England led to a war. Ac-
cordingly, Lisa outfitted Champlain and sent him back to the 
Arapaho nation with instructions to open trade with the 
Spanish if possible, and, at least according to what he later 
told the Spaniards, if the trade would "not be to the pre-
judice of the government [of Spain] • 1145 
44
oglesby, Manuel Lisa ••• , p. 115. Alvin M. 
Josephy, Jr. The Indian Heritage of America (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1969), p. 117. 
' 
45Manuel Lisa to the Spaniards of New Mexico, September 
8, 1812, Manuel Lisa Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. 
Louis, Mo. Herbert E. Bolton, "New Light on Manuel Lisa and 
the Spanish Fur Trade," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 
XVII, No. 1 (July, 1913), 63. 
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By August, 1812, no word had been received from the 
Champlain party. No one knew if they had reached their 
destination or had been killed. The loss of Champlain would 
certainly have been a personal blow to Lisa for the two men 
were long-time associates. More than that, however, with the 
loss of Champlain went Lisa's immediate hopes of opening a 
connection between the Upper Missouri country and the Spanish 
to the south. The Indians becoming more hostile at this time 
further dampened any hopes of success. Meanwhile the McKnight 
expedition, which will be discussed below, had been outfitting 
in St. Louis and was heading in the direction of Santa Fe. 
These factors made it imperative for Lisa to act immediately 
h f . 1 d 46 or face t e loss o any potentia Santa Fe tra e. With this 
situation in mind Lisa made what has been described as a last-
ditch attempt to secure ingress to Spain's northern bastion. 
But first, another member of the Champlain party deserves 
examination. 
One of the men accompanying Champlain on his attempt 
to open trade with the Spanish was Ezekiel Williams. The 
' particulars ·about this man and his activities are still 
somewhat clouded, but there is sufficient historical evidence 
46 Oglesby, Manuel Lisa ••• , pp. 127-28. 
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to fix him in time and place as a member of the party Manuel 
Lisa sent out in 1810 to open trade negotiations with the 
Spanish on the approaches to Santa Fe. 47 Apparently the 
Champlain party broke up on the upper Platte River, Williams 
and a small group continuing on to the Arkansas. According 
to what Williams later told the United States Indian Agent 
at Fort Osage on the Missouri, he was robbed and kept 
prisoner by a band of Kansas Indians who found him in June, 
1813. He was kept prisoner until mid-August and then re-
leased. The weary traveler arrived at Boon's Lick trading 
post on September 1, 1813. 48 According to Professor Goetz-
rnann ~1e Williams incident furnished authorities with important 
geographical information. It established the existence of 
the Central Rockies which form most of the state of Colorado. 
Thus it clearly showed that "the Spanish settlements of New 
Mexico and Manuel's Fort on the Yellowstone did not ••• 
4711Ezekiel Williams' Adventure in Colorado," Missouri 
Historical Society Collections, IV, No. 2 (1913), 194-95. 
There is another work extant concerning the trek of Williams. 
It is David H. Coyner, 1he Lost Trappers: A Collection of 
Interesting Scenes and Events in the Rocky Mountains (Cin-
cinnati: J.A. & U.P. James, 1847). This account is con-
sidered to be a very exaggerated and inaccurate account. 
4811Ezekiel Williams' Adventure in Colorado," p. 195. 
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lie on opposite sides of a single mountain ridge. 1149 Santa 
Fe was obviously not a "few days ride" from the nearest 
western outpost of the Americans. 
Now back to Manuel Lisa and his last attempt to gain 
inroads to Spanish trade. Not having heard from the Champlain 
party (including Williams) for many months Lisa dispatched 
another trader, Charles Sanguinet, one of his most trusted 
and able lieutenants, to the Spanish in the name of the 
Missouri Fur Company. Sanguinet was armed with a most inte-
resting letter. The letter explained that Sanguinet's trip 
was necessary as no word had been received from Champlain, 
and it was clearly a proposal for trade. 50 
In September, 1812, Charles Sanguinet with over 
$1,000.00 in merchandise, set out for Santa Fe from Fort 
Manuel. The letter he carried was of immense importance be-
cause of what it tells concerning Lisa's ideas about trade, 
as well as the activity in the fur trade by the Spaniards. 
Thus it should be quoted at some length. Lisa told the 
Spaniards, 
' 
49 Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire ••• , p. 27. 
SOManuel Lisa to the Spaniards of New Mexico, 
September 8, 1812, Lisa Papers. Bolton, "New Light on Manuel 
Lisa ••• ," pp. 63-64. 
Ever since my first journey among the 
forks of the Missouri, nine hundred 
leagues from my domicile, I have 
desired to find an opportunity to 
communicate with my [com]patriots, 
the Spaniards. I have had hunters 
to the number of twenty-three who 
have gone to the Arapaho nation. 
Last year they came to my Fort Mandanne 
[sic] where I equipped them anew to 
return to the place whence they had 
come. They are the ones who informed 
me that the Spaniards of Mexico were 
coming every year to trade with the 
Arapahoes. Therefore I gave to a 
certain Juan Bautista Champlain, an 
honorable young man, and Juan Bautista 
Lafargue, some goods for the purpose 
of trading with you, •.. since up 
to the present I have not had any news 
[of them] , I have decided to send one 
of my trusted servants, Don Carlos 
Sanguinet, with two engages to let 
them know they should come out with 
their peltry; •• 
I have especially instructed Don Carlos 
Sanguinet to arrange that this letter 
of mine should fall into the hands 
of some Spaniard who may be worthy to 
communicate with me [sea digno de 
communicar conmigo] on those honor-
able principles, and in no other 
manner, my desire being to engage in 
business and open up a new commerce 
which might easily be done. With this 
in view, and as directory of the 
Missouri Fur ;ompany, I propose to you 
gentlemen that if you wish to trade 
and deal with me, for whatever quantity 
of goods it may be, I will obligate my-
self to fill each year any bill of goods 
which shall be given me, and all shall 
be delivered [as stipulated] both as to 
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quality and as to quantity, at the 
place nearest and most convenient 
for both parties, to your satis-
faction, after we shall have agreed 
on the chosen place. 
In case any of you should wish to 
come with Don Carlos Sanguinet to 
this my establishment to com-
municate and trade with me, you 
will be received and treated with 
great pleasure and satisfaction, 
and assured to a sufficient escort, 
agreeable to you, up to the time of 
your return to your country •••• Sl 
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While Lisa waited for news from Sanguinet he directed 
the completion of Fort Manuel. The news that did finally 
arrive in December was all bad. Lisa was informed from the 
land of the Arapaho that Champlain had been killed by the 
Blackfeet, that Lafargue and five others had run off to the 
Spaniards, and that eight more had run off to the Crows. Never 
having reached Santa Fe, Sanguinet, himself, was back at Fort 
Mandan by January, 1813, with some thirty horses for which he 
had bartered. No trade agreement with the Spaniards had been 
made, and Sanguinet had no Spanish official with him to dis-
cuss the matter with Li¥1. 52 This incident drew Lisa's 
51Manuel Lisa to the Spaniards of New Mexico, 
September 8, 1812, Lisa Papers. 
52Richard Dillon, "Meriwether Lewis, Manuel Lisa, and 
the Tantalizing Santa Fe Trade," Montana, the Magazine of 
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efforts to contact Santa Fe to a close. The War of 1812 now 
interrupted the activities of the Missouri Fur Company and 
it fell on hard times. 
Another incident whereby individual Americans sought 
their fortunes on the roads to Santa Fe, and involved the 
United States Government, was the effort by Joseph McLanahan, 
Reuben Smith, James Patterson and Emanuel Blanco. These 
traders left St. Genevieve in November, 1809, and reached 
Santa Fe in the latter part of February the following year. 
The Spanish Governor of New Mexico did not buy their story of 
an intention to settle in that region, and had them im-
prisoned. Colonel Jose Manrrique, the ad interim governor, 
became quite alarmed at the ease with which Spain's pos-
sessions were being encroached upon by foreigners. He 
encouraged the New Mexicans to open trade arrangements with 
the surrounding Indian tribes in order to secure the red 
man's friendship and use them as sources of information 
relative to the activity of intruders. 53 
' Western History, XVII, No. 2 (April, 1967), 51-52. 
53Loomis, Pedro Vial ••• , p. 249. Detailed 
information on their route is scarce. 
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The imprisonment of McLanahan, Smith and party caused 
some consternation among citizens in the United States when 
they became aware of the fate of their fellow Americans. 
Once the American newspapers took up the story the issue 
became one of Spanish oppression versus the "innocent" traders. 
To capitalize on such an emotional issue was not difficult: an 
excerpt from the Louisiana Gazette would point this out well: 
Mark the pretended ignorance of 
these bloodhounds, they knew these 
gentlemen were from St. Genevieve 
in the Territory of Louisiana, • • • 
Vermin! what a prostitution of 
language! Messrs. Smith M'Clanahan 
and Patterson strangers to the 
policy of Mexico and the monkish 
barbarism of the natives, they con-
ceived they would visit white men 
clothed with the Christian name: 
unhappy incredulity~ They would 
have found more generosity in the 
breast of an Arab, more hospitality 
in the den of a Hiena. -- The 
assassins of Mexico have ere-this 
butchered three respectable in-
habitants of Louisiana! ..• 54 
Appeals were made to the State Department by some 
• 
leading Americans including General Andrew Jackson to 
pressure the Spanish Government for the immediate release of 
54 b"d I l. • ' pp. 249-50. 
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these "three respectable inhabitants of Louisiana,"55 or take 
stern action if the traders were no longer alive. In De-
cernber, 1810, Secretary of State Robert Smith did instruct 
Governor Benjamin Howard of the Louisiana Territory to write 
Nemesio Salcedo, the Commandant-General of the Provincias 
Internas, in behalf of the prisoners attesting to their char-
acter and citizenship. 56 Official correspondence surrounding 
this issue mounted. Salcedo was informed that a number of 
men in high places of government had "interested themselves 
warmly in behalf of the sufferers. 1157 
The McLanahan party was finally released after a 
year in the Santa Fe prison and returned to Louisiana in June, 
1812. The three men, McLanahan, Smith and Patterson, cele-
brated their return from the "assassins of Mexico" by in-
forming the Governor in St. Louis that they intended to join 
a filibustering expedition into Texas to help liberate that 
56Robert Smith to Governor Benjamin Howard, December 
11, 1810, Carter, Territorial Papers, XIV, 426-27. This 
letter indicates that Governor Claiborne had also attempted 
to intercede for the traders a few months earlier. 
57 Ibid. 
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land from the yoke of Spain. The United States Government's 
attitude toward such projects has already been discussed, 
but it might be of merit here to include a portion of what 
Secretary of State .Monroe wrote to Governor Howard upon 
learning of the plans afoot. 
If the projected visit contemplates 
any measure of hostility to Spain 
it is repugnant to the policy of the 
United States. It is also positively 
prohibited by law.SS 
Yet another private trading venture forced the 
American Government to become involved diplomatically with 
Spain at a time when it would have much preferred that 
relations with His Catholic Majesty remain tranquil. Some-
time during 1811 and 1812, James Baird, a personal friend of 
Zebulon M. Pike, joined with Robert McKnight and Samuel 
Chambers in an effort to open trade relations with the Spanish 
in New Mexico. The feasibility of overland contact with 
Santa Fe had been established by the journey of Pike as well 
as others. In fact, Pike's Journals were published by this 
' time and their impact upon the people of the United States 
58 . Monroe to Governor Howard, September 3, 1810, SD, 
Domestic Letters. 
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including trader, trapper and government official, cannot be 
over emphasized (See Chapter IV) • Baird and his party used 
th J 1 "d b 59 e ourna s as a gui e ook. 
There can be little doubt that these men were aware 
of the way Spanish officials frowned uoon foreign intrustion 
as of late. News of the Hidalgo uprising in Mexico and the 
subsequent independence activity doubtless gave encouragement 
to such traders. It was hoped that the new revolutionary 
governments would look with more favor upon trade with their 
neighbors to the east. Unknown to the Baird-McKnight-Chambers 
party before they departed on their long journey, the Hidalgo 
movement had been short-lived and the leader had been executed. 
Given the suspicion on the part of the Spanish that Americans 
aided in the recent uprisings and were constantly threatening 
New Spain with filibustering activities, a favorable reception 
60 in New Mexico could hardly be expected. 
59Frank B. Golley, "James Baird, Early Santa Fe 
Trader," Missouri Historical Society Bulletin, XV, No. 3 
(April, 1959), p. 179. Family tradition suggests that Baird 
and the famous explorer,Zebulon Montgomery Pike, became 
friends during their stay at Pittsburgh, and that it was 
through Pike that Baird first became cognizant of the pos-
sibilities of the Mexican trade. 
60Chittenden, The American Fur Trade ••• , II, 495-96. 
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Nevertheless mules, horses, provisions and trade 
goods were gathered, and the expedition left St. Louis for 
the northern frontier of New Spain sometime in April, 1812. 61 
The complete cargo, consisting of such things as silk, muslin, 
calico, cotton, gun powder, knives, jackets and purses, was 
valued at approximately $10,000.00. After several months of 
exhausting travel they arrived at Taos, using the route recom-
mended by Pike on his map -- up the Arkansas River to the 
Purgatory River, then to the mountains and finally to Taos. 
It was in Taos that the party learned of the failure of the 
Hidalgo uprising. They were subsequantly arrested and es-
corted to Santa Fe. In spite of sufficient documentation and 
trade goods to verify their status as legitimate traders, 
Governor Manrrique had the Americans placed in jail and their 
goods were applied to the cost of maintaining the prisoners. 
Just how long they remained in jail in Santa Fe is not known, 
but from that town the Americans were taken to Chihuahua by 
way of Albuquerque and El Paso. While in Chihuahua the 
prisoners were at liberty under bond and restricted to the 
' confines of the city limits. Sometime in 1815 they were tried 
for their part in a supposed conspiracy and confined in the 
61 Golley, "James Baird ••• ," p. 174. 
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Military Hospital. 62 
News of the capture and imprisonment of the Baird 
party reached St. Louis in early 1813, and it opened a storm 
of protest from members of the traders' families, newspaper 
editors and Congressmen. It was demanded of the Spanish that 
they release their prisoners immediately. Due to the efforts 
of Baird's wife and McKnight's brother, the case was laid 
before the Department of State in 1813. This move brought 
little success until 1817; for until that time Luis de Onis, 
the only Spanish official in the United States of sufficient 
rank and power to do anything about the situation, was not 
credited by the American Government. 63 
In February, 1817, Secretary of State Monroe initiated 
a series of letters to Minister Onis, who had finally been 
recognized officially as the Spanish Minister to the United 
States. The correspondence relative to the imprisonment of 
Baird, McKnight and Chambers continued for several years to 
no avail. In a bureaucratic and procrastinating fashion 
' 62
rbid., pp. 179-81. 
63
rbid., pp. 180-83. Baird apparently wrote his wife 
during his stay in Chihuahua. 
L 
243 
reminiscent of earlier times, the Spanish colonial officials 
wrote and forwarded letter after letter between each other 
and the Crown relative to the imprisonment and release of 
64 the Americans, all to no positive result. In justice to the 
Spanish it must be pointed out here that the period 1818-1820 
was a most trying one for them. Both at home and in the 
colonies revolution was the byword; frantic efforts were 
being made to hold on to their colonial empire. Ferdinand 
VII was struggling to maintain his throne. In such a situation 
the fate of several American trappers languishing in a 
Chihuahuan jail would not hold a place of prime importance 
for the troubled Spanish officials. This would be all the 
more true due to the continued reluctance of the United 
States Government to involve itself diplomatically with 
Spain over the activities of individual American citizens in 
the territory of a foreign power. 
64Monroe to Onis, February 8, 1817, ibid., p. 183. 
Onls to J.Q. Adams, February 13, 1817, ibid.:-P:- 184. John 
Scott, Delegate to Congress from the ~1iSS'Ollri Territory to 
J.Q. Adams, December 29: 1817, ibid., p. 185. J. Q. Adams 
to Onis, January 7, 1818, ibid.;-p:- 185. Onis to J. Q. Adams, 
January 12, 1818, ibid., p-:-186. Onis to Don Ruiz de Apodaca, 
Viceroy of New Spain, January 12, 1818, ibid., p. 187. The 
correspondence of the American officials--cin also be found 
in Carter, Territorial Papers, XV. 
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The prisoners were eventually set free in 1821 by 
the revolutionary government of Augustin Iturbide. In the 
interim, however, the inability of the United States to secure 
any redress from the Spanish provoked a storm of protest 
from some American citizens, especially those living in the 
more western states and territories. The inability of the 
American government to effect the release of the prisoners 
was easily translated by the populace into the lack of desire 
to do so, the press playing a large role in this aspect. 
Records indicate that official channels were used albeit to 
'l 65 no ava1 • 
The latter days of Madison's administration witnessed 
another attempt by several Americans to open a trade route 
to Santa Fe, an attempt which was not well received by offic-
ials in that city. Auguste Pierre Chouteau had continued 
active trading out of St. Louis following the War of 1812. 
In his position as Agent to the Osage Indians he likewise 
continued to hold a place of influence in government circles. 
Governor William Clark of the recently created Territory of 
' Missouri, was especially complimentary of the Frenchman's 
65 Golley, "James Baird • • • , " p. 180. 
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service to the American nation. 66 In the summer of 1815, 
Chouteau formed a partnership with Jules de Mun of St. Louis 
for the purpose of trading on the Upper Arkansas with the 
Arapaho and other Indian tribes of that region. 
These two men actually arrived at the idea for such 
a trading enterprise when another trader, James Philibert, 
returned to St. Louis in 1815 for more supplies in order to 
rendezvous on the Upper Arkansas with members of a party he 
had led there the previous year. The new team received a 
license to trade from Governor Clark and set out on Sep-
tember 10, 1815. On the way across the Plains, De Mun and 
Chouteau bought out Philibert, expecting to acquire the ser-
vices of his men when they would rendezvous on Huerfano 
Creek near Pueblo, Colorado. Huerfano Creek was a fork of 
the Arkansas called El Haerfano by the Spanish. On arriving 
at the appointed spot December 8, 1815, the men Philibert 
had left behind were nowhere to be found. Inquiry among 
the Indians established that the men, thinking Philibert 
' 66 Clark to William H. Crawford, December 11, 1815, 
Clark Papers, MSS, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, 
Mo. Appointment of William Clark as Governor of the Missouri 
Territory by President Madison, June 16, 1813, ibid. 
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1 t d d h d h . d 67 os or ea , a gone over to t e Spaniar s at Taos. 
It was decided that Chouteau would remain on the 
Huerfano and De Mun would go into Taos to inquire about the 
trappers. He would also speak to the Spaniards about future 
trapping in the region. De Mun found the trappers in Taos 
apparently well and happy. Proceeding to Santa Pe De Mun also 
found the Spanish Governor, Alberto Maynez, rather well dis-
posed toward American traders. De Mun gives the following 
account: 
Having seen on my way to Santa Fe 
that the rivers abounded with beaver, 
. I asked the Governor the permission of 
coming, with a fixed number of hunters, 
to catch beaver in the rivers which 
empty themselves into Rio del Norte. 
This he could not take upon himself 
to grant, but had the goodness to write 
on that subject to the commandant General. 
As I could not wait for the answer, Don 
Alberto told me to come back • • • to know 
the General's answer.68 
What De Mun had to say next is of interest in light 
of the geographic concepts held at the time. It should be 
' 67 Thomas Marshall, "Journals of De Mun • • • , " pp. 
172-73. De Mun's letter to Governor William Clark, November 
25, 1817, is given in full. 
68Ibid., p. 173. 
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kept in mind that the western boundary dispute between Spain 
and the United States was as yet unsettled, although progress 
was being made. De Mun continued, 
I must not omit to say that the 
Governor did not seem a moment to 
doubt that we had a right to fre-
quent the east side of the mountains, 
and there to trade or catch beaver 
if we could; for he advised me not 
to go to the south of Red River of 
Natchitoches, but from that river 
to the northward we might trade 
and hunt as we pleased. 69 
Here was one Spaniard whose concept of what the Americans had 
purchased in 1803 came close to matching that of the Ameri-
cans themselves. 
De Mun subsequently returned to Taos, picked up his 
trappers and returned to Chouteau on the Huerfano. It was 
then decided De Mun should return to St. Louis for additional 
supplies; accordingly, he set out at the end of February, 1816, 
and reached St. Louis some forty-six days later. Being well 
supplied De Mun once more turned west and made rendezvous 
with Chouteau at the mquth of the Kansas River as previously 
arranged. The two men then started for the Rocky Mountains, 
where De Mun once again left Chouteau at camp and sought out 
69
rbid. 
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the Spanish authorities to see if word had been received from 
the Commandant-General in Chihuahua. 70 
To De Mun's consternation there had been a change in 
Governors at Santa Fe. The new official, Pedro Maria de 
Allande, was not well disposed towards Americans. In fact, 
the Governor would not even allow De Mun to enter the city, 
and ordered him out of Spanish territory immediately. Ac-
cordingly, the De Mun-Chouteau trading party recrossed the 
mountains and wintered on the east side of the Arkansas 
. 71 River. 
Not willing to give up so easily, De Mun decided to 
make one more trip back to Taos and see if the climate had 
improved to any degree. Upon his arrival at this small village 
72 he was told that there were "very unfavorable reports." 
The Spanish authorities confronted him with the story that they 
had news of an American fort with some 20,000 men being built 
on the Arkansas at the Rio de las Animas (located in the 
7
oibid., pp. 175-76. 
' 
71Ibid. 
72Ibid., p. 177. 
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southeastern corner of the present-day state of Colorado) • 
De Mun offered himself as a hostage while the Spaniards 
searched out the rumors. Several days later there arrived 
in Taos a force of Spanish militia under the command of 
Lieutenant Don Francisco Salazar who proceeded to take De 
Mun back to his companions, raised all their caches, and 
escorted the whole party back to Santa Fe. The provincial 
Governor was most angry because the Americans had not taken 
heed of his first orders and left Spanish territory. Governor 
Allande did not hold the same concept as to where American 
territory extended and Spanish domain began expressed by his 
predecessor. He would not accept the traders' explanation 
of their right to trap along the Arkansas and into the rnoun-
tains. According to De Mun, 
I replied • . • that we were taken on 
.American territory, where our Governor 
had given us a license to go. At this 
he got into a violent rage, saying that 
we should pay for our own and our 
Governor's ignorance; using all the 
time very abusive language; repeating 
several times that he would have our 
brains blown l.\P ••• 73 
73
rbi"d., 178 80 pp. - • 
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The trappers were subsequently imprisoned for forty-
eight days after which they received a court martial composed 
of six members and a president -- Governor Allande. Once 
again the question of boundaries came up. De Mun insisted 
that he was not on Spanish soil while on the Arkansas, because 
that river was within United States territory since the pur-
chase of Louisiana. In addition, Governor Clark had issued 
h 1 . . h 74 t em 1censes to trap in t e area. 
It has been noted earlier that Governor Clark main-
tained a manuscript map on which he continually made changes 
and notations as more knowledge became available. This map 
covers much more territory than the engraved map which came 
out in 1814, and is of more value in determining what concepts 
Clark held relative to the Southwest. On the manuscript map 
the Nebraska and Kansas country is carefully charted; Gover-
nor Clark definitely used Pike's map for the approaches to 
Santa Fe. Clark continually made revisions and notations. 
For example, high along the third fork of the Arkansas 
[Huerfano] he now added "Chouteau & Dumen [sic] taken by 
Spaniards. 1175 ' To the south and southwest of the Lower 
74 Ibid. 
75 Wheat, From Lewis and Clark ••• , II, 51. 
r 
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VII. SECTION OF WILLIAM CLARK'S MANUSCRIPT 
MAP 
Source: Goetzmann, William H. 
Exploration and Empire: The Explorer and the 
~t.UU_n__tlliL.!'.?.tnn_i_ng_Qf the American West. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966, p. 26. 
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Rockies, however, he continued to rely upon inaccurate 
Spanish maps which had in turn been relied upon by the famous 
Baron von Humboldt. Thus imaginary geography continued 
to prevail. Given the other information he had received 
from "mountain men" such as Colter and Drouillard, it would 
not be unusual to find Governor Clark issuing licenses to trap 
k . 76 along the Ar ansas River. 
Governor Allande denied that the United States had 
·the right to issue such licenses and permit trappers "to go 
f f .d . ,,77 as ar as the headwaters o sai river. Furthermore, the 
Spaniard spoke much about a big river that was the boundary 
between the t\·10 countries but did not know its name. When 
De Mun suggested it might be the Mississippi, Allan de "jumped 
up saying, that that was the big river he meant; that Spain 
had never ceded the west side of it. "7 8 
The sentence of the court martial was that the 
Americans leave the dominions of Spain which they did, re-
turning to St. Louis in early September, 1817. De Mun 
76 Ibid. • 
77 Marshall, "Journals of De Mun • • • , " p. 180. 
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figured the loss of the trapping venture to the·tune of over 
$30,00o.oo. There now remained the question of whether 
the United States Government could or would demand satis-
faction of the King of Spain "for outrages committed by his 
• Am . • . 79 ignorant Governor on erican citizens." The State Depart-
ment, now under the leadership of John Quincy Adams, did 
initiate a claim against the government of Spain, and a settle-
80 
ment was finally reached years later. 
Meanwhile, in November, 1816, the people of the United 
States elected another Chief Executive. Following the prece-
dent set down by the nation's first President, Madison decided 
not to run for a third term and the Jeffersonian-Republican 
mantle fell to another Virginian, James Monroe. Monroe was 
certainly no newcomer to the field of national politics or 
international diplomacy, having held several ministerial posts 
in Europe under both Jefferson and Madison, as well as Cabinet 
positions under the latter statesman. 
79 Ibid. Statement and Proof in Case of Chouteau and 
De Mun, of Their Loss al'\d Treatment by the Spaniards, ASP, 
Foreign Relations, IV, 209-10. 
80 Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., lst Sess., II, 
1953-66. 
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Although the pending negotiations and problems with 
Spain would not be settled until several years after Monroe 
assumed the office of President, his election, in many ways, 
marked the end of one period of United States-Spanish relations 
and the opening of a new era. The new period would see a 
decided quickening of pace respective to concluding unsettled 
issues with Spain, and a definite interest on the part of 
government to sponsor expeditions to the Rocky Mountain region. 
The scientific aspect of such expeditions was obvious, but 
much of the new approach had to do with military reorganization 
and defense. Indian policy was also a major factor. The man 
largely responsible for this reorganization, and the admini-
strative force behind a more vigorous approach to the west, 
was Monroe's Secretary of War, John c. Calhoun. 
The War Department was responsible for the management 
of army business and the conduct of Indian Affairs. In both 
areas there was a mixture of civilian and military influence 
that proved difficult to reconcile at times. Great distances 
and poor roads did little to facilitate administration, and 
the absence of a true q~artermaster corps during the time 
of Jefferson and Madison added to faulty management. As 
Leonard White points out in his work on the Jeffersonians, 
"Army organization before 1813 ••• was extremely simple. 
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; 
• • • The army consisted of small self-sufficing scattered 
posts mostly on the frontier under the control of local 
81 
commanders." The War of 1812 forced the Congress to act 
and in 1813 some reorganization took place, and a General 
Staff was created. Once the war was over, however, there 
was an immediate cry for reduction of the armed forces. By 
an act of congress within two months of the Battle of New 
Orleans, Congress passed a bill which read in part, 
That the military peace establishment 
of the United States shall consist 
of such proportions of artillery, 
infantry, and riflemen, not ex-
ceeding in the whole ten thousand 
men, as the President shall judge 
proper, and that the corps of 
engineers as at present established, 
be retained.82 
When James Monroe took the oath of office in March, 
1817, the state of the military and its management were not 
such that anyone would volunteer to have the chance to put 
them in order. Monroe had difficulty in persuading someone 
' 81
white, The Jeffersonians ••• , p. 236. 
82L. n. Ingersoll, A History of the War Department of 
the United States, With Biographical Sketches of the Secretaries 
(Washington, D.C.: Francis B. Mohun, 1880), pp. 74-75. 
1817, the position was accepted by John c. Calhoun. Although 
without military experience he attacked his duties with a 
determination and vision that made him "one of the remarkable 
83 
cabinet members of his age." 
Part of his task was the formulation of a defense 
policy for the western frontier, and here he differed ex-
tensively with many high ranking army officers who were 
thinking more in terms of a limited advance on the frontiers. 
The famous Yellowstone Expedition of 1818, and the first 
expedition led by Stephen H. Long in 1819, were the earliest 
efforts in what Francis Prucha describes as Calhoun's "dreams 
84 
of national grandeur." Although not completely successful 
due to a still cautious Congress, the aforementioned expeditions 
signaled a new dawn in army exploration of the West and in 
cartography of the Southwest. The Indians were to find in 
Calhoun a man who strongly believed that any type of indepen-
dent status for Indians within state limits should be abolished: 
furthermore, if the red man opposed the process of civilization 
• into the white man's world, removal to the West was the only 
83 Prucha, Sword of the Republic ••• , p. 135. 
84Ib' . -~ .. ~·I p. 140. 
r 
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answer. 
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Thus after 1818, the approaches to Santa Fe were be-
coming attractive to the United States Government as well as 
to the individual trader or trapper. In fact, the attempts 
of individual Americans to seek fortunes in the West began to 
rapidly increase, culminating in what has been described as 
the most significant trip ever made in the West -- the opening 
of the Santa Fe Trail by William Becknell in 1821. 86 By that 
time, however, the independence movement in Mexico had sue-
ceeded and Santa Fe was no longer under the control of His 
Catholic Majesty. The new :.1exican officials viewed trade 
with the United States, at least in the beginning, in a dif-
ferent light than did the Spanish. Within a few short years 
visions of trade with New Mexico loomed forth in the minds 
of men too numerous to count. 
Meanwhile, the western boundary question was being 
brought to a conclusion by the diligent efforts of John Quincy 
85
rbid., p. 254. Ingersoll, A History of the War 
Department~.~ •• , p. 461-
86 h · 1 b f d The full story of t e Santa Fe trai may e oun 
in R. L. Duffus, The Santa Fe Trail (New York: Logmanns, 
1930). See also William Becknell, "Journal of Two Expe-
ditions from Boon's Lick to Santa Fe," Missouri Historical 
Society Collections. 
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Adams and Luis de Onis. Once he had been officially 
recognized by the United States Government in December, 1815, 
Onis had considered the solution of territorial problems with 
the United States vital to the larger scope of Spanish 
colonial policy. He hoped a well-defined border would aid 
in defending the colonies and deter restless adventurers from 
east of the Mississippi. Furthermore, a settlement of the 
boundary dispute would ease the diplomatic tension between 
his country and the United States. 87 
The final delineation of a common western boundary 
between United States and Spanish territory was integrally 
tied to settlement of the Florida question. As noted several 
times above the settlement of the Florida issue was foremost 
in the minds of American statesmen; such was also the case 
with Spanish diplomats. Spain's inability to control Florida 
in the waning years of her colonial empire is well known, 
but she still valued the territory and ~ished to hold on to 
it. The Americans had been pushing into West Florida for 
some time, and the War of 1812 all but secured the entire area 
for the United States. ' President Madison evidenced full 
support for the American urge to make West Florida a part of 
87 Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands ••• , pp. 1-2. 
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h . 88 t e Union. East Florida also had its allure. 
The strategic value of East Florida during the War of 
1812 gave justification to American statesmen to consider 
annexing the area. Following the war the inability of 
Spanish officials to restrain the Indians from raiding into 
American territoriJ, and the inability, if not reluctance, 
of these same officials to return the hundreds of runaway 
slaves, kept the lure for possession of East Florida in 
American sights. Little more than verbosity occurred over the 
Floridas between the end of the War and the year 1818 however, 
until General Andrew Jackson made his famous move into the 
area and stirred up a veritable "hornet's nest" of diplomatic 
haranguing. 
Another vital factor to the outcome of the Adams-Onis 
negotiations was the explosive situation facing Spain in the 
form of renewed independence movements spreading throughout 
her New World possessions. Actually this situation could be 
considered the key issue which eventually forced Spain to give 
in to the United States on the question of the Floridas, and 
' 
88
.Tunerican interest in and occupation of West Florida 
is discussed fully in Issac J. Cox, The West Florida Contro-
versy, 1798-1813: A Study in American Diplomacy (Gloucester, 
Mass.: Peter Smith, 1967). See especially Chapters X-XVII. 
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make concessions on the western boundary. Spain feared United 
States active support of the insurgent governments, and, as 
it proved, was willing to go to great lengths to prevent such 
aid. The active sympathy of the American populace permitted 
the outfitting of privateers in our ports under the flags of 
the belligerent countries. Too often these privateers were 
manned by American crews in violation of neutrality laws. 
Faced with the rising power of the insurgents and the swelling 
tide of opinion in the United States, the Spanish Foreign 
Minister, Jose Garcia de Leon y Pizarro, feared a recognition 
by Washington of the independence of the rebel states. He 
thus grew increasingly alarmed at the precarious condition 
of the indefensible borderlands. 89 
Pizarro tried in vain to enlist the support of England 
in his nation's negotiations with the United States. He wished 
England to assume responsibility for maintaining the integrity 
of the Spanish Empire and to mediate directly in the affairs 
of Spain with America. This England would not do. Between 
' 
89
arooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands ••• , p. 115. 
Pizarro was appointed Foreign Minister by Ferdinand VII in 
October, 1816. Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and ~~e 
Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1965), p. 305. 
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England and the United States at the moment there were too 
many diplomatic bargainings in process which had grown out of 
the Treaty of Ghent to allow for an added complication. 
Besides mediation by the British was flatly refused by the 
American Government. Therefore, alone, and in serious trouble 
with her colonial subjects, Spain had to tackle the Florida 
and western boundary questions with one of the ablest states-
men America could put forth. Many historians consider John 
Quincy Adams to have been one of America's finest statesmen 
. d' 1 90 J.n l.p omacy. 
John Quincy Adams's first major proposal to Onis 
was made on January 16, 1818. It called for a line north 
from the source of the Colorado River of Texas to the northern 
limits of Louisiana; the line would run across the prairies 
just to the east of the Rocky Mountains. This proposal was 
actually the offer that Jame::> Monroe had made to the Spanish 
in 1816, when he was Secretary of State. Such a boundary 
would save the Louisiana Purchase for the United States but 
. h . h 'f' 91 J.t would cut t e nat1on off from t e Pac1 1c. One can 
' 
90 Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands ••• , p. 115. 
91
aemis, John Quincy Adams ••• , p. 309. 
r 
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only conclude that such an offer was made with full knowledge 
that Santa Fe and all of New Mexico would be well outside 
United States territory. While the cartography of the South-
west was still primitive, that Santa Fe was some distance to 
the west of the Colorado River of Texas was common knowledge 
given the events of the previous decade. Here was a golden 
• 
opportunity for Onis to take advantage of a rather carelessly 
made offer and lock-up the Americans east of the Rockies. 
Such an opportunity quickly calls to mind the time, not too 
many years earlier, when Spain attempted to restrict the 
United States to an area east of the Alleghenies. On!s 
apparently did not see his opportunity. It would have done 
him little good even if he had for his instruction of the 
moment did not allow for him to agree to a boundary for the 
United States even tnat far west: In answer to Adams's 
January proposal the Spanish minister offered the customary 
boundary between Spanish Texas and French Louisiana; a point 
half-way between the Mermentau and Calcasieu Rivers, two 
small parallel streams flowing into the Gulf of Mexico en-
' tirely within the State of Louisiana. 92 
92~., p. 310. 
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President Monroe would not accept any line that cut 
the State of Louisiana. He did offer, however, to bring 
America's proposal eastward to the Trinity River. Monroe 
told Adams, 
We may agree to fix the boundary by 
the Trinity, from its mouth to its 
source, then to the Arkansas at its 
nearest point, and along the Arkan-
sas to its source, thence due West 
to the Pacific, or to leave the 
limit in the latter instance to 
be settled by commissioners. If 
this is done, and Florida, west, 
to the Perdido, is ceded, and 
the Convention of 1802 ratified, 
the u States will undertake to 
pay, in satisfaction of claims, 
on account of the French 
spoliations, and condemnations 
in Spanish ports, ••• 93 
This is the first recorded suggestion of carrying the boundary 
line through to the Pacific. Whether it was Monroe's idea or 
the suggestion of John Quincy Adams is not clear. 94 
93 Memorandum, Monroe to J.Q. Adams, cited in ibid. 
Bemis notes that this memorandum is found between two docu-
ments dated February 5 ~nd 23, 1818, in a volume of letters 
from James Monroe to J.Q. Adams, 1798-1831, Adams MSS. 
94Philip c. Brooks feels that John Jacob Astor 
prompted Adams to include Oregon in the treaty line, although 
there is no certain record of Astor's intervention. John 
Astor's interest in the Pacific Northwest needs no comment; 
he did assemble a dinner party of a hundred persons to welcome 
J. Q. Adams home from England in 1817, and perhaps he planted 
r 
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In February, 1818, the whole diplomatic situation 
received a sudden jolt when Andrew Jackson, the Napoleon des 
bois, marched into Florida to "punish" the renegade Indians, 
Spanish and English.· Now, added to the problems of boundaries 
a·nd spoliation claims was the hue and cry from the Spanish 
that their sovereignty had been violated by this aggressive 
act. The invasion of Florida by General Jackson also percipi-
tated a serious debate within President Monroe's Cabinet. 
Outside the official family, Henry Clay and his cohorts saw 
a chance to use Jackson's actions to levy criticisms against 
the Administration. Monroe was worried about political 
opposition, but he feared more the diplomatic effect if he 
disavowed Jackson's moves. Privately the President deemed 
Jackson's actions in Florida to be well beyond what he was 
authorized to do, and stated as much to the Genera1. 95 
Publicly, however, Monroe, with the support of Adams, felt 
the idea of obtaining Oregon in the mind of that statesman 
at that time. See Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands • 
• • , pp. 151-52. Adams will later claim the whole idea was 
his own; see below. ' 
95Monroe to Jackson, July 19, 1818, Stanislaus Murray 
Hamilton (ed.), The Writings of James Monroe (6 vols., New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 190'0), VI, 55. ~onroe to 
Madison, July 20, 1818, ~., 61. 
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he must take a different stand. As he told Jefferson a few 
months after the event, "his [Jackson's] trial, unless he 
should ask it himself, would be the triumph of Spain, & 
confirm her in the disposition not to cede Florida. 1196 Rather 
than apologize Monroe desired to use the situation to press 
Spain into a settlement of the outstanding issues without 
driving her to the brink of war. 
As expected Luf s de Onfs announced he could negotiate 
no treaty until the United States restored Florida to Spanish 
authority and paid suitable indemnity for the outrages com-
mitted against his country. In Madrid, Pizarro ceased com-
munications with the American Minister, George Erving. In 
actuality, however, Adams and Onis continued to hold meetings 
and pursue an amicable settlement of the boundary question. 
It was during these meetings that the two diplomats agreed 
to use John Melish's "Map of the United States with the 
contiguous British and Spanish possessions. 1197 This map 
96Monroe to Jefferson, July 22, 1818, ibid., 63. 
Jackson insisted until his death that he had orders to proceed 
as he did in Florida; 11kewise President Monroe swore he never 
so commissioned the General. 
97
wheat, From Lewis and Clark .•. , II, 62. Melish 
was praised by former President Jefferson for producing a 
map which gave a "luminous view of the comparative possessions 
of different powers in our America," ~·, p. 64. Wheat also 
notes that the Melish map was used to settle boundary dis-
putes with Mexico in 1828 and with the Republic of Texas in 1838. 
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originally had been published in 1816, but the two statesmen 
were making use of a later edition. The map had been received 
well and included the information furnished by the previously 
published efforts of Pike, Lewis and Clark and von Humboldt. 
It should be noted, however, that none of the above as yet 
d . h h . h 98 epicted t e Sout west wit accuracy. Although Onis com-
plained somewhat over the cartographic authority of the 
Melish map he agreed to use the map for negotiations. Try as 
they may the two negotiators could arrive at no workable 
solution. 
The Foreign Minister in Madrid now faced with loss 
of his British mediation scheme, and extremely fearful that 
the United States would extend recognition to the revolutionary 
movements in South America, began to alter his hard line. 
On1s, in early April, was instructed to place the Spanish 
f f b d h b . 99 of er o a western oun ary at t e Sa ine. Later the same 
month, Pizarro wrote that Onis could offer the cession of 
the Floridas and cancellation of all claims, if the United 
States was to promise no recognition or aid to the insur-
100 gents. ' 
98~., p. 63. 
99 Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands ••• , p. 141. 
lOOibid., p. 134. 
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It was during the crisis caused by the Jackson move 
into Florida, a time when both America and Spain were not 
officially negotiating, that the French Minister to the 
United States, Hyde de Neuville, offered his services to 
mediate the outstanding issues and prevent a break between 
Spain and the United States. His motives are not clear; 
regardless, Monroe and Adams were happy to avail themselves 
of the Frenchman's services. From July, 1818, to the con-
clusion of the treaty, the negotiations between Spain and 
the United States were channeled through this gentleman. 101 
On July 16, 1818, Adams submitted another major 
proposal to the Spanish which yielded more of Texas than the 
original Colorado River offer, but included more of the 
Oregon Territory. The offer read in part, 
lOlBemis, John Quincy Adams ••• , p. 320. Bemis has 
the following to say about the motives of the French Minister: 
"In his sketchy MAmoires, Hyde de Neuville reveals a deep-
seated fear of British intrusion in the Caribbean area. Un-
doubtedly he wanted to strengthen Spain's position there by 
composing all her differences with the United States on the 
Continent of North America. It is also quite possible that 
he felt the establishmeat and enforcement of an agreed boun-
dary between the two countries in North America would dis-
courage the filibustering plots of the Napoleonic exiles. 
Certain it is that the French Government feared the United 
States might recognize the independence of the new states of 
Latin America; perhaps here was a way of staving off such a 
calamity." 
r 
the Trinity, from its mouth to its 
source, thence a line due north to 
the Red River, following a course 
of that to its source, then crossing 
to the Rio del Norte, and following 
the course of it, or the summit of 
a chain of mountains northward and 
parallel to it; there stop, or take 
a line west to the Pacific. 102 
On the Melish map the Rio Grande appears to rise in about 
41° 30' N.L. By October, 1818, Adams and On1s had agreed 
to the Sabine River north to tl1e Red River, but from this 
268 
point north and west the two diplomats were far from agreement. 
Again whether the idea to give up most of Texas was conceived 
by Adams or Monroe may never be known. Several years after 
the treaty was concluded, John Quincy Adams declared that 
he was the last man in the Administration to agree to the 
103 Sabine for the western boundary. To put it in his own 
words, "I was the last who had consented to take the Sabine 
104 for our western boundary." Samuel Flagg Bemis feels that 
102~·, p. 321. 
103
niary Entry /,or April 13, 1820, Walter LaFeber 
(ed.), John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire, 
Letters, Papers and Speeci1es (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 
1965), p. 86. 
l0 4Ibid. 
,, 
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ever since Monroe had anything to do with the Spanish ne-
gotiations he had been willing to give up Texas for the 
Floridas: therefore, it was he that commanded the steps to 
retreat eastward from the Colorado. "Adams followed his 
105 
chief with no great if any protest," The "stair-step" 
boundary line from the Texas-Louisiana border needed much more 
refining. It is of interest to note that none of the subse-
quent proposals made by either the United States Government 
or the Spanish were of such design as to include Santa Fe or 
any of New Mexico. 
It was years after the conclusion of negotiations that 
John Quincy Adams learned that by I~ovember, 1818, On!s had 
received instructions from Pizarro to yield on a boundary 
west of the Sabine if necessary to prevent a break, even as 
far west as the Colorado. Adams could have had Texas, or most 
of it, but Onis kept these latest instructions to himself and 
continued his hard bargaining for the Sabine. 106 It was 
during the first two months of 1819 that the two diplomats 
concluded their arduous task. They had ceased to wrestle 
' 
"b k d f t• h ' II 1° 7 ac an or n across t e Continent. 
105
aemis, John Quincy Adams ••. , p. 321. 
106 Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands ••• , p.146. 
lO? · J l Q ' Ad 329 Bemis, o 1n uincy ams • • • , p. • 
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The final stages of the negotiations hinged around 
the degree of north latitude on which the line to the Pacific 
would be drawn. Adams held out for 41° N.L., and Onis would 
not come further south than 43° N.L. In early February, 1819, 
President Monroe was inclined to accept the Spaniards' latest 
offer and settle the matter once and for all. He indicated 
some concern over political harassment from Clay because of 
the relinquishment of Texas, but wanted the matter closed. 
The President directed Adams to get General Jackson's opinion 
108 
on giving up Texas. Accordingly, the Secretary of State 
called upon General Jackson on February 2, 1819, and asked 
his opinion of the negotiations with Spain thus far. Adams 
noted that Jackson felt the friends of the Administration 
would be satisfied, but their adversaries would be severe 
in their censure. According to Adams the General said, 
there were many individuals who would 
take exception to our receding so far 
from the boundary of the Rio del Norte, 
which we claim, as the Sabine, and 
the enemies of the Administration 
would certainly make a handle of it 
to assail them: but the possession 
of the Floridas was of so great 
108
oiary Entry for February 1, 1819, LaFeber, Adams's 
Letters,Papers and Speeches, p. 80. 
r 
importance to the southern frontier 
of the United States, and so essential 
even to their safety, that the vast 
majority of the nation would be 
satisfied with the western boundary 
"f b . . 109 as we propose, i we o tain the Floridas. 
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President Monroe called a Cabinet Meeting to consider 
On1s's latest offer and all except Adams felt agreement was 
so near it would be senseless to jeopardize a treaty at this 
time. The Floridas had been secured; the Sabine would secure 
Louisiana on the west. Adams brought up to the President 
that public opinion and political criticism would be bitter 
over the loss of Texas, but Monroe assured the Secretary 
that his political opponents would be troublesome whether 
a treaty was signed or not, and the acquisition of Florida 
and title to the Pacific would offset any popular opposition 
110 to the loss of Texas. On February 22, 1819, John Quincy 
109
oiary Entry for February 2, 1819, ibid. Diary 
Entry for February 3, 1819, Allan Nevins (ed.), The Diary 
of> John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845 (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1951), p. 209. Andrew Jackson continually denied that 
he agreed on the Sabine boundary or giving up Texas for 
Florida. See Jackson tb Francis P. Blair, October 24, 1844, 
John Spencer Bassett (ed.) , Correspondence of Andre\·/ Jackson 
(7 vols., Washington: Carnegie Institution of Nashington, 
1933), VI, 326. Jackson to Blair, January 21, 1845, ibid., 
367. 
110
oiary Entry for February 2, 1819, LaFeber, 
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Foreign Policy.. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963. 
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Adams and Luis de Onis affixed their signatures to a monu-
mental document. In his diary that evening Adams wrote, 
The acquisition of the Floridas has 
long been an object of earnest desire 
to this country. The acknowledgement 
of a definite line of boundary to the 
South Sea forms a great epoch in our 
history. The first proposal of it 
in this negotiation was my own, and 
I trust it is now secured beyond 
the reach of revocation.111 
Adams was convinced that the United States should 
273 
obtain more by adhering to our demands, but he seems to have 
maintained that stand almost alone. President James Monroe 
was never disposed to endanger the United States by making 
a determined effort to get Texas or draw a line westward to 
the Pacific bringing Santa Fe within the American orbit. He 
wanted Florida, and he got it. In later years Adams would 
receive more than a little criticism for relinquishing Texas; 
politics have a strange way over the memories of men. 
Actually in 1819, Texas and New Mexico were theoretically 
on the Diary of John Qulncy Adams for the details of this 
important period of negotiations; neither the papers of 
Adams or Monroe as edited by Ford and Hamilton throw any 
light on the subject. 
111
oiary Entry for February 22, 1819, Nevins, Diary 
of John Quincy Adams, pp. 211-12. 
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available for American expansion, at least in a commercial 
way; trade was the byword. The flood of immigrants which 
began after 1820 could not be foreseen, nor could the desire 
for cheap land and agricultural pursuits be predicted. The 
Florida situation was much more immediate and in tune with 
the expansionist ideas holding forth in Washington. Thus 
one period of United States-Spanish relations came to a 
close, which in itself signaled the opening guns of a new 
and more vigorously aggressive period to follow. 
' 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
It is hoped that the preceding chapters have shed a 
bit more light on the many faceted story of American interest 
in the Spanish Southwest during L~e better part of the first 
two decades of the nineteenth century. It has been seen that 
during the administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison many American citizens demonstrated more than a little 
concern for penetrating Spanish-held territory beyond the 
Mississippi and ~issouri rivers. Such was especially the case 
with the trader and the trapper. Their concern represented, 
for the most part, a desire to make quick and sizable fortunes; 
some men, of course, were drawn to the Southwest by the lure 
of simple adventure or power. Were it up to these indi-
viduals, the United States flag would have been flying above 
the government buildings in Texas, New Mexico and California 
years before it actually did. These people did, in fact, 
represent an aggressive, expansionist-minded America to the 
Spaniards. 
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When one looks to the interests and attitudes of 
the American Government during these same years, however, 
it becomes quite obvious that the officials and statesmen 
of this nation were more cautious than many an individual 
citizen. The diplomatic consequences of any move toward 
land claimed by Spain could easily prove serious and were 
weighed carefully. In fact, the United States Government, at 
times, discouraged and forbade its citizens to move toward 
the Rocky Mountains. Such a fact becomes all the more inte-
resting when one notes that Thomas Jefferson, President from 
1801 to 1809, is considered this nation's first "expansionist" 
President. 
Using various statements made by Thomas Jefferson, 
and considering the fact that he negotiated the Louisiana 
Purchase, historians have continually played upon Jefferson's 
idea to build an "Empire of Liberty." There is little doubt 
that Jefferson, statesman and man of science, cast eyes 
towards the West. Were his thoughts any part of a syste-
matic plan to bring what was then Spanish under the control 
' of the United States? It is hoped that the foregoing chapters 
have proven such an argument weak indeed. 
As early as 1786 Jefferson remarked that the 
American Confederation was a "nest from which all America, 
r 
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1 North and South is to be peopled." Referring specifically 
to Spanish-held territories he expressed hope that His 
Catholic Majesty would hold on to them until "our population 
can be sufficiently advanced to gain it from them piece by 
piece." 2 Such remarks, made during the trying times of the 
Confederation, and in particular reference to the question 
of the use of the Mississippi then under discussion, can 
hardly be considered part of a serious expansionist or 
imperialistic plan in the true sense. 
Another statement by Thonas Jefferson that historians 
are wont to quote indicating an expansionist-minded President, 
are his words to James Monroe in November, 1801. In a letter 
to Governor Monroe of Virginia, Jefferson noted, 
1 
On our western and southern frontiers 
Spain holds an immense country, the 
occupancy of which, however, is in the 
Indian natives, except a few insulated 
spots possessed by Spanish subjects. 
It is very questionable, indeed, whether 
the Indians would sell? whether Spain 
would be willing to receive these people? 
' 
Jefferson to A. Stuart, January 25, 1786, Julian P, 
Boyd et al (eds.), The Paners of Thomas Jefferson (17 vols., 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950 - ) , IX, 217-18. 
and nearly certain that she would not 
alienate the sovereignty. . • • How-
ever our present interests may restrain 
us within our own limits, it is impos-
sible not to look forward to distant 
times, when our rapid multiplication 
will expand itself beyond those limits, 
and cover the whole northern, if not the 
southern continent, with a people speak-
ing the same language, governed in simi-
lar forms, and by similar laws; ••• 3 
The action of President Jefferson which has most 
branded him an expansionist, of course, was the Louisiana 
Purchase. As developed in Chapters I and II Jefferson had 
been interested in the vast Louisiana territory for many 
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years before the famous Purchase. The Purchase did, in fact, 
extend the boundaries of America far to the west of the 
Mississippi. Perhaps Gilbert Chinard, in his dated but 
excellent biography of Thomas Jefferson comes close to the 
accurate evaluation of the Purchase vis-a-vis expansionism 
when he notes that Jefferson's desire for Louisiana was not 
so much a desire of expansion or imperialism as the con-
viction that colonies such as Louisiana were only pawns in 
the game of European poaitics. Thus he concluded that there 
3 Jefferson to James Monroe, November 24, 1801, A. A. 
Lipscomb et al (eds.), The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (19 
vols., Washington, 1903-04), X, 295-96. 
279 
existed a "permanent danger of seeing France recover some day 
her former colonies or, still worse, to have them fall into 
thh fh .. h4 e ands o t e Br1t1s • 
When the necessity for determining the western boun-
dary of the Louisiana Purchase presented itself it is true 
that President Jefferson, using the more advantagous French 
maps as his source of authority, claimed the Rio Grande. 
Such a limit would have immediately brought Santa Fe within 
the confines of the United States. Although he doubtless 
had little idea of the relationships between the several 
major river systems of the Plains such as the Arkansas and 
the Platte and their proximity to Santa Fe, he knew well that 
the Rio Grande would extend American territory west of the 
province of Texas and into New Mexico. The early French maps 
upon which he was relying indicated this. Certainly after 
the return of Zebulon Pike the President knew that Santa Fe 
would be ours if the Spanish would only agree to the Rio 
5 Grande as a boundary. Yet, as we have seen, the President 
4Gilbert China;d, Thomas Jefferson, The Apostle of 
Americanism (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
1966) I P• 401. 
5John L. Allen, "Geographical Knowledge & American 
Images of the Louisiana Territory," The Western Historical 
Quarterly, II (April, 1971), 154-58. Allen points out that 
while information on Louisiana was voluminous following the 
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was not prone to insist upon the Rio Grande as a sine qua non 
in our negotiations with the Spanish Government. He was 
more than a little willing to move the boundary line im-
mediately to the Colorado of Texas, and further east if 
necessary. Although Jefferson would continually hold to the 
idea that America had "some pretensions" to a more westerly 
border he put no barriers in the way of his negotiators by 
insisting upon such limits. There is the strong possibility 
that the President figured the land would come to us sooner 
or later as Spain lost control, so why fight for it. Again 
such conjecture, while plausible, does not give us a picture 
of an active expansionist government greedy for access to 
the rich mines of northern New Spain. 
That there is early evidence of a type of thinking 
which burst forth in the Manifest Destiny movement of mid-
nineteenth century America should perhaps be mentioned. 
Chinard has again captured the mood of the times when he 
sees Jefferson as laying down the moral foundation of American 
imperialism which the biographer calls "a curious mixture of 
' 
Purchase, most was copied and reprinted from the same few 
sources of English, Spanish and French origin, all inaccurate 
in varying degrees. Of the Western rivers the Platte and 
Arkansas were seldom mentioned or described. 
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common sense, practical idealism, and moralizing not to be 
found perhaps in any other people, but more permanently 
American than typically Jeffersonian. 116 
Following the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, re-
marks of an expansionist nature can be found in the writings 
of other leading statesmen of the early nineteenth century. 
Nevertheless it is proposed that such remarks were made more 
in the line of future hopes and possibilities, than as part 
of any systematic plan by the United States Government to 
possess what belonged to Spain. What plans there were seem 
to have been in regard to the Floridas. The whole Florida 
issue was in turn directly tied to the Mississippi Question 
and the security of America's Gulf Coast. Santa Fe and the 
remainder of the Spanish Southwest were not of immediate con-
cern to official America. The words and actions of James 
Madison and James Monroe offer adequate testimony to this 
stand. Given the problems between the United States and 
Great Britain during the administration of James Madison, it 
is quite understandable that his attention was turned more 
. ' to the Atlantic coast than to lands west of the Mississippi. 
President Monroe's role during the final days of the Adams-
6
chinard, Thomas Jefferson, ••• , p. 398. 
282 
Onls negotiations clearly indicate that he would not let 
individual Americans' desires for New Mexico and Texas hinder 
or delay the final boundary settlement with Spain. Although 
the evidence is not conclusive, it seems likely that Monroe 
would not have even insisted on an access to the Pacific had 
it not been for his shrewd and able Secretary of State, John 
Quincy Adams. 
Another aspect of the United States-Spanish diplomacy, 
and American interest in the Southwest, which has borne heavily 
on this study has been an evaluation of the cartographic de-
velopment and the role it played in determining outstanding 
issues. At the beginning of the nineteenth century American 
statesmen had to rely on maps of Spanish and French origin to 
gain any sort of picture of what lay beyond the Mississippi 
and Missouri river basins. The Spanish and French themselves 
were relying in large measure on their own cartographic efforts 
of earlier times. Given Spain's proclivity to keep her carto-
graphic findings a secret from the outside world, and noting 
the geographic concepts evidenced by frontier officials, the 
' Spanish seemed to have done a very good job of keeping their 
findings from each other as well •. The maps of Spanish origin 
on which American and English map makers later based their 
own work declined in accuracy as they illustrated areas west 
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and south of the Lower Missouri River. The Arkansas and 
Platte river systems were often confused; the headwaters of 
the Red and Canadian rivers were continually interchanged, if 
not ignored, by the early cartographers. Descriptions of 
the interior mountain ranges were most indefinite. By the 
opening of the nineteenth century, as far as territory west 
of the Mississippi was concerned, American (and Spanish) 
officials could rely with confidence only on geographic 
delineations of the Missouri River up to the Mandan Villages, 
the Sabine River course, and the Red River of Texas from its 
mouth for a distance of some 300 miles. While much of the 
Great Plains had been charted, details remained quite in-
accurate. 
Following the Louisiana Purchase President Jefferson 
preferred to use maps of French origin in stating his claims 
to western limits. These maps obviously gave him a stronger 
arguing point. The French claimed westward to the Rio Grande, 
including the outpost of Santa Fe, based upon the La Salle 
landing on the Texas shore and the distances traveled by 
' their various explorers and trappers. The Spanish would 
never accept such claims; nevertheless Jefferson, in his 
report to Congress following the Purchase, based his claims 
almost entirely on the statistics of the Frenchman Le Page 
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du Pratz. 
The expedition of Lewis and Clark, followed by the 
onrush of traders and trappers, greatly reduced the amount 
of geographic guesswork as far as the Upper Missouri region 
and Pacific Northwest were concerned. The famous and contra-
versial expedition of Zebulon M. Pike gave the United States 
a more accurate view of much of the Great Plains. This en-
deavor did not, however, alter the paucity of accurate 
geographic knowledge of the Lower Rocky Mountain region or 
the remaining land of the Spanish Southwest. As we know 
Pike's papers were confiscated by Spanish officials and the 
maps in his Journals made use of the famous von Humboldt map 
for depicting the approaches of Santa Fe and environs. It 
has been indicated several times in this study that Baron 
von Humboldt did not personally make observations in this 
region: he relied on earlier and inaccurate maps of Spanish 
origin. Accordingly, geographic misconceptions continued 
well into the nineteenth century. 
Thus when Spaniards were accusing Americans of en-
' croaching upon their lands, and when Americans were asserting 
their rights to explore or trap rivers well into the Lower 
Rocky Mountains, both people were supporting their claims 
with shaky authority. That Spanish officials truly feared 
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American settlements on. the.Upper Missouri as being dangerously 
close to Santa Fe, indicates well their concepts of the geog-
raphy of the region. That American traders and trappers were 
of the same thinking is also significant. Other misconceptions 
such as the notion of a "grand reservoir of snows and faun-
tains" from which all the major rivers of the continent flowed 
was held by all -- Spaniard and American. When nations try 
to determine boundaries and spheres of authority erroneous 
geographical concepts become quite significant. 
In the decade following the expeditions of Lewis and 
Clark and Pike, the many American traders and trappers that 
set out for Santa Fe, some reaching their destination, added 
considerably to America's knowledge of the approaches to that 
attractive region. By the administration of James .Monroe the 
river and overland routes from the Upper Missouri and St. 
Louis to Santa Fe became better known and more accurately 
charted. The Arkansas and Platte river highways were no 
longer confused; the Red and Canadian rivers, however, still 
remained obscure. They would remain so until the mid-1800's. 
' The Melish map used by John Quincy Adams and Luis 
de Onis in the final days of their deliberations was con-
siderably more accurate as far as the areas north of the Red 
River of Texas, the Great Plains and the Upper Rocky Mountains 
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were concerned. That Santa Fe did, in fact, lie quite a 
distance from American settlements in the above-mentioned 
regions had been determined. As mentioned in Chapter V, 
at no time during the Adams-On!s negotiations did the American 
diplomat propose a western limit which would have encom-
passed any part of the present-day state of New Mexico. 
The long-standing claim of the Rio Grande had disappeared 
from the hard dealing of the negotiating table; it doubtless 
remained in the minds of some Americans as a goal we would 
some day realize. 
It has been pointed-out that the w~ole attitude of 
the United States Government vis-a-vis the Spanish Southwest 
took a more active, and, if you will; more aggressive turn 
following the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819. The coming cf 
John Calhoun to the War Department, his subsequent military 
and Indian policies, as well as the successful opening of the 
Santa Fe Trail in 1821, were most significant in this more 
positive approach. What might be termed latent feelings of 
Manifest Destiny were awakened, never to come to rest until 
' America had extended to the Pacific. 
It is felt that many historians have taken the period 
following the administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison, with all the positive moves by the United States 
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Government directed towards the Spanish Southwest, and 
have concluded that such was the attitude from the begin-
ning days of this nation. Quite a case may be made along 
these lines for individual Americans desiring land, trade, 
wealth or power. The Florida issue fits well into the 
expansionist mold. It is strongly contended, however, that 
the United States Government, especially the executive 
leadership, did not as policy systematically press along 
the roads to Santa Fe. The type of Manifest Destiny so 
prevalent in mid-nineteenth century America, when Govern-
ment officials such as James K. Polk took an active role in 
expansion, cannot be read back into the first two decades 
of the country and applied to men like Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison. 
' 
B I B L I 0 G R A P H Y 
• 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources 
Manuscript Material: 
Bates, Frederick. Bates Papers. Missouri Historical Society, 
St. Louis. 
Carondelet, Francois Luis Hector. Carondelet Papers. 
Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis. 
Clarnorgan, Jacques. Clarnorgan Papers. Missouri Historical 
Society, St. Louis. 
Clark, William. William Clark Collection. Missouri 
Historical Society, St. Louis. 
Delassus, Charles D. Charles Delassus Papers. liissouri 
Historical Society, St. Louis. 
Forsyth, Thomas. Thomas Forsyth Papers. Missouri Historical 
Society, St. Louis. 
Jefferson, Thomas. Thomas Jefferson Collection. Missouri 
Historical Society, St. Louis. 
Lisa, Manuel. Manuel Lisa Papers. Missouri Historical 
Society, St. Louis. 
National Archives. Records of the Office of the Secretary of 
War, Record Group 107. 
Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Relating to 
Military Affairs, 1800-89 (Microcopy 6). 
Letters Receive• by the Secretary of War, Main 
Seiies, 1800-70 (~icrocopy 221). 
Registers of Letters Received by the Secretary of 
War, Main Series, 1800-70 (Microcopy 22). 
Letters Sent to the President by the Secretary of 
War, 1800-63 (Microcopy 127). 
288 
289 
National Archives. General Records of the Department of 
State, Record Group 59. 
Domestic Letters, 1784-1866. 
Notes From the Spanish Legation in the United States 
to the Department of State, 1790-1906 (Microcopy 59). 
Dispatches From United States Ministers to Spain, 
1792-1906 (Microcopy 31) • 
Spanish Archives of New Mexico, 1621-1821. Archives Division 
of the State of New Mexico Records Center, Santa Fe 
(Microfilm) • 
Records of the Superintendency of Indian Affairs, St. Louis. 
Vol. 30, Missouri Fur Company. Kansas State 
Historical Society (Microfilm) • 
Government Documents: 
Carter, Clarence Edwin (ed.) The Territorial Papers of the 
United States. Vol. IX: The Territory of Orleans, 
1803-1812; Vols. XIII, XIV, XV: The Territory of 
Louisiana-Missouri, 1803-1821. Washington: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1934-1960. 
Documents Relating to the Purchase and Exploration of 
Louisiana. Boston: Houghton :Iifflin & Company, 
1904. 
Laws of 
Message 
a Public and General Nature, of the District of 
Louisiana of the Territory of Louisiana of the Ter-
ritorl of Hissouri and of the State of ~'1issouri. 2 
vols. Jefferson City: W. Lusk & Son, 1842. 
From the President of the United States Conununicating 
Discoveries i'1ade In :exploring 'l'he !'-1issouri, Red River 
and Washita, By Captains Lewis and Clark, Doctor 
Sibley and !·Ir. Dunbar; With a Statistical Account of 
the Countries A'ljacent, February 19, 1806. Washington, 
180.6. 
U.S. Congress. American State Papers: Documents Legislative 
and Executive of the congress of the unitea States. 
38 vols. Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832-1861. 
• The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the 
-----·united States, With An Appendix, Contain1ng Important 
State Papers and Public Documents, and All the Laws 
of a Public Nature. Nashington: Gales and Seaton, 
1852. 
290 
Published Material: 
Abel, Annie IIeloise (ed.). Tabeau's Narrative of Loisel's 
Expedition to the Upper Missouri. Translated from 
the French by Rose Abel Wright. Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1939. 
American Historical Association. Annual Report, 1896. 
Washington: 1898. "Correspondence of Clark and 
Genet," I, 930-1107. 
Bassett, John Spencer (ed.). Correspondence of Andrew 
Jackson. 7 vols. Washington: Carnegie Institution 
of Washington, 1933. 
Boyd, Julian P. et al (eds.). 
Jefferson. 17 vols. 
The Papers of Thomas 
Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1950- • 
Carroll, H. Bailey and Haggard, J. Villasana (Translators). 
Three New Mexico Chronicles: The Exposicion of Don 
Pedro Pino 1812; the Ojeda of Lie. Antonio Barreiro 
1832; and the additions by Don Jose Agustin de 
Escudero 1849. Albuquerque: The Quivira Society, 
1942. 
Chavez, Fray Angelico, O.F.M. Archives of the Archdiocese 
of Santa Fe, 1678-1900. Washington: Academy of 
American Franciscan History, 1957. 
Coues, Elliott (ed.). History of the Expedition Under the 
Command of Lewis and Clark. 3 vols. New York: 
Dover Publications, Inc., 1965. 
Devoto, Bernard (ed.). The Journals of Lewis and Clark. 
Boston: Houghton Hifflin Company, 1953. 
Eliot, Charles W. (ed.). American Historical Documents, 
1000-1904. New York: P.F. Collier & Son. 
Ford, Paul Leicester (ed.). 
10 vols. New York: 
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. 
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1897-1899. 
Ford, 
• 
Worthington Chauncey (ed.). 
Adams. 7 vols. New York: 
ers, 1968. 
Writings of John Quincy 
Greenwood Press Publish-
Hackett, Charles W. (ed.). Historical Documents Relating to 
New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya and Approaches Thereto, to 
1775. Collected by F.A. and Fanny R. Bandelier. 3 
VoIS. Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1937. 
291 
Hamilton, Stanislaus Murray (ed.). The Writings of James 
Monroe. 6 vols. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1900. 
Holmes, Jack D.L. (ed.). Documentos Ineditos para la historia 
de la Luisiana, 1792-1810. Madrid: Ediciones Jose 
Porrua Turanzas, 1963. 
Houck, Louis (ed.). The Spanish Regime in Missouri. 2 vols. 
Chicago: R.R. Donnelley and Sons Company, 1909. 
Hunt, Gaillard (ed.). The Writings of James Madison. 
New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1908. 
Jackson, Donald (ed.). Letters of the Lewis and 
tion With Related Documents, 1783-1854. 
versity of Illinois Press, 1962. 
Clark Expedi-
Urbana: Uni-
----· The Journals of Zebulon Montgomery 
ters and Related Documents. 2 vols. 
versity of Oklahoma Press, 1966. 
Pike Nith Let-
Norman: Uni-
James, Thomas. Three Years Among the Indians and Mexicans. 
La 
The 1846 Edition, Unabritlged, Philadelphia: J.B. 
Lippincott Company, 1962. 
Feher, Walter 
tinental 
Chicago: 
(ed.). John Quincy Adams and American Con-
Empire: Letters, Papers and Speeches. 
Quadrangle DooJ;s, 1965. 
Le Page du Pratz. Histoire de la Louisiane. 3 vols. Paris, 
1758. 
Lipscomb, Andrew A. (ed.). The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. 
19 vols. Washington: The Thomas Jefferson Hemorial 
Association, 1903-04. 
Luttig, John c. Journal of a Fur-Trading Expedition on the 
Upper rHssouri 1812-1813. Edited by Stella H. Drunun. 
St. Louis: Missouri ilistorical Society, 1920. 
Nasatir, A.P. (ed.). Before Lewis and Clark: Documents Il-
lustrating the History of the :•hssouri, 1785-1804. 
2 vols. St. Louis: St. Louis Historical Documents 
Foundation, 195~. 
Nevins, Allan (ed.). The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-
1845. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951. 
Richardson, James D. A Compilation of the ~1essages and Papers 
of the Presidents. 10 vols. Washington: Bureau of 
National Literature, 1897-1907. 
292 
Robertson, James Alexander (ed.). Louisiana Under the Rule 
of Spain, France, and the United States, 1785-1807. 
2 vols. Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clar, Company, 1911. 
Rowland, Dunbar (ed.). Official Letter Books of w.c.c. 
Claiborne, 1801-1816. 6 vols. Jackson, Mississippi: 
State Department of Archives and History, 1917. 
Twitchell, Ralph Emerson (comp.). The Spanish Archives of 
New Mexico. Cedar Rapids: The Torch Press, 1914. 
Washington, H.A. (ed.). The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. 
Washington: Taylor & Maury, 1854. 
White, Joseph M. A New Collection of Laws, Charters and Local 
Ordinances of the Governments of Great Britain, France 
ana Spain. 2 vols. Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson, 
Law Booksellers, 1839. 
Secondary Sources 
Cartographic and Bibliographic Sources: 
Arrowsmith, Aaron. A New General Atlas Constructed From the 
Latest Authorities, Exhibiting the Boundaries and 
Divisions Also the Chains of Mountains and Other 
Geographical Features of All the Known Countries of 
the World. Edinburgh: A. Constable & Co., and 
Longman & Company, 1823. 
A New Map of Mexico and Adjacent Provinces, 1810. 
A large map in four separate sections in the collec-
tion of Newberry Library, Chicago. 
Calendar of the Correspondence of James Madison. Bulletin of 
the Bureau of Rolls and Library, Department of State. 
Washington: Department of State, 1894. 
Catalogue, President Jefferson's Library. Washington: Galen 
and Seaton, 1829. 
. . 
List of Manuscript Maps In the Edward E. Ayer Collection. 
Newberry Library, Chicago. 
Paullin, Charles o., and Wright, John K. Atlas of the Histori-
cal Geography of the United States. Washington: 
Carnegie tiistitutions and American Geographical Society 
of New York, 1932. 
293 
Wagner, Henry R. Bibliography of Printed Works in Spanish 
Relating to Those Portions of the Uniteo States 
Whicn Formerly Belonged to Mexico. Santiago: La 
Imprenta Diener, 1917. 
The Cartography of the Northwest Coast of America 
to the Year 1800. 2 vols. Berkeley: university of 
California Press, 1937. 
The Plains and the Rockies: A Bibliography of 
Original tJarratives of Travel and Adventure 1800-
1865. 3rd ed. Revised by Charles L. Camp. Columbus: 
Long's College Book Company, 1953. 
Wheat, Carl I. Mapping the Transmississiepi West. Vol. I: 
The Spanish Entrada to the Louisiana Purchase, 1540-
1804; Vol. II: From Lewis and Clark to Fremont, 
1804-1845. San Francisco: The Institute of Histori-
cal Cartography, 1957-58. 
Books: 
Abernethy, Thomas P. The Burr Conspiracy. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1954. 
~~~~· The South In the New Nation, 1789-1819. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1961. 
Bannon, John Francis (ed.). Bolton and the Spanish Border-
lands. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964. 
Bemis, Samuel Flagg. John Quincy Adams and 
American Foreign Policy. New York: 
l965. 
the Foundations of 
Alfred A. Knopf, 
Billington, Ray Allen. Westward Expansion: A History of The 
American Frontier. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963. 
Borden, Martin. Parties and Politics In the Early Republic. 
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967. 
Brant, Irving. James M&dison. 6 vols. Indianapolis: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1953. 
Brooks, Philip Coolidge. Diplomacy and the Borderlands: 
Adarns-onis Treaty of 1819. Berkeley: University ~C~a~l-i_f_o_r_n_i-·a~-P-r_e_s_s~,......_1_9~3-9-• ...;;;..,_ 
The 
of 
Chapman, Charles E. A History of Spain, Founded on the 
Historia de Espana y de la Civilizacion Espanola of 
Rafael Altamira. New York: Macmillan Co., 1918. 
294 
Chinard, Gilbert. Thomas Jefferson, The Apostle of American-
ism. Ann Arbor: university of Michigan Press, 1966. 
Chittenden, Hiram Martin. The American Fur Trade of the Far 
West. 2 vols. New York: The Press of The Pioneers, 
Inc., 1935. 
Cleland, Robert Glass. This Reckless Breed of 
pers and Fur Traders of the Southwest. 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1950. 
Men: The Trap-
New York: 
Cline, Gloria Griffen. Exploring the Great Basin. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1963. 
Coyner, David H. The Lost Trappers: A Collection of Inter-
esting Scenes and Events in the Rocky Mountains. 
Cincinnati: J.A. & U.P. James, 1847. 
Cox, Issac Joslin. The Early Exploration of Louisiana. 
Cincinnati Press, 1905. 
• The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813. 
~~~~-Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1967. 
DeConde, Alexander. A History of American Foreign Policy. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963. 
Descola, Jean. A History of Spain. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1963. 
Devoto, Bernard. The Course of Empire. Cambridge: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1952. 
Douglas, Walter B. Manuel Lisa. Edited by Abraham P. 
Nasatir, New York: Argosy Antiquarian Ltd., 1964. 
Duffus, R.L. The Santa Fe Trail. New York: Longman's, 
Green, 1930. 
Faulk, Odie B. A Successful Failure. Austin: Steck-
Vaughn Company, 1965. 
Garrett, Julia Kathryn. Green Flag Over Texas. 
Cordova Press, 1939. 
Goetzmann, William H. Exploration and Empire: 
and the Scientist in the winning of the 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. 
Dallas: 
The Explorer 
American lvest. 
Green, Philip Jackson. The Public Life of William Harris Crawford, 1807-1~8~2~5-.~-c=h-i~·-c_a_g_o_:~-T=h-e~-u-n~i-v_e_r_s_i-·t-y~-o~f 
lChicago Libraries, 1938. 
295 
Gregg, Josiah. Commerce of the Prairies. Edited by Max L. 
Moorhead. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. 
Harris, Burton. John Colter, His Years In the Rockies. New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952. 
Hatcher, Mattie Austin. The Opening of Texas to Foreign Set-
tlement, 1801-182'1-.~~A~u~s~t~i~'n:..:..&:_..:::~U~n~i~v~e~r==-sTi~t~y~o~f;.::.,:T~e~x,;,.:.:a_s~'..;;..,::;..... 
Press, 1927. 
Hawgood, John A. America's Western Frontiers. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1967. 
Hermann, Binger. The Louisiana Purchase and Our Title West of 
the Rocky Mountains, with a Review of Annexation by 
the United States. Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1898. 
Hollon, W. Eugene. The Lost Pathfinder: Zebulon Montgomery 
Pike. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1949. 
Ingersoll, L.D. A History of the War Department of the United 
States, With Biographical Sketches of the Secretaries. 
Washington: Francis B. Mohun, 1880. 
Jacobs, James Ripley. Tarnished Warrior: Major James 
Wilkinson. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. 
Josephly, Alvin M. Jr. The Indian Heritage of America. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. 
Lamar, Howard Roberts. The Far Southwest, 1846-1912. A Ter-
ritorial History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
l966. 
Loomis, Noel M. and Nasatir, Abraham. Pedro Vial and the 
Roads to Santa Fe. Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1967. 
Lyon, E. Wilson. Louisiana In French Diplomacy, 1759-1804. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934. 
Malone, Dumas. Jefferson and His Time. 4 vols. Boston: 
Little Brown an• Company, 1948-1970. 
296 
Marshall, Thomas M. A History of the Western Boundary of the 
Louisiana Purchase, 1819-1841. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1914. 
Oglesby, Richard Edward. Manuel Lisa and the Opening of the 
Missouri Fur Trade-.~~N~o-rm~a-n~:.;...;.....~U~n~i~v~e~r~s~i~.t~y.._,;:;~o~f~O~k~l~a~h~o-m~a 
Press, 1963. 
Peterson, Merrill D. Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 
" " Priestley, Herbert I. Jose de Galvez. Berkeley: university 
of California Press, 1916. 
Prucha, Francis Paul. The Sword of the Republic: The United 
States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846. London: The 
Macmillan Company, 1969. 
Richardson, Rupert N. Texas The Lone Star State. New York: 
Prentice-Hall, 1967. 
Sinunons, Marc. Spanish Government in New Mexico. 
Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1968. 
Skarsten, M.O. George Drouillard, Hunter and Interpreter For 
Lewis and Clark and Fur Trader, 1807-1810. Glendale: 
The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1964. 
Smelser, Marshall. The Democratic Republic, 1801-1815. New 
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968. 
Thomas, Alfred Barnaby. 
Northeast of New 
sity of Oklahoma 
After Coronado: Spanish Exploration 
Mexico, 1696-1727. Norman: Univer-
Press, 1935. 
Forgotten Frontiers: A Study of the Spanish Indian 
Policy of Don Juan Bautista de Anza, Governor of New 
Mexico, 1777-1787. Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1932. 
• Teodoro de Croix. Norman: University of Oklahoma 
~~~~~Press, 1941. 
Twitchell, Ralph Emerson. 
History. 2 vols. 
Press, 1911. 
The Leading Facts of New Mexican 
Cedar Rapids, Iowa: The Torch 
Old Santa Fe, The 
Capital. Santa Fe: 
tion, 1925. 
Story of New Mexico's Ancient 
New Mexican Publishing Corpora-
297 
Whitaker, Arthur Preston. The Mississippi Question, 1795-
1803: A Study In Trade, Politics, and Diplomacy. 
Gloucester: The Peter Smith Co., 1962. 
The Spanish-American Frontier: 1783-1795. New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927. 
White, Leonard D. The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administra-
tive History, 1801-1829. New York: The Free Press, 
1951. 
Articles: 
Alford, Terry L. "The West as a Desert in American Thought 
Prior to Long's 1819-1820 Expedition," Journal of the 
West, VIII (October, 1969), 515-25. 
Allen, John L. "Geographical Knowledge and American Images 
of Louisiana Territory," Western Historical Quarterly, 
II (April, 1971), 151-70. 
Alter, J. Cecil. "Father Escalante's Map," Utah Historical 
Quarterly, IX (1941), 64-72. 
Auerbach, Herbert S. "Father Escalante' s Route, 11 Utah His-
torical Quarterly, IX (1941) , 73-80. 
Beauregard, H.T. (trans.). "Journal of Jean Baptiste 
Trudeau Among the Arikara Indians in 1795." Missouri 
Historical Society Collections, Vol. IV, No. 1 (1912), 
9-48. 
Beers, Henry Putney. "Military Protection of the Santa Fe 
Trail to 1843," New Mexico Historical Review, XII, 
No. 2 (April, 1937), lt3-33. 
Bloom, 
Bobb, 
Lansing B. "The Death of Jacques D'Eglise," New 
Mexico Historical Review, II, No. 4 (October,~27), 
369-79. 
Bernard. "Ducareli and the Interior Provinces," His-
panic American ~istorical Review, XXXIV (February;--
1954f, 20-36". 
Bolton, Herbert E. "New Light on Manuel Lisa and the Spanish 
Fur Trade," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XVII, 
No. 1 (July, 1913), 61-66. 
Bolton, Herbert E. "Pageant in the Wilderness: 
the Escalante Expedition to the Interior 
Utah Historical Quarterly, XVIII (1950), 
298 
The Story of 
Basin, 1776," 
1-265. 
Brooks, P.C. "Pichardo's Treatise and the Adams-Onis Treaty," 
Hispanic American Historical Review, XV (1935), 94-99. 
Cox, Issac J. "The Exploration of the Louisiana Frontier, 
1803-1806," Annual Report of the American Historical 
Association, 1904, Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1905, 149-174. 
"Opening the Santa Fe Trail," Missouri Historical 
Review, XXV (1931), 30-66. 
"The Louisiana-Texas Frontier," Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly, X, No. l (July, 1906); XVI, 
No. 4 (April, 1913); XVII, No. l (July, 1913) i XVII, 
No. 2 (October, 1913). 
Creer, Leland Hargrave. "Spanish-American Slave Trade in the 
Great Basin," New Mexico Historical Review, XXIV 
(July, 1949), 171-83. 
Dillon, Richard. "~eriwether Lewis, Manuel Lisa, and the 
Tantalizing Santa Fe Trade," Montana, the Magazine 
of Western History, XVII, No. 2 (April, 1967), 46-52. 
Fisher, Lillian E. "Teodoro de Croix," Hispanic American 
Historical Review, IX (November, 1929), 488-504. 
Folmer, Henri. "Contraband Trade Between Louisiana and New 
Mexico in the Eighteenth Century," New Mexico His-
torical Review, XVI, No. 3 (July, 1941), 249-74. 
Golley, Frank B. "James Baird, Early Santa Fe Trader," 
Missouri Historical Society Bulletin, XV, No. 3 
(April, 1959), 171-93. 
Hill, Joseph J. "Spanish and Mexican Exploration and Trade 
Northwest from New Hexico into the Great Basin, 1765-
1853," Utah Historical Quarterly, III, No. l 
(January, 1930), 3-23. 
' 
• "An Unknown Expedition to Santa Fe In 1807," 
-----The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, VI, No. 4 
(March, 1920). 
Jackson, Donald. 
View," in 
examined. 
1967. 
"The American Entrada: A Spanish Point of 
McDermott, John Francis. The Frontier Re-
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
299 
Jackson, Donald. "Zebulon M. Pike "Tours" Mexico," The 
American West, III (Sununer, 1966), 67-71 and 89-93. 
Knudson, Jerry W. "Newspaper Reaction to The Louisiana 
Purchase," Missouri Historical Review, LXIII 
(January, 1969), 182-213. 
Lindley, Harlow. "Western Travel, 1800-1820," The 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, VI-;-N°o. 2 
(September, 1919), 167-91. 
Marshall, Thomas M. (ed.) • "The Journals of Jules de .Mun," 
Missouri Historical Society Collections, v, No. 2 
(February, 1928), 167-208. 
Morris, Wayne. "The Wichita Exchange: Trade on Oklahoma's 
Fur Frontier, 1719-1812," Great Plains Journal 
(Spring, 1970), 79-83. 
Nasatir, Abraham P. 
the Northern 
ical Review, 
"Jacques Clamorgan: Colonial Promoter of 
Border of (Jew Spain," New Mexico Histor-
XVII (April, 1942), 101-112. 
"John Evans, Explorer and Surveyor," Missouri 
Historical Review, XXV (1931) , 219-
"Personal Narrative of Col. John Shaw, of Marquette County," 
Wisconsin State Historical Society, Collections, II 
(1856), 197-232. 
Scholes, France v. "The Supply Service of the New Mexico 
Missions in the Seventeenth Century," New Mexico 
Historical Review, V, No. l (January, 1930), 93-116. 
Stenberg, Richard. "The Western Boundary of Louisiana, 1762-
1803," The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXXV 
(October, 1931), 95-108. 
Storm, Colton. "Lieutenant Armstrong's Expedition to the 
Missouri River, 1790," r1id-America: An Historical 
Quarterly, XXV (N.S. Vol. XIV), (1943), 180-88. 
Thomas, Alfred B. "Documents Bearing Upon the Northern 
Frontier of New,Mexico, 1818-1819," New Mexico His-
torical Review, IV, No. 2 (April, 1929), 146-63. 
-----· "Spanish Expeditions Into Colorado," The Colorado 
Magazine, I, No. 7 (November, 1924), 289-300. 
"Spanish Exploration of Oklahoma," Chronicles of 
Oklahoma, VI, No. 2 (June, 1928), 188-213. 
300 
Thomas, Alfred B. "The Yellowstone River, James Long and 
Spanish Reaction to American Intrusion Into Spanish 
Dominions, 1818-1819," New Mexico Historical Review, 
IV, No. 2 (April, 1929), 164-77. 
Viles, Jonas. "Population and Extent of Settlement in 
Missouri Before 1804," Missouri Historical Review, 
V (July, 1911) I 189-213. 
Weber, David J. 
1821," 
"Spanish Fur Trade From New Mexico, 1540-
The Americas, XXIV (1967), 122-36. 
"Ezekiel Williams' Adventure in Colorado," Missouri Histori-
cal Society Collections, IV, No. 2 (1931), 194-208 • 
• 
THE EXPLORER, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 
AND THE APPROACHES TO SANTA FE: A STUDY OF AMERICAN 
POLICY RELATIVE TO THE SPANISH SOUTHWEST, 1800 - 1819 
APPROVED: 
Supervising Professor 
APPROVED: 
